Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, insured under two-long term disability plans, sued the Plans when Unum decided to deduct his Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefit as deductible income under each plan, resulting in what he termed a "double offset." Because the court held that Unum's decision was not an abuse of discretion, that the plain language of the Plans permitted the deduction of the SSDI benefit from each plan, and that plaintiff was not entitled to equitable estoppel, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plans. View "Renfro v. The Funky Door Long Term Disability Plan, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that defendant owed it mineral royalty payments pursuant to an area-of-interest provision contained in a 1979 agreement. The court certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court: (1) Under Nevada law, does the Rule Against Perpetuities apply to an area-of-interest provision in a commercial agreement? and (2) If the Rule Against Perpetuities did apply, is reformation available under Nevada Revised Statute 111.1039(2)? All further proceedings in the case were stayed pending receipt of the answer from the Nevada Supreme Court.

Plaintiff brought suit against Deerbrook for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by Deerbrook's insured and after plaintiff received a judgment against the insured, the insured assigned his bad faith claim to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Deerbrook breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured when Deerbrook did not attempt to reach a settlement of plaintiff's claims after the insured's liability in excess of the policy limit became reasonably clear. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's rejection of his request to instruct the jury that it could consider Deerbrook's failure to effectuate a settlement in determining whether Deerbrook breached the implied covenant. The court concluded that plaintiff's proposed jury instruction was consistent with the law but that there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs, employees at a defense plant in Arizona, collectively bargained for the right to receive employer-provided healthcare coverage after they retired. At issue was whether those employees, now retirees, were contractually entitled to receive premium-free healthcare coverage until age 65, or whether the contracts on which the retirees relied as providing that entitlement allowed their prior employer to start charging them for their insurance. The court held that Raytheon expressly agreed to provide 100% company-paid healthcare coverage for eligible retirees; that Raytheon's obligation survived the expectation of the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs); and that Raytheon's agreed-upon obligation could not be unilaterally abrogated by Raytheon, regardless of the rights Raytheon reserved for itself in Plan documents, because the CBAs did not incorporate the Plans' reservation-of-rights provisions with respect to employer contribution issues, as opposed to issues relating to the provision of monetary or in kind benefits for particular medical services. The court further held that the district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs' claim for punitive and extra-contractual damages.

When a dispute arose regarding certain services Janice Karman, plaintiff, provided in connection with the movie, "Alvin and the Chipmunks, The Squeakquel," plaintiffs (Karman and Bagdasarian Productions) filed this action. Fox moved to stay the case and to refer the dispute to a referee as the parties' Purchase/Producer Agreement-Literary Material provided. The district court granted the motion and plaintiffs brought this interlocutory appeal to contest the reference. The court concluded that the district court's order was not final, plaintiffs have not been put "out of court" by the order, and the collateral order doctrine was inapplicable because the decision to refer could be reviewed and, if incorrect, later remedied by the court. As such, the appeal was premature and the court lacked jurisdiction over it under 28 U.S.C. 1291.

This case arose when R&R sued the Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, a subsidiary of AIG, for breach of contract, unfair competition, and tortious bad faith denial of an insurance claim to recover damages from a wildfire. In Case No. 10-55115, R&R appealed from the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on its bad faith tort claim. In Case No. 10-55888, R&R appealed from the district court's grant of costs in favor of AIG. The court reversed the district court's grant of judgment in AIG's favor on R&R's bad faith tort claim after addressing the disclosure requirements of Rules 26(a) and 26(e), as well as exclusion of the invoices at issue under Rule 37(c)(1). Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court's reversal of the district court's judgment on R&R's claims necessitated reversal of the district court's award of costs as well.

Plaintiffs, current and former customers of AT&T, filed a class action against AT&T, alleging unjust enrichment and and breach of contract. AT&T responded by seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in its contracts with plaintiffs. The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on state-law unconscionability grounds, relying primarily on the agreement's class-action waiver provision. The court reversed the district court's substantive unconscionability ruling where the FAA preempted the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver. The court remanded for further proceedings related to plaintiffs' procedural unconscionability claims for the district court to apply Washington choice-of-law rules.

This case arose out of a dispute between two telecommunications carriers over their interconnection agreement (ICA) under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. Plaintiff Western is a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider and Defendant Qwest is a local exchange carrier (LEC). The court concluded that Western has failed to exhaust the prudential requirement that it first present its claim, that Qwest violated its statutory duty to negotiate the ICA in good faith, to the Public Utility Commission (PUC) before bringing that claim in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing that claim. The court also concluded that the ICA's provision (1) requiring Western to interconnect with Qwest's network via at least one point per Local Access and Transport Area (LATA); and (2) providing Western with the signaling systems of its choice only where such systems were available, did not violate the Act. However, the court concluded that the ICA, as approved, did violate the Act insofar as it applied to access charges, rather than reciprocal compensation, to calls exchanged between a CMRS provider and a LEC, originating and terminating in the same LATA, when those calls were carried by an interexchange carrier (IXC). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision upholding the PUC's approval of the ICA to that extent, and remanded to the PUC for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, the former in-house counsel for Toyota Motor Corp. (TMS), presented TMS with a claim asserting, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge related to TMS's alleged unethical discovery practices. TMS and plaintiff settled the claims and entered into a Severance Agreement. TMS subsequently sued in state superior court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permanent injunctive relieve to prevent plaintiff from violating the attorney-client privilege and plaintiff filed a cross complaint for a TRO and a permanent injunction prohibiting TMS from interfering with his business practices and those of his consulting business. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., governed the Severance Agreement; the FAA authorized limited review of the Final Award; and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing the Severance Agreement where the arbitrator's writing was sufficient under the terms of the Severance Agreement and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard California law in addressing plaintiff's affirmative defenses. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's contempt motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case arose from a landlord-tenant dispute in the wake of the WaMu failure in September 2008. GE alleged that Chase failed to pay rent on two properties under lease agreements that Chase assumed after it purchased WaMu's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to terms of a written Purchase & Assumption Agreement (P&A Agreement). GE filed suit against Chase alleging breach of the lease agreements and the district court granted Chase's motion to dismiss GE's complaint on the grounds that GE lacked standing to enforce or interpret the terms of the P&A Agreement. The court held that because GE was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the P&A Agreement, GE had no enforceable rights under that contract. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.