Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two individuals, both members of a San Francisco gang known as Mac Block, were involved in a shootout at a funeral reception that resulted in the death of a man named Simmons and injuries to several bystanders. The government alleged that the defendants, after a confrontation with Simmons, retrieved firearms and returned to the scene, where a gunfight ensued. One defendant was accused of aiding and abetting the murder, while the other was alleged to have directly participated in the shooting. Both were charged with murder in aid of racketeering under the VICAR statute and with being felons in possession of firearms.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial. Before trial, the court considered, but ultimately denied, a motion to bifurcate the trial so that the jury would first decide whether the defendants committed murder, and only if so, then consider the racketeering elements. The court concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent, specifically United States v. Barker, precluded such bifurcation. The court also addressed a Batson challenge to the government’s peremptory strike of a Black juror, finding the government’s race-neutral explanation sufficient and not pretextual. The jury convicted both defendants on all counts, and the court denied post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that Barker forecloses bifurcation of the elements of a single VICAR murder charge, reasoning that such bifurcation would impermissibly alter the structure of the offense as defined by Congress. The court also upheld the district court’s rejection of the Batson challenge, finding no clear error in the determination that the government’s strike was not racially motivated. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. MANNING" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in Montana suspected Danielle Williams of drug trafficking and observed her and Brandon Gordon engaging in suspicious activity, including Gordon climbing a fence with a black bag and entering Williams’s vehicle. After a traffic stop, officers found drug paraphernalia and two stolen handguns in the vehicle. Gordon later admitted to daily methamphetamine use and intent to use the stolen items to pay a drug debt. He was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for possessing a stolen firearm. At trial, the jury acquitted him of the stolen firearm charge but convicted him of being a felon in possession. He was sentenced to 87 months in prison.Gordon appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the conviction. He then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, raising several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that his attorney misinformed him about sentencing exposure, failed to challenge the indictment, and did not move to suppress evidence. The district court denied his claims, declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, and dismissed a second-in-time § 2255 motion as an unauthorized successive petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that counsel’s alleged sentencing predictions did not constitute ineffective assistance, so no evidentiary hearing was required. The court also held that, although the district court should have considered all ineffective assistance claims related to plea negotiations as a whole, Gordon’s claims failed on the merits. Finally, the court determined that Gordon’s second-in-time § 2255 motion should have been treated as a motion to amend, but denied relief because the only argument raised was foreclosed by binding precedent. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. GORDON" on Justia Law

After being convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, the petitioner was sentenced to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. While incarcerated, he participated in recidivism reduction programs and earned time credits under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). He continued to accrue these credits while on home confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Upon nearing the end of his custodial sentence, he sought to have his earned time credits applied to reduce both his remaining time in custody and the length of his supervised release. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) applied some credits to end his custody early but refused to apply the remaining credits to reduce his supervised release, arguing that the FSA did not permit such use.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed his habeas corpus petition, agreeing with the government that the FSA time credits could not be used to shorten the term of supervised release. The court found that the credits could only be applied to reduce time in custody, not supervised release, and thus denied the petitioner’s request for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the FSA, as well as relevant canons of statutory construction, demonstrate that Congress intended for earned time credits to be applied toward reducing the length of supervised release, not just custodial time. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded with instructions to grant the petition in part, direct the government to recalculate the petitioner’s earned time credits, and provide the recalculation to his probation officer. The main holding is that, under the FSA, earned time credits may be used to reduce the term of supervised release. View "GONZALEZ V. HERRERA" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple offenses related to sex trafficking, including trafficking minors who were often recruited from foster care or group homes. He exerted control over these victims through violence and threats, collected all proceeds from their prostitution, and provided them with basic necessities in return. The defendant also filmed sexual acts with minor victims and arranged for some to be tattooed with his aliases. A grand jury indicted him on several counts, including conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor, sex trafficking of minors, sex trafficking by force, sexual exploitation of a child, and possession of child pornography. He was found guilty on all counts, but his appeal focused on two counts related to sex trafficking and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss two counts of the indictment as duplicitous, rejecting his argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 creates two separate crimes—one for sex trafficking by advertising and another for other forms of trafficking—based on different mens rea requirements. The court found that the statute defines a single offense with multiple means of commission. After a jury conviction, the district court sentenced the defendant to life in prison, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the nature of the offenses and the defendant’s history, and adequately addressed his mitigation arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that sex trafficking a minor by advertising is not a separate crime under § 1591, but rather an alternative means of violating the statute, so the indictment was not duplicitous. The court also found no procedural or substantive error in the life sentence imposed. View "USA V. BRADFORD" on Justia Law

Kyle Handley was convicted of two counts of kidnapping for ransom under California Penal Code section 209(a). This statute mandates life imprisonment without parole if the victim suffers death or bodily harm, or is confined in a manner exposing them to a substantial likelihood of death. The information filed against Handley did not specifically allege these circumstances. However, during the trial, Handley consented to jury instructions and a verdict form requiring special findings on these allegations. Following his conviction, the state trial court sentenced him to life without parole.On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected Handley’s claim that the jury’s findings and his sentence should be reversed because he was not formally charged with the special allegations. The court held that the Constitution does not require an information to charge punishment-enhancing facts. Alternatively, it found that Handley received constitutionally sufficient notice of the special allegations through informal amendment of the information during a jury instruction conference at trial.Handley then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. He argued that he lacked adequate notice of the special allegations because they were omitted from the written information. The district court denied the petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Handley’s habeas petition. The panel held that it was not clearly established that the Sixth Amendment requires state charging documents to allege punishment-enhancing facts. Nor was it clearly established that the notice required by the Sixth Amendment must be provided by the written information itself and cannot be provided through informal amendment. The court also found that the state court’s factual findings regarding informal amendment were reasonable. The decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law, and Handley was not entitled to de novo review of his Sixth Amendment claim. View "HANDLEY V. MOORE" on Justia Law

Mohamed Ahmed Hassan was convicted of four counts of bank robbery, with all incidents captured on surveillance cameras. The robberies occurred in January 2022 at Chase Bank branches in San Diego, California. The robber, who wore a face mask and hat in three of the four incidents, demanded money from tellers and escaped with approximately $15,400. Hassan was arrested by the FBI shortly after the fourth robbery. The prosecution presented surveillance footage and rideshare and cell phone records linking Hassan to the crimes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California held a bench trial after Hassan waived his right to a jury trial. The court found Hassan guilty on all counts, relying primarily on the surveillance footage. The court did not consider the rideshare and cell phone records as conclusive evidence tying Hassan to the robberies. Hassan appealed, arguing that the district court improperly relied on extrinsic evidence by comparing his in-court appearance to the surveillance footage and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the trier of fact may identify a defendant by comparing their in-court appearance to photographic or video evidence. The court found that the district court did not rely on extrinsic evidence and that the visual comparison, along with other available information, was sufficient to establish Hassan's guilt. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction on all counts. View "United States v. Hassan" on Justia Law

Donnie Bryant, a member of a Las Vegas-based street gang, participated in a gang-related shooting at the age of sixteen, resulting in a 70-year prison sentence. He was convicted under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute and for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Decades later, Bryant sought compassionate release, arguing that his youth at the time of the offense, a sentencing disparity with his codefendant, and the alleged improper "stacking" of his firearm sentences under the First Step Act constituted "extraordinary and compelling" reasons for relief.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Bryant's motion. The court held that while youth could be considered in an appropriate case, Bryant's crime was not the product of youthful immaturity, and he had not demonstrated significant rehabilitation. The court also found that the sentencing disparity with his codefendant, who received a reduced sentence through a plea deal, was not an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Additionally, the court rejected Bryant's argument regarding the stacking of his firearm sentences, noting that his sentences were imposed correctly under the law at the time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that a defendant's youth at the time of the offense is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court also ruled that a sentencing disparity resulting from a codefendant's guilty plea does not qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason. Lastly, the court clarified that Bryant's sentences for his firearm convictions were not improperly stacked in violation of the First Step Act, as the Act's amendments did not apply to his case. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Raul Perez Cruz, a native and citizen of Mexico, pled guilty to money laundering in 2021 and was sentenced to 144 months in prison. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. He conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on past experiences with cartels and fear of retaliation due to his purported cooperation with the U.S. government.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal due to his conviction of a particularly serious crime. The IJ also denied his CAT claim, finding that he did not show it was more likely than not he would be tortured upon return to Mexico, nor that he could not safely relocate within Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that his fear of future torture was speculative and that there was no due process violation despite technical difficulties during the hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Perez Cruz did not meet his burden to show he would more likely than not be tortured if returned to Mexico. The court also found that Perez Cruz did not overcome the presumption that the agency reviewed all evidence before it. Additionally, the court was not persuaded by his contention that audio issues during his hearing denied him due process, as there was no demonstration that the IJ prejudicially missed or misunderstood anything said during the hearing. The petition for review was denied. View "Perez Cruz v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Federal agents conducted a sting operation in which Rami Ghanem attempted to export military equipment from the United States to Libya. Ghanem pleaded guilty to six counts, including violations of the Arms Export Control Act, unlawful smuggling, and money laundering. He proceeded to trial on a charge of conspiring to acquire, transport, and use surface-to-air missiles, for which he was found guilty and initially sentenced to 360 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated Ghanem’s conviction on the missile conspiracy charge due to improper jury instructions on venue and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court recalculated the guidelines range as 78-97 months but imposed the same 360-month sentence, considering the same relevant conduct as before.The Ninth Circuit reviewed Ghanem’s appeal, rejecting his arguments that the district court committed procedural errors at resentencing. The court held that the district court applied the correct legal standards in declining to reduce Ghanem’s offense level for acceptance of responsibility and did not clearly err in finding that Ghanem’s failure to accept responsibility outweighed his guilty plea and truthful admissions. The court also found that the district court adequately explained its sentencing decision, addressed Ghanem’s argument about sentencing disparities, and correctly considered conduct underlying the dismissed charge.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 360-month sentence, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the sentence was warranted under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court also rejected Ghanem’s constitutional arguments under Apprendi v. New Jersey, holding that the district court’s reliance on conduct underlying the dismissed charge did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. View "United States v. Ghanem" on Justia Law