Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal agents identified the defendant as the source of fentanyl that caused a fatal overdose in Goleta, California. Their investigation revealed that he had been selling drugs for years, frequently operating from his apartment. A search of the apartment uncovered nearly $13,000 in cash, various tools associated with drug distribution, and significant quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and Alprazolam. The defendant admitted that the cash was proceeds from drug dealing and that a safe in his bedroom was primarily used to store drugs and drug proceeds. His phone also contained substantial evidence indicating his apartment functioned as the center of his drug-trafficking activities.A grand jury indicted the defendant for possession with intent to distribute multiple controlled substances. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Central District of California considered—over defense objection—a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. The defendant argued that his apartment was primarily his residence, not a stash house, and that the enhancement should not apply. The district court found ample evidence that the apartment was used as a place to sell drugs and imposed the enhancement, ultimately sentencing the defendant to 105 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement for abuse of discretion and affirmed the sentence. The court held that the enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) applies when a defendant regularly uses his home for substantial drug trafficking, even if the residence also serves as his primary home. The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that drug trafficking was a primary or principal use of the apartment. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. TEKOLA" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in California state court of first-degree murder, rape, and sodomy arising from the 1988 killing of a woman at an apartment lodge where both lived. On the day of the crime, the man consumed large amounts of alcohol and interacted repeatedly with the victim, ultimately assaulting and killing her in her apartment. Physical evidence and the man’s own detailed post-arrest confessions were central to the prosecution’s case; he admitted to deliberating about ensuring the victim’s death after an initial assault. The defense at trial argued intoxication, but the jury convicted him of first-degree murder and found a special circumstance, leading to a death sentence.After the California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and special circumstances (but reversed a robbery charge), the man pursued state and federal habeas relief. His federal habeas petition alleged, among other things, that the prosecution withheld exculpatory blood-alcohol test results (a Brady claim) and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present additional evidence of intoxication and mental impairment (Strickland claims). The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California initially denied most relief but later set aside the murder conviction and special circumstance finding based on the Brady and Strickland claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. The Ninth Circuit held that under AEDPA’s deferential standards, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that there was insufficient factual support for the existence of undisclosed blood-alcohol test results and that counsel’s alleged failures did not prejudice the defense. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to deny habeas relief as to the convictions and special circumstances, remanding solely for resolution of any remaining penalty-phase claims. View "BRADFORD V. VANG" on Justia Law

The defendant, a person of Mexican descent, worked at a tax preparation business serving Spanish-speaking clients in Boise, Idaho. He was indicted on seven counts of preparing and presenting false and fraudulent tax returns. During jury deliberations, it became undisputed that one juror made racially biased comments about Mexicans. This juror, identified as Juror 5, participated in nearly all deliberations and expressed views suggesting animus toward Mexicans, including remarks about how Mexicans "hate Americans" and allegations connecting the defendant's employer to criminal activity.After the biased statements were reported, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho conducted a special voir dire with all jurors to determine the impact of the comments. Several jurors confirmed hearing the remarks, but most denied being influenced by them. The district court excused Juror 5 for good cause but allowed the remaining eleven jurors to continue deliberations without instructing them to start anew. Thirteen minutes later, the jury returned a partial verdict. The defendant moved for a mistrial and later for a new trial, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated. The district court denied both motions, applying the standard from United States v. Sarkisian, which asks whether exposure to prejudicial comments tainted the verdict.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the proper standard is from United States v. Remmer, which presumes prejudice when juror bias is discovered before a verdict is accepted, and places a heavy burden on the government to prove harmlessness. The court found that the government failed to rebut this presumption, and therefore reversed the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial and remanded for a new trial. View "USA V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law

John Chapman, who has multiple neurodevelopmental disorders, maintained a romantic relationship with Jamie Feden for several years, despite being married to another woman. In 2019, Chapman and Feden traveled together from Pennsylvania to Las Vegas. Prior to and during this period, Chapman conducted online searches related to murder and body disposal. While in Nevada, Chapman took Feden to a remote desert location, restrained her with zip ties and duct tape under the pretense of a bondage photoshoot, and ultimately caused her death by asphyxiation. He left her body in the desert and returned to Pennsylvania, where he used her phone to communicate with her friends and family to conceal her death. After suspicions arose, Chapman was questioned by police and confessed to the crime after being read his Miranda rights.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Chapman’s motion to suppress his confession, finding that he had knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary. During trial, Chapman argued his mental conditions affected his perception and intent. After lengthy deliberations and substantive jury notes indicating a deadlock, the district court gave an Allen charge and made coercive comments to a holdout juror. The jury returned a guilty verdict for kidnapping resulting in death. Chapman’s post-verdict motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated Chapman’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding impermissible jury coercion due to the undisclosed jury notes, the coercive Allen charge, and the court’s direct comments to a holdout juror. The court also held, for the first time in the circuit, that the “holding” element of the federal kidnapping statute can be satisfied by non-physical means such as deception. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress Chapman’s confession. View "USA V. CHAPMAN" on Justia Law

Three defendants, including the petitioner, were convicted in California state court for the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a victim who was forced into a car trunk and subsequently killed. The petitioner, who was 18 at the time, confessed to police after being advised of his Miranda rights. At trial, the judge made several offhand, jocular, and at times insensitive comments, including remarks touching on race, gender, and capital punishment. The petitioner did not testify and raised claims at various points about judicial bias and misconduct, an involuntary confession, invalid Miranda waiver, and the improper admission of codefendants’ statements.After conviction and a death sentence, the petitioner’s direct appeal and two state habeas petitions were denied by the California Supreme Court, which rejected his claims both on the merits and on procedural grounds. The petitioner then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which denied relief. The district court also denied a request to expand the certificate of appealability to include claims regarding his confession and the admission of codefendants’ statements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The court held that the petitioner’s claims of judicial bias and misconduct failed because the trial judge’s comments, while inappropriate, did not demonstrate actual bias or render the trial fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit also declined to expand the certificate of appealability, finding that the petitioner’s claims regarding the voluntariness of his confession, the validity of his Miranda waiver, and any Bruton violation were not debatable among reasonable jurists and that any error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. The denial of habeas relief was affirmed. View "BURNEY V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

A man was convicted by a jury in Arizona of kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder in 1996, and received a death sentence from a judge. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme Court, he sought postconviction relief in state court, but his counsel failed to investigate or present any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) at the sentencing phase. The first postconviction relief (PCR) attorney never met with him and was unaware of the need to investigate sentencing issues. No mitigating evidence or penalty-phase IAC claim was presented to the state courts at that time.The state trial court dismissed his initial PCR petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied further review. He then filed a federal habeas petition, raising, for the first time, claims that his trial and PCR counsel were ineffective at sentencing and arguing that he was ineligible for execution due to intellectual disability. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona found his claims procedurally defaulted because they had not been presented in state court and Arizona law generally bars such successive claims. The district court also found that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel did not excuse the default. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, which allowed ineffective PCR counsel as cause to excuse certain procedural defaults, the case was remanded for further consideration. New mitigating evidence was presented, but subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence (Shinn v. Ramirez) prevented the federal court from considering evidence not first presented to the state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it was not clear whether Arizona courts would find the penalty-phase IAC claim procedurally barred and, applying Rhines v. Weber, granted a stay and abeyance. This allows the petitioner to return to state court to present his unexhausted IAC claim, as the Rhines criteria were satisfied: good cause existed, the claim was potentially meritorious, and there was no intentional delay. The court remanded with instructions to stay federal proceedings pending state court exhaustion of the claim. View "DOERR V. SHINN" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances after he brutally assaulted a woman, set her on fire, and left her to die. The victim survived for ten months before dying from complications related to her injuries. The petitioner had previously pleaded guilty to rape and attempted murder relating to the same incident, but after the victim’s eventual death, he was charged with murder and sentenced to death following a bench trial. His confessions to law enforcement, as well as physical evidence and eyewitness testimony, connected him to the crime.After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the California Supreme Court, the petitioner filed several state habeas petitions, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective in various respects during both the guilt and penalty phases. The California Supreme Court denied relief, often adopting the factual findings of a referee appointed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The referee found trial counsel credible and discounted much of the petitioner’s new evidence as lacking credibility or being recently fabricated. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted relief based on cumulative ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase, finding that trial counsel’s multiple deficiencies prejudiced the petitioner.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the deferential standards required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court had reasonably determined that trial counsel was not deficient in most respects and that any errors did not result in prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remanded for consideration of the petitioner’s remaining claims. View "SCOTT V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Bolandian was convicted of insider trading based on allegations that he traded on nonpublic information regarding the mergers of two companies, information allegedly obtained from a friend, Ashish Aggarwal, who worked at J.P. Morgan. Bolandian executed trades in the stocks of PLX Technologies and ExactTarget before their respective acquisitions, ultimately earning substantial profits. These trades occurred while Aggarwal, though not assigned to the deals, worked in the relevant banking group. The case revolved around whether Aggarwal had improperly shared confidential information, and whether Bolandian knowingly traded on it.Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California severed Aggarwal’s trial from that of Bolandian and another co-defendant, Sadigh, due to the risk of antagonistic defenses. Aggarwal was ultimately acquitted by a jury. Afterward, a superseding indictment charged only Bolandian and Sadigh, and eventually Bolandian alone proceeded to trial. During Bolandian’s trial, a juror (Juror No. 6) expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial due to a family connection to J.P. Morgan. The district court questioned Juror No. 6 briefly, but allowed him to remain on the jury after both parties did not object.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Bolandian’s conviction and focused on the issue of juror bias. The court held that the district court failed in its independent duty to investigate credible allegations of juror bias after Juror No. 6 expressed doubt about his impartiality. The panel concluded that defense counsel’s agreement to keep Juror No. 6 did not waive Bolandian’s right to challenge for bias, as a proper investigation is a prerequisite to waiver. The Ninth Circuit found plain error, vacated Bolandian’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial. View "USA V. BOLANDIAN" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in California of forcible rape, false imprisonment by menace or violence, and corporal injury on a cohabitant after he assaulted his girlfriend. Following his prison sentence, as a Mexican national who had entered the United States unlawfully, he was removed from the United States through an expedited process based on his conviction for rape, which was deemed an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. Days later, he illegally reentered the country and was arrested near the border.He was then charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, he moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his state rape conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and thus his removal had been improper. The district court denied his motion. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed for the sake of argument that the defendant met the statutory requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies and deprivation of judicial review. However, it held that he failed to show that his removal was “fundamentally unfair” under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). The court concluded that the California rape statute under which he was convicted was a categorical match to the generic federal definition of rape, which includes rape by non-physical duress. Therefore, his conviction was properly considered an aggravated felony, making his expedited removal lawful. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA V. GONZALEZ-REYES" on Justia Law

Koby Don Williams, a supervisor with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, was charged with attempted online enticement of a minor after engaging in an undercover operation where he believed he was communicating with a thirteen-year-old girl named “Rebecca.” In reality, “Rebecca” was a persona created by law enforcement. Williams exchanged nearly 100 texts and several phone calls, during which “Rebecca” repeatedly stated her age. Williams negotiated sexual acts and payment, offered to travel with “Rebecca,” and ultimately arranged a meeting, bringing cash, alcohol, and generic Viagra. When arrested, Williams claimed he was conducting a human trafficking investigation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over Williams’s trial. Williams’s primary defense was that he never believed “Rebecca” was a minor, asserting that he thought he was communicating with an adult. He filed pretrial motions to suppress or authenticate the decoy advertisement and, after conviction, moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and statutory misinterpretation. The district court denied these motions. At sentencing, the court imposed a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, based on Williams’s alleged perjury, without making specific factual findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), rejecting Williams’s argument that the statute required proof he attempted to “transform or overcome the will” of a minor. The Ninth Circuit also found no plain error in the government’s failure to produce the original decoy advertisement. However, the court vacated Williams’s sentence, concluding the district court erred by not making explicit findings required to support the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, and remanded for resentencing. The conviction was affirmed. View "USA V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law