Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit against Toyota when the new car that she leased developed mechanical problems during the warranty period and Toyota failed to repair them to her satisfaction. In addition to several California state law claims, she alleged breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq. The district court granted Toyota's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff did not, before filing suit in civil court, pursue her claims through the California Dispute Settlement Program (CDSP) that Toyota maintained and specified in its warranty. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that her failure to initially resort to the CDSP provided Toyota an affirmative defense to her warranty claims under the MMWA, but did not defeat subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the prerequisite in section 2310(a) of the MMWA that a "consumer may not commence a civil action... unless he initially resorts to [an informal dispute settlement procedure]" was merely a codification of the MMWA's exhaustion requirement and did not operate as a jurisdictional bar. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded so that the district court could consider how to proceed with the instant action, including the failure-to-exhaust issues.

Chevron, the franchisor, brought suit for declaratory judgment against one of its franchised dealers, M&M Petroleum Services, Inc. M&M responded with a counterclaim of its own, a counterclaim that was not only found to be frivolous, but the product of perjury and other misconduct. The court held that had M&M merely defended Chevron's suit, it could not have been held liable for attorneys' fees. The court held, however, that in affirmatively bringing a counterclaim that was reasonably found to be frivilous, M&M opened itself up to liability for attorneys' fees under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2805(d)(3). Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that Chevron was eligible to recover attorneys' fees, nor did the district court abuse its discretion in determining that M&M's counterclaim was frivolous and awarding attorneys' fees to Chevron under section 2805(d)(3).

This dispute emerged from state and federal litigation over liability for damages and defense costs in certain environmental tort suits. At issue was an action for damages that appellants brought in federal court and a declaratory judgment action that appellee brought in state court, which appellants later removed to federal court. The district court dismissed the former and remanded the latter in light of a related third action that had been pending for several years in state court. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that the parties' claims should be resolved in a more comprehensive action (Vulcan Action). The court also held that the district court had discretion under Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. and Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am. to remand the removed action. The court further held that the district court's concerns about piecemeal litigation and interfering with the progress made in the Vulcan Action supported dismissal under Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case originated with a misunderstanding regarding a $645 charge on the credit card bill of appellant. Chase Bank misidentified the basis for the charge but failed to respond to appellant's requests for information about it. After unsuccessfully attempting to get response from Chase Bank, appellant and his wife filed this action, alleging, inter alia, claims under the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), 15 U.S.C. 1666-1666j and Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act (UDCPA), Or. Rev. Stat. 646.639-643. The court held that the trial court erred in holding that appellant failed to state a claim under the UDCPA. The court declined to certify appellant's proposed question to the Oregon Supreme Court regarding this claim because existing state precedent guided the court's decision. As to the FCBA claims, the trial court erred in requiring evidence of detrimental reliance to support actual damages and in limiting statutory damages for Chase Bank's multiple violations of the FCBA to a single recovery. Finally, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying any award of attorneys' fees related to appellant's successful claim under the FCBA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

These consolidated cases arose out of a 2007 labor dispute between the Painters Union and Nevada contractors over whether the Union's card check established its majority status under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), thereby requiring the contractors to bargain with the Union pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. One set of cases arose from the Union's charges before the NLRB that the contractors failed to bargain in good faith during the following card check. The other case arose from the district court, where the Union sought an order to arbitrate whether the card check established the Union's majority status under the terms of the CBA. In the petitions for review from the NLRB's decision, the court enforced the NLRB's order, and denied the Union's and Flooring Solutions' petitions for review. In the appeal from the district court, the court held that the dispute over whether the Union established majority status pursuant to the CBA's card check provision was primarily contractual and subject to arbitration. Therefore, the court withdrew its prior decision and replaced it with this opinion reversing the district court's order denying arbitration. The court remanded for the district court to order all parties to arbitrate whether, under the CBA's card check provision, the Union established majority status.

WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl (WPP) appealed from the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant and cross-appellants cross-appealed the district court's decision to dismiss some of WPP's claims without prejudice. WPP generally alleged violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78(a), that amidst large operating losses unknown to investors, Spot Runner executives solicited WPP to buy shares in it at the same time that executives of the company were selling personally owned shares. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) fraudulent scheme against all of the defendants, the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(b) fraudulent omissions claim against the general counsel for Spot Runner and Spot Runner, and the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5 insider trading claim against Spot Runner. The court reversed the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(b) omission claims against the founders of Spot Runner.

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, brought an action against Chase, alleging that it increased his interest rates retroactively to the beginning of this payment cycle after his account was closed to new transactions as a result of a late payment to Chase or another creditor. The court had previously issued an opinion reversing the district court's dismissal of most of plaintiff's federal and state claims. However, Chase sought Supreme Court review of the court's decision and the Supreme Court reversed with respect to the federal claim and remanded for further proceedings. Consequently, the court withdrew its prior opinion and, consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling, affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's first cause of action under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1615, for failure to notify of rate increase, as well as plaintiff's sixth cause of action for breach of contract for failure to notify him "of any change if required by applicable law." Although the Supreme Court's decision did not specifically address the court's ruling on plaintiff's state law claims, the court held: as Delaware law permitted the actions taken by Chase, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's second, third, and fourth state law causes of action were foreclosed; plaintiff's fifth cause of action failed to state a claim for consumer fraud under 6 Del. C. 2513(a); and plaintiff's seventh cause of action failed to state a claim for breach of an implied duty of good faith. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in Nevada state court against his employer, alleging that the employer failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees overtime and minimum wages, listing causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b), under Nevada labor laws, and for breach of contract. At issue was whether a rejected offer of judgment for the full amount of a putative class representative's individual claim mooted a class action complaint where the offer preceded the filing of a motion for class certification. The court held that where a defendant made an unacceptable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfied a named plaintiff's individual claim before the named plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, the offer did not moot the case so long as the named plaintiff could still file a timely motion for class certification. Once filed, a timely motion for class certification related back to the time of the filing of the complaint. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that plaintiff could no longer file a timely motion of class certification; that it erred in refusing to allow plaintiff to abandon his FLSA claims; and that it erred in holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.100 abrogated plaintiff's breach of contract claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

CollegeSource, Inc. (CollegeSource), a California corporation with its principal place of business in California, sued AcademyOne, Inc. (AcademyOne), a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, in federal district court for the Southern District of California, alleging that AcademyOne misappropriated material from CollegeSource's websites. AcademyOne moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and the district court granted its motion. The court held that AcademyOne was subject to specific personal jurisdiction, but not general personal jurisdiction, in California with respect to CollegeSource's misappropriation claims. Under the doctrine of pendant personal jurisdiction, AcademyOne was also subject to personal jurisdiction in California with respect to the remainder of CollegeSource's claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of CollegeSource's complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of its action against defendant, alleging tort, contract, and state statutory claims and seeking, among other remedies, a constructive trust and declaratory judgment over an oil and gas lease located on allotted land, wherein title to the land was held by the United States in trust for various Indian allottees. At issue was whether the district court had federal jurisdiction. The court held that 28 U.S.C. 1360(b), 28 U.S.C. 1331, and 25 U.S.C. 345 did not grant federal jurisdiction and therefore, plaintiff presented no basis for concluding that the action was within the "limited jurisdiction" of federal courts. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the suit based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court did not need to reach any other issues raised by the parties, including exhaustion of tribal remedies. The court noted, however, that its holding did not preclude plaintiff from seeking relief in Blackfeet Tribal Court.