Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Island Industries, Inc. filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Sigma Corporation, alleging that Sigma made false statements on customs forms to avoid paying antidumping duties on welded outlets imported from China. Island claimed that Sigma falsely declared that the products were not subject to antidumping duties and misrepresented the products as steel couplings instead of welded outlets. The jury found in favor of Island, concluding that Sigma was liable under the FCA.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. Sigma requested a scope ruling from the Department of Commerce, which determined that Sigma’s welded outlets fell within the scope of the antidumping duty order on certain carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings from China. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed this ruling. Sigma’s appeal was stayed pending the Federal Circuit’s decision, which ultimately affirmed the scope ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the case and that the action did not need to be initiated in the Court of International Trade. The court also held that 19 U.S.C. § 1592, which provides a mechanism for the United States to recover fraudulently avoided customs duties, does not displace the FCA. The court rejected Sigma’s argument that it lacked an “obligation to pay” antidumping duties under the FCA and concluded that Island’s theory that Sigma violated the FCA by knowingly falsely declaring that no antidumping duties were owed was legally valid and supported by sufficient evidence. The court also found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under either of Island’s theories of liability. View "ISLAND INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SIGMA CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The defendant, Eliel Nunez Sanchez, was charged with illegal reentry after removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Nunez, a Mexican citizen, had entered the United States illegally as a child. In 2006, he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine while armed. In 2010, he was arrested again for possession of methamphetamine for sale, leading to removal proceedings. During these proceedings, Nunez waived his right to appeal and was deported. He reentered the U.S. illegally multiple times and was deported each time based on the original removal order.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Nunez's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies because his waiver of the right to appeal was valid. Nunez then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Nunez did not meet any of the three requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) to collaterally attack the removal order. First, Nunez did not exhaust his administrative remedies, as his waiver of appeal was considered and intelligent. Second, he was not deprived of the opportunity for judicial review because his waiver was valid. Third, the entry of the removal order was not fundamentally unfair, as Nunez's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, and he was not prejudiced by the denial of voluntary departure.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Nunez's motion to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Banks, a state prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in January 2021, alleging nine claims. Two of these claims were exhausted, while the remaining seven were unexhausted. Banks also moved for a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber to return to state court and exhaust the unexhausted claims. However, after filing his federal petition, Banks took no action to exhaust his seven unexhausted claims for over a year.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Banks’s motion for a Rhines stay in April 2022, citing his failure to show good cause for his post-filing lack of diligence and intentional delay in reviewing his federal petition. The district court dismissed Banks’s two exhausted claims with prejudice and his seven unexhausted claims without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that a district court does not abuse its discretion by considering a petitioner’s diligence in pursuing state court remedies after filing a federal petition when evaluating good cause under Rhines. The court emphasized that the district court must consider a petitioner’s post-filing diligence in pursuing state court remedies. The Ninth Circuit found that Banks failed to demonstrate good cause excusing his lack of diligence and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rhines stay and abeyance.Additionally, the Ninth Circuit rejected Banks’s argument that the district court contravened Rose v. Lundy by not offering him the choice of withdrawing his entire mixed habeas petition. The court explained that Banks did not have such a choice because the district court dismissed his two exhausted claims with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Rhines stay and dismissal of Banks’s habeas petition. View "Banks v. Allison" on Justia Law

Ryan Barry, a probationer subject to warrantless search conditions, was implicated in drug trafficking by an anonymous tipster who reported that a person named "Ryan" was selling drugs from an apartment in Van Nuys, California. The tipster also mentioned that "Ryan" drove a red convertible Ford Mustang. Officer Giovanni Espinoza of the LAPD investigated and found Barry, who matched the description and was on post-release community supervision for felony convictions. Barry was observed driving a red Mustang near the apartment. During a subsequent encounter, Barry was found with drugs and did not deny living at the apartment when informed of the impending search. Barry's possession of a key to the apartment further supported the officers' belief that he resided there.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Barry's motion to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of the apartment, as well as his request for an evidentiary hearing. Barry entered a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the suppression motion, and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the standard articulated in United States v. Grandberry, which requires probable cause to believe that a parolee resides at the location to be searched. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including Barry's responses to Officer Espinoza, the anonymous tip, and Barry's possession of a key, established probable cause that Barry resided at the apartment. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "USA V. BARRY" on Justia Law

Tracey Brown was convicted by a Nevada jury of multiple offenses related to a series of convenience store robberies. During the trial, an incident of juror misconduct occurred when several jurors shared an elevator with a prosecution witness, Teshae Gallon, and her friend. The friend made comments about the case, including references to surveillance videos and Gallon’s truthfulness. Brown moved for a mistrial based on this misconduct, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that the misconduct did not prejudice Brown. The court offered to replace two jurors who recalled the incident with alternates, but Brown chose to keep the original jurors.The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Brown’s convictions on direct appeal, concluding that although juror misconduct had occurred, Brown failed to show it was prejudicial. The court relied on Meyer v. State, which requires the defendant to demonstrate that juror misconduct probably affected the verdict.Brown then filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court, which was denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition. The Ninth Circuit held that the juror misconduct constituted trial error, not egregious misconduct, and thus required Brown to show actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson. The court found that the Nevada Supreme Court’s application of Meyer did not violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent and that the state court’s factual determinations were reasonable based on the record. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that habeas relief was not warranted and affirmed the denial of Brown’s petition. View "BROWN V. ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA" on Justia Law

Steven Zinnel was convicted of bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes. He was sentenced to 152 months in prison and ordered to pay over $2.5 million in restitution and fines. The government sought to garnish funds from Zinnel's TD Ameritrade Individual Retirement Account to satisfy the unpaid restitution and fines. Zinnel objected to the garnishment and requested that the proceedings be transferred to the District of Oregon, where he claimed to reside.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Zinnel's motion to transfer the proceedings, ruling that venue was proper in the Eastern District of California. The court overruled Zinnel's objections to the writ of garnishment and ordered TD Ameritrade to disburse funds to cover the unpaid restitution, fines, and a litigation surcharge. Zinnel appealed the final garnishment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in denying Zinnel's motion to transfer the garnishment proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits that the plain language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) imposes a mandatory obligation on the district court to transfer the proceedings upon the debtor's timely request. The court also held that the district court's failure to transfer the proceedings was not subject to harmless error analysis, as it necessarily affected the debtor's substantial rights.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's final order of garnishment and remanded the case, allowing Zinnel to litigate the proceedings in the district where he now resides. The court concluded that the appeal was not moot, as a partial remedy could still be fashioned by directing the United States to return the funds to TD Ameritrade. View "United States v. Zinnel" on Justia Law

Michael Hogan, a death row inmate in Nevada, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Hogan challenged the district court's denial of relief on two certified issues and sought to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) on five additional issues. The case predates the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Hogan's first certified claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to investigate his 1971 Iowa manslaughter conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in his Nevada penalty proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hogan's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the Iowa conviction in Nevada rather than in Iowa. The court also found that Hogan could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the Iowa conviction as a crime of violence under Nevada law.Hogan's second certified claim argued that the procedural default of his trial-court IAC claims should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasons for concluding that Hogan failed to establish "cause" under Martinez. The court held that Martinez applies to procedural defaults based on state timeliness rules and that Hogan's failure to raise the trial IAC claims in his second petition did not preclude Martinez relief. The court remanded Claims 2(A)-(G) and (I)-(O) to the district court for further proceedings.The Ninth Circuit granted Hogan's motion to expand the COA to include whether the district court erred in dismissing his challenges to the aggravating circumstances (Claims 5(A) and (B)) as procedurally defaulted. The court held that these claims were properly exhausted and that Nevada's procedural rules were not consistently applied as of 1990, allowing federal review of the merits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits of these claims.The Ninth Circuit declined to expand the COA to cover four other issues, including Hogan's Confrontation Clause claim, jury instructional errors, lethal injection claim, and cumulative errors claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on these issues. View "Hogan v. Bean" on Justia Law

Antoine Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and the use and discharge of a firearm causing death during a crime of violence. The charges stemmed from the robbery of an armored truck in which a guard was fatally shot. Johnson argued that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was unlawful because intervening Supreme Court case law invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, and thus, the jury must have based his conviction on invalid crime-of-violence predicates.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Johnson’s motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court held that Johnson’s § 924(c) conviction was based on at least one valid predicate pursuant to the elements clause: Hobbs Act robbery. The court also ruled that any error in the jury instructions was harmless because no reasonable juror could have found Johnson guilty of § 924(c) based solely on his participation in the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and not the commission of the robbery itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on two alternative grounds. First, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no error in the jury instructions because the district court correctly instructed the jury that it could rely on either of two valid predicate crimes of violence: the direct commission of Hobbs Act robbery or Hobbs Act robbery under a Pinkerton theory of liability. Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that even if the trial court had instructed the jury that it could rely on one invalid predicate in addition to the valid theories of Hobbs Act robbery, the error would have been harmless on the facts of this case. View "JOHNSON V. USA" on Justia Law

Petitioners Joshua Davis and N.A. were victims of a cryptocurrency theft and extortion scheme. The defendants impersonated Davis to gain control of his cellphone number, hacked his email accounts, and stole both Davis's and N.A.'s Ether. Davis reported the crime to the FBI and filed a petition for remission, while N.A. also reported the theft and filed similar petitions. The government, however, failed to properly calculate the restitution amounts, leading to the district court ordering restitution that significantly understated the value of the stolen Ether.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California sentenced the defendants and ordered restitution of $43,000 to Davis and $40,000 to N.A., based on the government's incorrect calculations. Petitioners later discovered the errors and filed motions to reopen the restitution orders, arguing that the correct value of their stolen Ether was much higher. The district court acknowledged the government's mistakes but denied the motions, concluding that Petitioners did not "discover further losses subsequent to sentencing" under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the petitions for writs of mandamus. The court held that Petitioners were entitled to seek mandamus relief under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), and that the limitations on motions to reopen a sentence set forth in § 3771(d)(5) do not apply to petitions to reopen restitution brought under § 3664(d)(5). The court concluded that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), allows crime victims to petition to reopen restitution when they "subsequently discover" that a district court's restitution order failed to include recoverable losses. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Petitioners met the additional good cause and timing requirements set forth in the MVRA. View "A. V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

Yasiel Puig Valdes signed a pre-indictment plea agreement with the Government, agreeing to plead guilty to making false statements to federal officers in exchange for a reduced sentence and the Government's promise not to bring an additional charge of obstruction of justice. Puig later decided not to plead guilty, leading the Government to declare him in breach of the plea agreement and seek to enforce a provision waiving all evidentiary objections to the admission of the plea agreement’s factual basis at trial, including objections based on Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California ruled that Rule 410 remained applicable and excluded the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement from being admitted at trial. The court held that the plea agreement was unenforceable because it had not been approved by the court, as required for agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). The Government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Ninth Circuit held that Puig’s waiver of the protections of Rule 410 was contingent on a court finding that there was a breach of an enforceable agreement. Since the plea agreement required court approval and such approval had not occurred, the agreement was not enforceable. Consequently, the waiver did not apply, and Rule 410 barred the admission of the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement at trial. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly excluded the factual basis under Rule 410. View "United States v. Puig Valdes" on Justia Law