Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant, a Mexican citizen residing in the United States, traveled to Hawaii in June 2023, where he rented a studio apartment. A suspicious package addressed to a name similar to his arrived at the property owner’s residence. After the owner opened the package and suspected it contained drugs, she turned it over to law enforcement. The package was later confirmed to contain nearly 5 kilograms of a methamphetamine mixture. The defendant was arrested and interviewed, during which he admitted to being recruited to pick up and deliver a package and to wire money linked to drug trafficking, though he claimed not to know the specific type or quantity of drugs involved.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii presided over the trial. A jury convicted the defendant on charges of conspiracy to possess and attempted possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The district court sentenced him to concurrent ten-year prison terms. The defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were improper regarding his knowledge of the drug’s type and quantity, and that religious images and expert testimony admitted at trial were prejudicial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under United States v. Hunt, the government must prove the defendant’s specific intent to possess the particular drug type and quantity to trigger the heightened penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The district court’s jury instruction relieving the government of this burden was not harmless error. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence for attempted possession but not the conviction itself, remanding for resentencing. The court affirmed the convictions, finding that any error in admitting expert testimony about “narco saints” was harmless. The judgment was thus affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "USA V. ALAVEZ" on Justia Law

David Ho-Romero was stopped at the border near San Diego in February 2021, and authorities discovered over 11 kilograms of methamphetamine in his vehicle. He was subsequently indicted for importing methamphetamine. During the investigation, prosecutors called Witness 1, Ho-Romero’s former romantic partner, to testify before a grand jury. After learning of Witness 1’s involvement from his roommate, Ho-Romero contacted Witness 1 and her friend (Witness 2), making statements that the government interpreted as threats. Based on these communications, Ho-Romero was charged with witness tampering but pled guilty only to drug importation, not to tampering. The parties agreed to dismiss the tampering charges in exchange for Ho-Romero stipulating to the admissibility of Witness 1 and Witness 2’s grand jury testimony.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California ordered a presentence report recommending an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Defense counsel objected, arguing Ho-Romero did not willfully obstruct justice. At sentencing, the district court applied the enhancement, interpreting “willfulness” as an objective standard without requiring a finding of specific intent to obstruct justice. The court found only that Ho-Romero’s statements could be understood as threats. With the enhancement, the Guidelines range increased, but the court imposed a downward departure, sentencing Ho-Romero to 60 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Ho-Romero appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo for legal error. The court held that § 3C1.1 requires a finding that the defendant acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice, citing United States v. Lofton as controlling law. The district court erred by not making such a mens rea finding. The Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, requiring proper findings as to Ho-Romero’s conscious purpose to obstruct justice. View "United States v. Ho-Romero" on Justia Law

Bryan Brandenburg remotely participated in divorce proceedings at a courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah. Following the proceedings, Brandenburg sent increasingly hostile emails to court staff, which ultimately escalated to threats of bombing the courthouse and other government and educational institutions, as well as various targets elsewhere. His threats prompted extensive security responses at the courthouse, including enhanced screenings, patrols, surveillance reviews, and coordination with law enforcement. Additionally, threats to journalists led to security measures at the University of Utah and Hall Labs, including evacuations, sweeps, and diversion of law enforcement resources during significant campus events.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii presided over Brandenburg’s criminal trial. A jury convicted him of transmitting threats in interstate commerce and making threats or false statements about explosives. At sentencing, the government requested a sentencing enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A), arguing that Brandenburg’s actions caused a substantial disruption of governmental functions. The district court agreed, finding that the courthouse security staff’s extensive response constituted such a disruption, and imposed the enhancement. Brandenburg appealed both his conviction and the sentencing enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a non-public-facing security response to a threat can qualify as a substantial disruption of governmental functions under § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A). The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court properly evaluated the scope and duration of the disruption and did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the sentencing enhancement for substantial disruption of governmental functions. View "USA V. BRANDENBURG" on Justia Law

Paul Engstrom pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and money laundering conspiracy, admitting to involvement in distributing 500 grams or more of cocaine—an offense carrying a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. In his plea agreement, Engstrom acknowledged he was ineligible for safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and agreed not to seek such relief. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, the court imposed a 70-month sentence, below the guideline range but above the statutory minimum, citing Engstrom’s difficult pretrial detention and his coconspirators’ similar sentences.Following sentencing, the district court held a resentencing hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, aiming to correct a perceived technical error in considering the mandatory minimum after granting Engstrom safety valve relief. The court concluded that Engstrom was eligible for safety valve relief, finding that his statements in open court were sufficient, and imposed a 46-month sentence, below the statutory minimum. The government moved for reconsideration, arguing Engstrom had not satisfied the statutory debrief requirement and was ineligible under the Supreme Court’s decision in Pulsifer v. United States, issued during the appeal, which interpreted § 3553(f)(1) to preclude safety valve relief if any one of three criminal history criteria applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s resentencing decision for plain error and found no error in holding the Rule 35 hearing. However, the Ninth Circuit held that Engstrom was not eligible for safety valve relief because he did not provide a complete debrief to the government as required by § 3553(f)(5), and, under Pulsifer, his prior three-point conviction categorically precluded relief. The court reversed the district court, vacated Engstrom’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing without safety valve relief. View "USA V. ENGSTROM" on Justia Law

After Volkswagen AG became the subject of a criminal investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for its use of defeat device software to evade emissions standards—a scandal widely known as “Dieselgate”—the company agreed to a plea deal with the DOJ. As part of the investigation, Volkswagen, through its law firm Jones Day, produced approximately six million documents to federal prosecutors in response to a grand jury subpoena. Lawrence Kalbers, a university professor, subsequently filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking all documents Volkswagen provided to the DOJ during the investigation, specifically referencing materials described in Volkswagen’s 2017 Annual Report.The DOJ denied the FOIA request, citing exemptions for law enforcement records and information protected by statute, including Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which safeguards grand jury materials. Kalbers challenged this denial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court ordered the DOJ to produce all responsive documents and a Vaughn index, later appointing a special master due to the volume of records. The special master recommended disclosure, reasoning the documents did not clearly reveal grand jury deliberations. The district court overruled DOJ and Volkswagen’s objections and ordered disclosure, prompting both parties to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that nearly all the requested documents are exempt from FOIA disclosure under Exemption 3 because they were obtained solely via a grand jury subpoena and their release would reveal matters occurring before the grand jury, thus compromising grand jury secrecy protected by Rule 6(e). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order requiring disclosure of these documents, but vacated and remanded as to four documents not marked as grand jury materials, instructing further review to determine their status. View "Kalbers v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in California of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of a homeowner during a burglary in 1985. The prosecution established that the defendant entered the victim’s home, stole property, and shot the victim in the back as he was fleeing. The case against the defendant was supported by fingerprint evidence, eyewitnesses, and testimony about his actions and statements before and after the crime. At trial, the defense argued alternative theories, including that another individual was the actual killer and that the shooting lacked intent. During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of the defendant’s prior felonies, while the defense offered extensive mitigating evidence regarding his abusive childhood and mental health issues.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction and death sentence. The defendant subsequently filed state and federal habeas petitions, raising claims about his competency to stand trial, the effectiveness of his counsel, and alleged jury coercion. The California Supreme Court summarily denied these claims, and the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied his federal habeas petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying the deferential standard required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court held that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded the evidence did not sufficiently support the defendant’s claims of incompetence or ineffective assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit also found no basis to conclude the trial court coerced the jury’s verdict or that California’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Beeler v. Broomfield" on Justia Law

Border Patrol agents observed a suspicious vehicle near the U.S.-Mexico border in Southern California. After the driver, Alex Ruiz, failed to stop for marked Border Patrol units, agents deployed spike strips and eventually apprehended him. Nearby, four individuals without legal immigration status were found hiding. Evidence at trial established that Ruiz transported these individuals, and a co-defendant testified to having coordinated the pickup with Ruiz.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over Ruiz’s trial. The government introduced a prior conviction Ruiz had for transporting illegal aliens, redacting prejudicial details. Ruiz objected, arguing its admission was improper under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that it was unconstitutional. The district court admitted the prior conviction to show knowledge and lack of mistake, provided limiting instructions to the jury, and took further steps to minimize prejudice, such as not allowing the documents into the jury room during deliberations. The jury convicted Ruiz on all counts, and he was sentenced to thirty-three months in prison and three years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Ruiz’s prior conviction under Rule 404(b) and whether its probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. The court held the prior conviction was properly admitted to prove knowledge, was not too remote in time, was supported by sufficient evidence, and was sufficiently similar to the charged conduct. The appellate court also found that any prejudice did not substantially outweigh the conviction’s probative value and that Ruiz waived his constitutional arguments by not raising them below. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. RUIZ" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani founded Theranos, a company that claimed its technology could run fast, accurate, and affordable blood tests using just a drop of blood. Holmes served as CEO, and Balwani as President and COO. They raised significant investments by making representations about the capabilities of Theranos’s proprietary devices, financial health, and business relationships. However, investigations revealed that the technology was unreliable, Theranos often relied on third-party devices, and its partnerships and finances were misrepresented to investors. Both Holmes and Balwani were indicted for conspiracy and wire fraud relating to investors and patients; they were tried separately, and each was convicted of multiple counts of fraud.Proceedings were held before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Holmes was convicted on four investor-related counts, while Balwani was convicted on all counts, including those related to patients and investors. At sentencing, both were found responsible for losses to multiple victims and given lengthy prison terms. The district court also ordered them to pay $452 million in restitution to fourteen victims, finding that the money invested constituted the lost property.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution order. The panel held that while some testimony by former Theranos employees should have been treated as expert opinion under Rule 702, any error was harmless. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting a regulatory report, limiting cross-examination, or excluding certain hearsay statements. It rejected arguments of constructive amendment and Napue violations. The panel clarified restitution calculations under the MVRA, holding that the victims’ actual losses equaled their total investments, affirming the district court’s order. View "United States v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Michelle Rodriguez was arrested after South Pasadena police discovered her in possession of a significant quantity of stolen mail and financial information, including 140 pieces of mail from 110 victims, 19 checks, multiple bank account and social security numbers, credit and debit cards, and two California driver’s licenses. The driver’s licenses were found among the stolen mail and other items in her backpack and a bag in the vehicle. Rodriguez admitted she was seeking mail and acknowledged possession of the items.The United States District Court for the Central District of California charged Rodriguez with three offenses: possession of stolen mail, possession of at least 15 unauthorized access devices, and aggravated identity theft. Rodriguez ultimately pled guilty to possession of unauthorized access devices under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), with the government agreeing to drop the other charges. At sentencing, the Probation Office calculated her Guidelines range, applying enhancements for number of victims and possession of authentication features, specifically the two California driver’s licenses. Rodriguez objected to the authentication feature enhancement, arguing it should require proof that she knowingly possessed such features with intent to defraud.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its application for abuse of discretion. The Court held that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) applies based on simple possession of an authentication feature and does not require proof of mens rea or intent to defraud. The enhancement was properly applied to Rodriguez’s sentence, as she conceded possession of the driver’s licenses with authentication features. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law. At sentencing, he received a prison term of 151 months, followed by three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment, stating they were “due immediately.” However, given the defendant’s indigency, the court established a payment schedule requiring him to make minimal payments while incarcerated and while on supervised release, including participation in the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.After judgment was entered reflecting both the immediate due date and the payment plan, the government sent a letter demanding immediate payment but also referencing the payment schedule. The defendant appealed, arguing that under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1), the court could either require the penalties to be due immediately or set a payment schedule, but not both simultaneously. He sought vacatur of the monetary penalties and resentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo. The court held that the district court did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) by declaring the penalties due immediately while also establishing a payment plan. The Ninth Circuit explained that the statute’s language and relevant precedent allow for the entire monetary obligation to be due immediately, with a payment schedule set in recognition of the defendant’s financial circumstances. The holding is consistent with similar approaches adopted by other circuits in analogous situations. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. PATRICK" on Justia Law