Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, employees at a defense plant in Arizona, collectively bargained for the right to receive employer-provided healthcare coverage after they retired. At issue was whether those employees, now retirees, were contractually entitled to receive premium-free healthcare coverage until age 65, or whether the contracts on which the retirees relied as providing that entitlement allowed their prior employer to start charging them for their insurance. The court held that Raytheon expressly agreed to provide 100% company-paid healthcare coverage for eligible retirees; that Raytheon's obligation survived the expectation of the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs); and that Raytheon's agreed-upon obligation could not be unilaterally abrogated by Raytheon, regardless of the rights Raytheon reserved for itself in Plan documents, because the CBAs did not incorporate the Plans' reservation-of-rights provisions with respect to employer contribution issues, as opposed to issues relating to the provision of monetary or in kind benefits for particular medical services. The court further held that the district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs' claim for punitive and extra-contractual damages.

When a dispute arose regarding certain services Janice Karman, plaintiff, provided in connection with the movie, "Alvin and the Chipmunks, The Squeakquel," plaintiffs (Karman and Bagdasarian Productions) filed this action. Fox moved to stay the case and to refer the dispute to a referee as the parties' Purchase/Producer Agreement-Literary Material provided. The district court granted the motion and plaintiffs brought this interlocutory appeal to contest the reference. The court concluded that the district court's order was not final, plaintiffs have not been put "out of court" by the order, and the collateral order doctrine was inapplicable because the decision to refer could be reviewed and, if incorrect, later remedied by the court. As such, the appeal was premature and the court lacked jurisdiction over it under 28 U.S.C. 1291.

This case arose when R&R sued the Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, a subsidiary of AIG, for breach of contract, unfair competition, and tortious bad faith denial of an insurance claim to recover damages from a wildfire. In Case No. 10-55115, R&R appealed from the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on its bad faith tort claim. In Case No. 10-55888, R&R appealed from the district court's grant of costs in favor of AIG. The court reversed the district court's grant of judgment in AIG's favor on R&R's bad faith tort claim after addressing the disclosure requirements of Rules 26(a) and 26(e), as well as exclusion of the invoices at issue under Rule 37(c)(1). Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court's reversal of the district court's judgment on R&R's claims necessitated reversal of the district court's award of costs as well.

Plaintiffs, current and former customers of AT&T, filed a class action against AT&T, alleging unjust enrichment and and breach of contract. AT&T responded by seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in its contracts with plaintiffs. The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on state-law unconscionability grounds, relying primarily on the agreement's class-action waiver provision. The court reversed the district court's substantive unconscionability ruling where the FAA preempted the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver. The court remanded for further proceedings related to plaintiffs' procedural unconscionability claims for the district court to apply Washington choice-of-law rules.

This case arose out of a dispute between two telecommunications carriers over their interconnection agreement (ICA) under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. Plaintiff Western is a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider and Defendant Qwest is a local exchange carrier (LEC). The court concluded that Western has failed to exhaust the prudential requirement that it first present its claim, that Qwest violated its statutory duty to negotiate the ICA in good faith, to the Public Utility Commission (PUC) before bringing that claim in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing that claim. The court also concluded that the ICA's provision (1) requiring Western to interconnect with Qwest's network via at least one point per Local Access and Transport Area (LATA); and (2) providing Western with the signaling systems of its choice only where such systems were available, did not violate the Act. However, the court concluded that the ICA, as approved, did violate the Act insofar as it applied to access charges, rather than reciprocal compensation, to calls exchanged between a CMRS provider and a LEC, originating and terminating in the same LATA, when those calls were carried by an interexchange carrier (IXC). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision upholding the PUC's approval of the ICA to that extent, and remanded to the PUC for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, the former in-house counsel for Toyota Motor Corp. (TMS), presented TMS with a claim asserting, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge related to TMS's alleged unethical discovery practices. TMS and plaintiff settled the claims and entered into a Severance Agreement. TMS subsequently sued in state superior court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permanent injunctive relieve to prevent plaintiff from violating the attorney-client privilege and plaintiff filed a cross complaint for a TRO and a permanent injunction prohibiting TMS from interfering with his business practices and those of his consulting business. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., governed the Severance Agreement; the FAA authorized limited review of the Final Award; and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing the Severance Agreement where the arbitrator's writing was sufficient under the terms of the Severance Agreement and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard California law in addressing plaintiff's affirmative defenses. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's contempt motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case arose from a landlord-tenant dispute in the wake of the WaMu failure in September 2008. GE alleged that Chase failed to pay rent on two properties under lease agreements that Chase assumed after it purchased WaMu's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to terms of a written Purchase & Assumption Agreement (P&A Agreement). GE filed suit against Chase alleging breach of the lease agreements and the district court granted Chase's motion to dismiss GE's complaint on the grounds that GE lacked standing to enforce or interpret the terms of the P&A Agreement. The court held that because GE was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the P&A Agreement, GE had no enforceable rights under that contract. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This appeal involved Continental's pursuit of a breach of contract claim against Thorpe in Thorpe's Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying Continental's motion to compel arbitration and disallowing its claim. The court held that the bankruptcy court had discretion not to enforce the arbitration clause at issue and that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to compel arbitration. The court also held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Continental further opportunity for discovery and Thorpe could not contract away its right to avail itself of the protections of 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the lower courts correctly disallowed Continental's claim.

The district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization under 11 U.S.C. 524(g), a special provision for the reorganization of companies facing substantial asbestos-related liability. Appellants were several insurance companies that did not reach settlements with Thorpe and Pacific, together with Debtors in bankruptcy court, and who were denied standing to challenge the reorganization plan. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the plan preempted appellants' state law contract rights; disagreed with the position of Debtors that the appeal was equitably moot; and in reaching the merits, reversed the district court's conclusion that appellants lacked standing. The court remanded to the district court with instructions that it return the case to the bankruptcy court to give appellants the opportunity to present their proof and argument.

This appeal concerned the maintenance of a suit for rescission under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., by plaintiffs Kenneth Weiss and his wholly-owned corporation. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims and awarded defendants attorneys' fees. The court held that a plaintiff suing under section 10(b) seeking rescission must demonstrate economic loss and that the misrepresentation or fraud conduct caused the loss. The court found that the record revealed that rescission was not feasible in the instant case. Yet employing a rescissionary measure of damages, Weiss would be able to convince the finder of fact that he was entitled to relief. On that basis, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment of Weiss's federal and state securities claims and remanded for consideration under a rescissionary measure of damages. With respect to the statue of limitations issue, the court remanded for consideration in light of Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on Weiss's state law claims of common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, mutual mistake, and unjust enrichment. The court vacated the district court's attorneys' fee award and dismissed the appeal of this award as moot.