Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Julian Omidi and his business, Surgery Center Management, LLC (SCM), were involved in a fraudulent scheme called "Get Thin," which promised weight loss through Lap-Band surgery and other medical procedures. Omidi and SCM defrauded insurance companies by submitting false claims for reimbursement, including fabricated patient data and misrepresented physician involvement. The scheme recruited patients through a call center, pushing them towards expensive medical tests and procedures regardless of medical necessity.A grand jury indicted Omidi and SCM for mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and related charges. After extensive pretrial litigation and a lengthy jury trial, both were convicted on all charges. The district court sentenced Omidi to 84 months in prison and fined SCM over $22 million. The government sought forfeiture of nearly $100 million, arguing that all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were derived from fraud. The district court agreed, finding that even proceeds from legitimate procedures were indirectly the result of the fraudulent scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's forfeiture judgment, holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), all proceeds directly or indirectly derived from a health care fraud scheme must be forfeited. The court rejected the argument that only proceeds from fraudulent transactions should be forfeited, noting that the entire business was permeated with fraud. The court concluded that there is no "100% Fraud Rule" in forfeiture cases seeking proceeds of a fraud scheme, and all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were subject to forfeiture. View "United States V. Surgery Center Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Larry Seng In was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after a gun was found in his car during a traffic stop. In moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the officers' actions, particularly handcuffing him, escalated a valid Terry stop into an unlawful de facto arrest because they handcuffed him before having probable cause to believe he was prohibited from possessing the gun.The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who held an evidentiary hearing and recommended denying the motion, concluding that the handcuffing was justified. However, the district court rejected this recommendation and granted In's motion to suppress, holding that the gun was obtained as a result of an unlawful de facto arrest without probable cause. The Government's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the traffic stop did not turn into a de facto arrest. The officers had a sufficient and reasonable basis to fear for their safety, justifying their decision to handcuff In during their investigation. The court noted that the presence of an unsecured gun in the car, In's initial dishonesty about the gun, and the location of the stop near a densely populated area contributed to the reasonableness of the officers' actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order granting the suppression motion and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. IN" on Justia Law

Michael Blake DeFrance was convicted of assaulting his girlfriend in 2013 under Montana Code Annotated section 45-5-206(1)(a), a misdemeanor. In 2018, he was found in possession of three firearms, leading to a federal indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied DeFrance's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the Montana statute could be violated without the use of physical force. DeFrance was subsequently convicted and appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction under Montana's PFMA statute qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The court concluded that because the Montana statute can be violated by inflicting emotional distress rather than physical injury, it does not have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force as required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Consequently, the court held that DeFrance's conviction under the Montana statute does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.The Ninth Circuit reversed DeFrance's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing or other proceedings consistent with their opinion. View "USA V. DEFRANCE" on Justia Law

Joshua Shuemake, a correctional officer, was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a no-contact order following an alleged assault on his former girlfriend. Despite this, he borrowed a handgun from his friend and co-worker, Luke Ulavale, to continue his private security job. The FBI, suspecting non-compliance with the order, searched Shuemake's residence and found two firearms, one of which was registered to Ulavale and had Shuemake's DNA on it. Ulavale initially lied to the FBI, claiming another friend had the gun, but later admitted under oath that he lent it to Shuemake and that they concocted a false story.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington admitted Ulavale's grand jury testimony after he claimed memory loss at trial. Shuemake was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and obstruction of justice. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting Ulavale's grand jury testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under the prior inconsistent statement rule, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), a district court can admit an earlier sworn statement if a witness on the stand contradicts that statement. The court found that dubious claims of memory loss, as shown by inexplicable claims of faulty memory or evasive testimony, may be treated as inconsistencies under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). The court concluded that Ulavale's feigned memory loss made Rule 801(d)(1)(A) applicable and affirmed Shuemake's conviction for obstruction of justice. View "USA V. SHUEMAKE" on Justia Law

Steven Catlin, a California state prisoner, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his 1990 conviction for the murders of his fourth wife, Joyce Catlin, and his adoptive mother, Martha Catlin, as well as his death sentence. Catlin was convicted of murdering three family members with paraquat, a poisonous herbicide. The habeas petition in this case relates to his convictions for the murders of Joyce and Martha and the death sentence for Martha’s murder.The California Supreme Court (CSC) summarily denied Catlin’s first state habeas petition on the merits in 2007 and rejected his second state habeas petition in 2013 as procedurally barred. The district court denied Catlin’s federal habeas petition and his motion for discovery and evidentiary development in 2019, granting a certificate of appealability on several claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Catlin’s claims under the deferential standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Catlin’s habeas petition, concluding that the CSC reasonably rejected Catlin’s claims. The court held that the CSC acted reasonably in rejecting Catlin’s claims of error arising from the state trial judge’s ex parte discussion with a juror, concluding that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of Catlin’s trial, and determining that there was no violation of due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois.The Ninth Circuit also declined to issue a certificate of appealability for Catlin’s uncertified claim that the state violated his due process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence and presenting false evidence. The court found that no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s resolution of this claim. View "CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Vitaliy Chmukh, a native and citizen of Ukraine, came to the United States as a refugee in 2001. In 2017, he was involved in using a stolen vehicle to steal packages from porches, leading to his arrest. He pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle under RCW § 9A.56.068 and possession of heroin under RCW § 69.50.4013. He was sentenced to 43 months for the stolen vehicle charge and 24 months for the controlled substance charge, serving 38 months in total.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Chmukh with removability based on these convictions, alleging that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and that the controlled substance conviction violated the Controlled Substances Act. An immigration judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Chmukh’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it matched the generic federal offense of possession of stolen property, requiring possession, actual knowledge that the property was stolen, and intent to deprive the owner of the property. The court also found that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, barring withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). The court rejected Chmukh’s arguments that the statute was overbroad and that the agency erred in its analysis. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Chmukh’s petition for review. View "CHMUKH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Nathan Wilson and Christopher Beasley were alleged to have set fire to a police car during a protest in Santa Monica, California, following the killing of George Floyd. They were federally indicted on one count of arson. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing they were selectively prosecuted based on perceived anti-government views. Alternatively, they sought discovery on their selective-prosecution claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the motion to dismiss but granted discovery on the selective-prosecution claim. The government indicated it would seek appellate review rather than comply with the discovery order, leading the district court to dismiss the indictment without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which allows for government appeals in criminal cases without requiring final decisions. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by granting discovery based on an erroneous view of the law. The district court had incorrectly defined the control group for determining discriminatory effect, failing to account for relevant factors beyond committing the same crime in the same location.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s selective-prosecution discovery order and the dismissal of the indictment without prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court did not address whether the defendants presented evidence of discriminatory intent. View "USA V. WILSON" on Justia Law

Andrew Hackett, a stock promoter, was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud related to the manipulative trading of a public company's stock. Hackett engaged in a pump-and-dump scheme, promoting the stock of First Harvest (later renamed Arias Intel) and recruiting others to do the same. He used call rooms to solicit investors and artificially inflate the stock price before selling his shares. The scheme was exposed by an FBI informant, leading to Hackett's conviction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Hackett to forty-six months of imprisonment, applying a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) for a loss exceeding $1.5 million. The court calculated an intended loss of $2.2 million based on Hackett's ownership of 550,000 shares and his intent to sell them at four dollars per share. Hackett's counsel objected to the loss calculation but did not argue that intended loss was an improper measure of loss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not plainly err in relying on the guideline commentary defining "loss" as the greater of actual loss or intended loss. The court noted that any error was not clear or obvious given the precedent recognizing both actual and intended loss and the lack of consensus among circuit courts on this issue. The court applied plain error review because Hackett's objection to the loss calculation was not sufficiently specific to preserve de novo review. View "USA V. HACKETT" on Justia Law