Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani founded Theranos, a company that claimed its technology could run fast, accurate, and affordable blood tests using just a drop of blood. Holmes served as CEO, and Balwani as President and COO. They raised significant investments by making representations about the capabilities of Theranos’s proprietary devices, financial health, and business relationships. However, investigations revealed that the technology was unreliable, Theranos often relied on third-party devices, and its partnerships and finances were misrepresented to investors. Both Holmes and Balwani were indicted for conspiracy and wire fraud relating to investors and patients; they were tried separately, and each was convicted of multiple counts of fraud.Proceedings were held before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Holmes was convicted on four investor-related counts, while Balwani was convicted on all counts, including those related to patients and investors. At sentencing, both were found responsible for losses to multiple victims and given lengthy prison terms. The district court also ordered them to pay $452 million in restitution to fourteen victims, finding that the money invested constituted the lost property.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution order. The panel held that while some testimony by former Theranos employees should have been treated as expert opinion under Rule 702, any error was harmless. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting a regulatory report, limiting cross-examination, or excluding certain hearsay statements. It rejected arguments of constructive amendment and Napue violations. The panel clarified restitution calculations under the MVRA, holding that the victims’ actual losses equaled their total investments, affirming the district court’s order. View "United States v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Michelle Rodriguez was arrested after South Pasadena police discovered her in possession of a significant quantity of stolen mail and financial information, including 140 pieces of mail from 110 victims, 19 checks, multiple bank account and social security numbers, credit and debit cards, and two California driver’s licenses. The driver’s licenses were found among the stolen mail and other items in her backpack and a bag in the vehicle. Rodriguez admitted she was seeking mail and acknowledged possession of the items.The United States District Court for the Central District of California charged Rodriguez with three offenses: possession of stolen mail, possession of at least 15 unauthorized access devices, and aggravated identity theft. Rodriguez ultimately pled guilty to possession of unauthorized access devices under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), with the government agreeing to drop the other charges. At sentencing, the Probation Office calculated her Guidelines range, applying enhancements for number of victims and possession of authentication features, specifically the two California driver’s licenses. Rodriguez objected to the authentication feature enhancement, arguing it should require proof that she knowingly possessed such features with intent to defraud.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its application for abuse of discretion. The Court held that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) applies based on simple possession of an authentication feature and does not require proof of mens rea or intent to defraud. The enhancement was properly applied to Rodriguez’s sentence, as she conceded possession of the driver’s licenses with authentication features. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law. At sentencing, he received a prison term of 151 months, followed by three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment, stating they were “due immediately.” However, given the defendant’s indigency, the court established a payment schedule requiring him to make minimal payments while incarcerated and while on supervised release, including participation in the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.After judgment was entered reflecting both the immediate due date and the payment plan, the government sent a letter demanding immediate payment but also referencing the payment schedule. The defendant appealed, arguing that under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1), the court could either require the penalties to be due immediately or set a payment schedule, but not both simultaneously. He sought vacatur of the monetary penalties and resentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo. The court held that the district court did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) by declaring the penalties due immediately while also establishing a payment plan. The Ninth Circuit explained that the statute’s language and relevant precedent allow for the entire monetary obligation to be due immediately, with a payment schedule set in recognition of the defendant’s financial circumstances. The holding is consistent with similar approaches adopted by other circuits in analogous situations. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. PATRICK" on Justia Law

During a protest in Oakland, California on May 29, 2020, Robert Alvin Justus, Jr. drove a van while his co-defendant, Steven Carrillo, fired an assault rifle at two Protective Security Officers stationed outside a federal courthouse. One officer was killed and the other sustained permanent disabilities. Prior to the incident, Justus and Carrillo connected through social media, sharing content that promoted antigovernment views and referenced the “Boogaloo” movement, known for its extremist rhetoric. Evidence at trial included Justus’s posts and communications indicating animosity toward law enforcement and the federal government, as well as their coordination before the attack.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial, where Justus was convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting murder and attempted murder of persons assisting federal officers under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1114(3), 1111, and 1112. The district court sentenced Justus to life imprisonment for murder and 240 months, to run concurrently, for attempted murder. Justus challenged the admissibility of his social media evidence, the district court’s jury instruction regarding duress, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Justus’s social media posts as relevant and probative of his intent, nor did it err in finding the evidence admissible under Rules 401, 403, and 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The appellate court also found the duress jury instruction proper, as the defense was unavailable but duress-like evidence was admitted to address Justus’s mental state. Finally, the panel concluded that sufficient evidence supported the convictions and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA V. JUSTUS" on Justia Law

Federal agents learned that a previously convicted felon arranged the sale of a World War II-era Russian machinegun, which he acknowledged could not be lawfully transferred. The defendant, though not in physical possession of the weapon, set up the transaction between an undercover federal agent—posing as a firearms and drug trafficker—and a third party who actually had the gun. The agent and the defendant traveled together to complete the purchase, and the defendant was later arrested.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the prosecution. A grand jury indicted the defendant for both possessing or transferring a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the machinegun charge, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen required invalidation of the statute, and also that the statutory exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) applied since the transfer was to a federal agent. The district court denied the motion, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Henry, which held that machineguns are not protected by the Second Amendment, and on earlier cases interpreting the statutory exemption narrowly. At trial, the jury acquitted on the felon-in-possession count but convicted on the possession or transfer count, and the district court sentenced the defendant to twenty-seven months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) for transfers to the United States does not apply to transfers to undercover agents unless the transfer is authorized by the government for its benefit. The court also held that its prior decision in Henry remains binding, and that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment. View "USA V. KITTSON" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, a Nevada prisoner sentenced to death, challenged his conviction and sentence based on the claim that the prosecutor impermissibly used peremptory strikes to exclude three Black prospective jurors during jury selection. The underlying facts involve the murder of Ebony Mason in 1994, for which the petitioner was charged after being linked to the crime through witness statements and physical evidence. He was ultimately convicted of murder and related charges after a trial in which three of four Black prospective jurors were excluded by the prosecution.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the petitioner’s Batson v. Kentucky claims on direct appeal. It found the prosecutor’s reasons for striking two jurors—Emma Jean Samuels and Angela Smith—were race-neutral, as both had close family members with criminal convictions. The court concluded that, once these two strikes were deemed nondiscriminatory, they did not factor into whether there was a pattern of discrimination, and thus, the exclusion of the first Black juror, Gwendolyn Velasquez, was viewed in isolation, with no prima facie case found. The Nevada Supreme Court therefore did not require the prosecution to provide a race-neutral reason for striking Velasquez.On federal habeas review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the Batson claims regarding Samuels and Smith, finding no unreasonable application of federal law. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson by excluding from consideration the strikes of Samuels and Smith when assessing whether a prima facie case was established as to Velasquez. The appellate court vacated the denial of relief as to Velasquez and remanded for an evidentiary hearing requiring the State to explain its strike. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of equitable tolling for additional untimely claims and declined to expand the certificate of appealability. View "DOYLE V. ROYAL" on Justia Law

Two members of the Gypsy Joker Motorcycle Club were prosecuted for their roles in the kidnapping and murder of a former club member. The victim had previously been expelled from the club for theft, severely beaten, and later participated in a robbery at one defendant’s home. In retaliation, the defendants and other associates tracked down the victim, forcibly abducted him, and transported him to a remote location where he was tortured and killed. His body was subsequently found in a field. Both defendants held significant roles in the club, with one serving as chapter president and the other as a full member.Following initial arrests on state charges, federal prosecutors obtained an indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The indictment charged both men with murder and kidnapping offenses under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, kidnapping resulting in death, conspiracy to commit kidnapping resulting in death, and for one defendant, racketeering conspiracy under RICO. Some co-defendants pleaded guilty, but the two appellants proceeded to trial. A jury convicted both on all counts except the racketeering conspiracy charge for one defendant. The district court sentenced each to concurrent life sentences.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that a VICAR indictment is sufficient if it tracks the statutory language, even without enumerating elements of the predicate state offense. The panel found no error in various evidentiary rulings, including exclusions of certain character evidence and expert testimony, as well as the admission of evidence regarding the club’s nature and culture. The court also upheld the jury instructions on VICAR purpose and consideration of punishment, and rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to mandatory life sentences, citing binding precedent. View "USA V. DENCKLAU" on Justia Law

Robert Hutton secretly installed a hidden camera in the bathroom of his home and, over the course of about a year, recorded several nude videos and images of his 14-year-old stepdaughter without her knowledge. He edited some of the footage to focus on moments when the victim was visibly nude. The victim discovered the existence of these files after seeing a suspicious file name on Hutton’s phone and subsequently reported the matter to the police. A search of Hutton’s residence uncovered additional child pornography, including images of other minors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over a bench trial based on stipulated facts. Hutton was charged with sexually exploiting a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). He moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the images were not “lascivious,” that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that he did not “use” the victim within the meaning of the statute. The district court denied these motions, found Hutton guilty, and sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Hutton’s arguments de novo where appropriate and for clear error regarding factual findings. The court held that existing Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed Hutton’s arguments on all grounds. Specifically, the court found that the district court did not clearly err in determining the images were “lascivious” under the Dost factors, that § 2251(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that Hutton’s conduct constituted “use” of a minor under the statute. The court also held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dubin v. United States, which interpreted the term “use” in a different statutory context, did not undermine the Ninth Circuit’s precedent regarding § 2251(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "USA V. HUTTON" on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement agents began investigating drug and firearm distribution activities in Spokane, Washington, in 2022. Their investigation led to Johnathan Allen, who had a significant criminal history and was known to distribute methamphetamine and possess firearms. Allen and three codefendants were indicted by a federal grand jury in January 2023 for distribution of methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. After his arrest, several pretrial motions and continuances delayed the trial. A superseding indictment was returned in May 2023, and Allen continued to file additional pretrial motions. Although Allen initially insisted on a speedy trial, the court, with agreement from the parties, set a new trial date for October 2023.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington later determined that a violation of the Speedy Trial Act (STA) had occurred because it had not sufficiently documented the reasons for the trial continuance as required by statute, nor had it obtained a waiver from Allen. The court dismissed both the original and superseding indictments without prejudice, after weighing the seriousness of the offense, the technical nature of the violation, and the lack of prejudice to Allen. The government promptly re-indicted Allen on the same charges, and the case proceeded to trial. During trial, the court admitted Facebook records linking Allen to the crimes, over his objection that they were not properly authenticated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Allen’s convictions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the indictments without prejudice, as it properly considered the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The appellate court also found no error in the admission of the Facebook records, concluding they were self-authenticating business records under Federal Rules of Evidence 902(11) and 803(6), and that their substantive content was properly authenticated under Rule 901(a). The court further held that the records were admissible under Rules 404(b) and 403. View "USA V. ALLEN" on Justia Law

Ryan VanDyke was subject to a civil protection order and a no-contact order in Idaho after persistently harassing a woman, violating both probation conditions for a prior telephone-harassment conviction and earlier court-ordered protections. In October 2022, after being charged with felony stalking for continued unwanted contact and harassment, a state court issued a no-contact order that explicitly prohibited VanDyke from using, attempting to use, or threatening physical force against the victim. In May 2023, while still under these orders, VanDyke entered a courthouse carrying a loaded revolver.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the federal indictment against VanDyke, which charged him with illegal firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). The district court found that, as applied to VanDyke, this statute did not fit within the historical tradition of firearm regulation required by the Second Amendment, and therefore held the statute unconstitutional in this context.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). The Ninth Circuit held that § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is constitutional as applied to VanDyke. The court reasoned that there is a historical tradition of both individualized and categorical disarmament of persons deemed dangerous, including those subject to judicial findings of threat or facing serious criminal charges. The court found that the procedures and justifications for VanDyke’s disarmament were analogous to those recognized in Rahimi and related precedent. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. VANDYKE" on Justia Law