Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man was convicted in California of forcible rape, false imprisonment by menace or violence, and corporal injury on a cohabitant after he assaulted his girlfriend. Following his prison sentence, as a Mexican national who had entered the United States unlawfully, he was removed from the United States through an expedited process based on his conviction for rape, which was deemed an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. Days later, he illegally reentered the country and was arrested near the border.He was then charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, he moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his state rape conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and thus his removal had been improper. The district court denied his motion. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed for the sake of argument that the defendant met the statutory requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies and deprivation of judicial review. However, it held that he failed to show that his removal was “fundamentally unfair” under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). The court concluded that the California rape statute under which he was convicted was a categorical match to the generic federal definition of rape, which includes rape by non-physical duress. Therefore, his conviction was properly considered an aggravated felony, making his expedited removal lawful. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA V. GONZALEZ-REYES" on Justia Law

Koby Don Williams, a supervisor with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, was charged with attempted online enticement of a minor after engaging in an undercover operation where he believed he was communicating with a thirteen-year-old girl named “Rebecca.” In reality, “Rebecca” was a persona created by law enforcement. Williams exchanged nearly 100 texts and several phone calls, during which “Rebecca” repeatedly stated her age. Williams negotiated sexual acts and payment, offered to travel with “Rebecca,” and ultimately arranged a meeting, bringing cash, alcohol, and generic Viagra. When arrested, Williams claimed he was conducting a human trafficking investigation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over Williams’s trial. Williams’s primary defense was that he never believed “Rebecca” was a minor, asserting that he thought he was communicating with an adult. He filed pretrial motions to suppress or authenticate the decoy advertisement and, after conviction, moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and statutory misinterpretation. The district court denied these motions. At sentencing, the court imposed a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, based on Williams’s alleged perjury, without making specific factual findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), rejecting Williams’s argument that the statute required proof he attempted to “transform or overcome the will” of a minor. The Ninth Circuit also found no plain error in the government’s failure to produce the original decoy advertisement. However, the court vacated Williams’s sentence, concluding the district court erred by not making explicit findings required to support the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, and remanded for resentencing. The conviction was affirmed. View "USA V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man convicted of the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter in Arizona. He was found guilty by a jury and subsequently sentenced to death by a judge. The sentencing judge identified multiple aggravating factors, including the especially cruel nature of the crimes, multiple victims, and prior violent felonies. The judge also found statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors, such as the defendant’s impaired capacity, troubled childhood, and psychological issues. After his conviction and sentencing were affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme Court, the defendant sought postconviction relief in state court through three separate petitions. His first petition did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim and was handled by counsel later conceded to be ineffective. A second petition, raising the IAC claim, was denied as untimely. A third petition argued he was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution, but that claim was rejected after an evidentiary hearing.In federal court, the petitioner’s IAC claim was initially deemed procedurally defaulted by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Subsequent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions, including Martinez v. Ryan, allowed for the possibility that ineffective postconviction counsel could excuse such defaults. The Ninth Circuit originally remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal courts may not expand the state court record based on ineffective state postconviction counsel.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered only evidence properly submitted in state court under procedural rules. The Ninth Circuit found the petitioner demonstrated “cause” to excuse the procedural default but failed to show “prejudice,” as his underlying IAC claim was not “substantial.” Although counsel’s performance was deficient, the new mitigating evidence was unlikely to have changed the sentencing outcome, given the weight of aggravating factors and Arizona precedent. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "RAMIREZ V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident that occurred at Lake Mead, where Bryce Tyrone Verhonich operated a jet ski with a passenger, Lily Hatcher, in the early morning hours. After taking a detour to view the sunrise, both Verhonich and Hatcher fell into the water under rough conditions. Verhonich, who was not wearing a life jacket or engine cut-off lanyard, was rescued, but Hatcher drowned. Subsequent investigation revealed that neither individual was wearing a personal flotation device and the engine cut-off switch lanyard was not attached to Verhonich. Surveillance and body camera footage confirmed these facts. Hatcher’s body was later recovered, and an autopsy found drowning as the cause of death, with drugs as contributing factors.The case was first tried before a United States magistrate judge, who found Verhonich guilty of negligent operation of a vessel, failure to wear a personal flotation device, and failure to attach the engine cut-off switch lanyard—all in violation of National Park Service regulations. The magistrate judge sentenced him to six months in custody and two years of probation. Verhonich appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing improper admission of evidence, insufficient evidence for conviction on negligent operation, and sentencing error. The district court affirmed the convictions and sentence.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that failure to wear a life jacket and failure to attach a safety lanyard may both be considered in determining negligent operation under 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(b)(8). The court found sufficient evidence to support Verhonich’s conviction, determined that evidentiary objections did not survive plain error review, and upheld the sentence as reasonable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. VERHONICH" on Justia Law

A woman born in Soviet Armenia immigrated to the United States as a child and was later convicted of grand theft in California. In 2011, she was ordered removed based on this conviction. However, because Armenia did not accept individuals born during the Soviet era, she was considered “stateless” and not deported. She lived in the United States under supervision, checking in annually with immigration authorities. In 2018, she was informed that Armenia had begun accepting such individuals, which placed her at immediate risk of removal. She promptly retained counsel, who identified grounds to vacate her conviction due to a procedural defect, and the conviction was vacated in May 2019.Following the vacatur, she filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings, but the Immigration Judge denied it, finding she had not explained why she waited over two years after the relevant California statute became effective to seek vacatur. She then filed a second motion to reopen, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel in the first motion failed to present facts or arguments about her diligence. The Immigration Judge denied the second motion as number-barred, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal, finding she had not demonstrated due diligence and thus was not entitled to equitable tolling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA applied the wrong standard in assessing diligence for stateless individuals. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it is reasonable for someone in her position to begin challenging removability only upon learning they are at risk of removal. The court found she acted with due diligence after learning of her removability and that the BIA abused its discretion in finding otherwise. The court granted her petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "ESKILIAN V. BONDI" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual convicted of two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, stemming from a 2018 indictment related to the sale of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court classified him as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior convictions: one federal conviction for distribution of cocaine and one Nevada state conviction for the sale of controlled substances under Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321(1)(a). This classification resulted in a higher sentencing range, and he ultimately received a sentence of 235 months, substantially longer than a similarly situated co-defendant.After his direct appeal was unsuccessful, he filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, arguing that his prior Nevada conviction was not a qualifying “controlled substance offense” for the purposes of the career offender enhancement. The district court held that this claim was procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal, and alternatively found that the prior conviction did qualify as a predicate offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that there was cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default, finding that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the career offender enhancement, and that this failure prejudiced the outcome. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit determined that the relevant Nevada statute is indivisible and overbroad, and therefore, his conviction under that statute cannot serve as a predicate offense for career offender status under the Guidelines. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 2255 motion and remanded for resentencing. View "USA V. CASILDO" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2024 to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the government sought an increased base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which applies if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The defendant conceded that a previous conviction for third-degree assault in Oregon counted as one predicate crime of violence, but contested whether his 2021 Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualified as a second predicate.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon concluded that attempted first-degree assault under Oregon law does qualify as a crime of violence and increased the defendant’s base offense level accordingly. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months and sentenced the defendant to 80 months’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the attempt statute in Oregon is broader than the federal definition of attempt and should not qualify under the “force clause” of the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying its precedent, the court held that the “attempted use” of physical force, as required by the force clause in the Sentencing Guidelines, means taking a substantial step toward the use of physical force. Because Oregon law requires a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury for a conviction of attempted first-degree assault, the Ninth Circuit concluded that such a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected the argument that a narrower “probable desistance” test should apply and affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. CHAVEZ-ECHEVERRIA" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempting to kidnap a federal officer and assaulting a family member of a federal official. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the court heard arguments from counsel for both the defense and the government, but did not ask the defendant if he wished to speak personally before sentencing—a procedural requirement known as allocution, mandated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.Shortly after imposing concurrent maximum sentences for both counts, the government realized the allocution right had been overlooked and promptly moved to reopen sentencing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which allows correction of “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days of sentencing. The district court granted the government’s motion over the defendant’s objection, vacated the original sentence, and set a new sentencing hearing. At the subsequent hearing, the defendant was allowed to address the court and allocute. The district court then reimposed the same sentences as before.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court had the authority to correct its failure to afford allocution by reopening sentencing under Rule 35(a). The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to allow a defendant the right to allocute under Rule 32 constitutes “other clear error” correctable under Rule 35(a). The court concluded that resentencing after a belated allocution is permissible under Rule 35(a), even if it requires the exercise of judicial discretion. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. DEPAPE" on Justia Law

In this case, law enforcement learned from a confidential informant that Christian Ferrari was manufacturing and selling privately made firearms, commonly called “ghost guns,” without the required federal license or serial numbers, making the weapons untraceable. Between March and May 2023, Ferrari sold 22 unregistered AR-15 style rifles, including 20 short-barreled rifles, to undercover ATF agents in four separate cash transactions. During these sales, Ferrari failed to ask for or provide paperwork, complete background checks, or exchange identification. The agents told Ferrari that the guns were intended for use in protecting marijuana grows in Northern California and for transport to Mexico.Ferrari was charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California and pled guilty to four counts of willfully dealing firearms without a license. The Presentence Investigation Report recommended a sentencing enhancement for firearms trafficking under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), based on Ferrari having “reason to believe” the guns would be used unlawfully. Ferrari objected, arguing there was no evidence he believed the agents were unlawful possessors or would use the guns unlawfully. The district court overruled his objection, finding the totality of circumstances gave Ferrari reason to believe in unlawful use, and applied the enhancement, resulting in a 37-month sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Ferrari changed his argument, claiming the Sentencing Guidelines required that the transferee in fact be an unlawful possessor or intend unlawful use. The Ninth Circuit, reviewing de novo, held that Application Note 13 to § 2K2.1(b)(5) does not require that what the defendant had reason to believe was actually true. Because Ferrari did not dispute he had reason to believe the agents were unlawful possessors, the district court correctly applied the enhancement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "USA V. FERRARI" on Justia Law

Three individuals were convicted under a federal law that prohibits those with prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Each had a history of violent conduct against intimate partners, and after their misdemeanor convictions under state law, they were later found in possession of firearms, leading to federal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).Prior to this appeal, each defendant was convicted in a United States District Court—one in the Northern District of California and two in the District of Alaska—of violating § 922(g)(9). The convictions were based on evidence that after their state-level domestic violence misdemeanor convictions, they knowingly possessed firearms. Following their convictions, the defendants appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court applied the framework established by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and concluded that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the appellants’ conduct but that the government demonstrated § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court rejected both the facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, holding that Congress may categorically disarm those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence without individualized findings of future dangerousness. The court further held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to these appellants and affirmed the judgments of conviction. View "USA V. MARTINEZ" on Justia Law