Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of former students who attended ITT Technical Institute, a for-profit college, brought suit against companies and individuals involved in servicing and collecting on certain private student loans known as the PEAKS loans. After the 2008 financial crisis, ITT, needing to comply with federal regulations limiting reliance on federal funds, established the PEAKS loan program with the backing of Deutsche Bank to generate non-federal revenue. The loans were internally backed by guarantees from ITT, and as default rates rose, ITT concealed the program’s financial troubles from investors and regulators. The PEAKS loans continued to be serviced by Vervent, Inc. and its affiliates, even after ITT’s collapse and bankruptcy in 2016. Students alleged that they were not aware that their loan payments were induced by fraud until after ITT’s public downfall.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the plaintiffs, as a putative class, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state-law claims. The defendants argued that the RICO claims were untimely, asserting that the statute of limitations began when the students received or began paying the loans, and also challenged proximate causation. The district court denied summary judgment on both grounds, finding fact issues precluded judgment as a matter of law. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages that were trebled under RICO. The district court denied defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the students neither knew nor reasonably should have known of their fraud-based injuries more than four years before suit was filed, so the claims were timely under RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. The court also concluded that defendants did not preserve their proximate cause argument for appeal because they did not properly raise it after trial. The judgment was affirmed. View "TURREY V. VERVENT, INC." on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico who entered the United States as a child was convicted in California in 2012 for violating a statute that prohibits distributing harmful material to a minor with the intent to seduce. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. The individual sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his conviction should not disqualify him for relief.An Immigration Judge found that the conviction constituted both a crime involving moral turpitude and a crime of child abuse under federal immigration law, pretermitting his application for cancellation of removal. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, holding specifically that the conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) was categorically a crime of child abuse, and dismissed the appeal. The Board declined to address whether the offense was a crime involving moral turpitude.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the categorical approach as articulated in its recent precedent, Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche. The court considered the petitioner’s arguments that the California statute was overly broad compared to the generic definition of a crime of child abuse, including claims about actual harm, consensual conduct between minors, mistaken belief about the victim’s age, and communications not received by a minor. The Ninth Circuit found each argument unpersuasive, concluding that the statute requires conduct that meets the federal definition of child abuse and that there was no realistic probability California would apply the statute as broadly as petitioner claimed. The court held that a conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) is categorically a crime of child abuse for immigration purposes, and therefore denied the petition for review. View "ADAME GARCIA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

Federal agents discovered that the defendant had engaged in sexually explicit conduct with a female minor, confirmed by photos on her social media. A search warrant was executed at the defendant’s home, and several electronic devices, including an iPhone 12, were seized. Forensic analysis revealed numerous images and videos depicting the minor victim and other unidentified girls in explicit sexual conduct, stored in a vault application and its deleted space, but still accessible. The defendant was arrested and charged with one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over the trial. Before trial, the government moved in limine to admit thirty-six images and videos as evidence. The defendant did not object, reviewed the material with the government, and agreed to oral descriptions. The district court admitted the evidence and published it to the jury in open court, though not in the jury room. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. He later moved for a new trial, arguing his counsel failed to pursue an affirmative defense under § 2252(c), which applies when fewer than three matters are possessed and reasonable steps are taken to destroy or report them. The district court denied this motion, finding no factual support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by failing to individually review each item of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and United States v. Curtin, but found the error harmless as it did not affect the verdict. The court affirmed the denial of a new trial, declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and affirmed the 120-month sentence, applying plain error review. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. DOYLE" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant diagnosed with autism, Tourette syndrome, OCD, and ADHD, who maintained a romantic relationship with a woman with significant physical disabilities. In September 2019, the defendant and the victim traveled from Pennsylvania to Las Vegas, where the defendant killed the victim in a remote Nevada desert. Prior to the trip, he conducted internet searches related to murder and body disposal. After the murder, he impersonated the victim through her phone and social media, raising suspicions among her friends and family. Eventually, police were alerted, leading to an investigation, the defendant’s arrest, and his confession to the crime.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada presided over the trial, during which the defendant moved to suppress his confession, arguing an invalid Miranda waiver and involuntariness. The district court denied this motion after a magistrate judge held a hearing and issued a report and recommendation. The trial lasted eight days, and the defense presented testimony regarding the defendant’s mental health. After jury deliberations, the defendant moved for a mistrial due to concerns about the interpretation of the “holding” element in the kidnapping statute and alleged jury coercion. The district court denied these motions and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The defendant then filed post-verdict motions for acquittal and a new trial, which were also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the “holding” element of the federal kidnapping statute under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) can be satisfied through non-physical means, including deception, and found sufficient evidence to support the conviction. However, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial because the district court improperly coerced the jury’s verdict, notably by giving an Allen charge while aware of the jury’s numerical division and making coercive comments to a holdout juror. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary. View "USA V. CHAPMAN" on Justia Law

A man who had recently been released on parole was stopped by police in San Pablo, California, while driving with his young niece and nephew. After a brief delay in pulling over, the officer learned of his parole status and asked the occupants to exit the car. The officer found a loaded, modified Glock pistol on the nephew, and text messages showed the man had instructed his mother to retrieve the child because he was carrying the gun. The gun and ammunition were manufactured outside California, and the gun was modified to fire automatically.A federal grand jury indicted the defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He sought to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds and to suppress the evidence, but while the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the suppression motion, the Ninth Circuit summarily reversed and remanded after a related case clarified that asking about parole status during a stop was permissible. The defendant then requested a stipulated-facts bench trial, after his request for a conditional plea was refused by the government. The district court found him guilty following the bench trial.At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility but, over its stated disagreement, did not apply a third point because the government declined to move for it, citing resources expended preparing for trial. The court also applied an enhancement for possessing the firearm in connection with child endangerment, a “wobbler” offense under California law, finding the conduct was felonious. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government has broad discretion to withhold the motion for the third acceptance point under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and the district court properly exercised its discretion in treating the child endangerment offense as a felony for sentencing purposes. View "USA V. YATES" on Justia Law

Jonathan Lopez was charged with possessing a firearm as a prohibited person after previously being convicted of two felony offenses under California Penal Code § 273.5, which penalizes willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on certain victims such as spouses or cohabitants. Lopez pleaded guilty to the federal firearm charge but reserved the right to challenge whether his prior state convictions qualified as “crimes of violence” for the purpose of sentencing enhancements under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, the probation office and the government recommended, and the court applied, an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which raises the base offense level if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. The district court found that Lopez’s two prior convictions under § 273.5 met this criterion, following then-binding Ninth Circuit precedent. The court overruled Lopez’s objection to this classification and sentenced him to a term of 67 months, which was below the guideline range due to a downward variance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered intervening Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit en banc decisions—Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), and United States v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc)—which clarified that, to be a categorical crime of violence, an offense must require a mens rea greater than recklessness as to the use of force directed at another. The Ninth Circuit held that § 273.5 does not categorically qualify because it requires only the intent to commit the act, not intent or knowledge that force will be directed at another. The court vacated Lopez’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "USA V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, after police discovered a loaded pistol on his person during a traffic stop. The prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on the defendant’s prior Oregon state felony convictions: two for third-degree assault and one for strangulation. The defendant challenged the use of these convictions as ACCA predicate offenses, arguing they did not meet the definition of “violent felonies.” He also argued that his constitutional rights were violated because the judge, rather than a jury, determined that his prior offenses occurred on different occasions, a necessary finding to trigger the ACCA enhancement.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon found that the prior convictions were for violent felonies and had been committed on different occasions, and imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The defendant appealed, raising the same constitutional and statutory objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Erlinger v. United States, the district court had erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey by making the separate-occasions finding itself, rather than submitting it to a jury. However, the Ninth Circuit held that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the record contained overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that the offenses occurred on different occasions. The court also held that the defendant’s Oregon convictions for third-degree assault and strangulation qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The court therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. PATTERSON" on Justia Law

The case centers on Mark William Anten, who, after previously serving as a confidential informant for the FBI, began sending a series of increasingly disturbing emails to former FBI handlers and other agents. These communications included self-identification as the “Unabomber,” explicit threats to bomb the Los Angeles FBI headquarters, and attachments referencing mass violence and bomb-making. The messages, sent in 2023, alarmed the agents involved, leading them to notify security and initiate threat assessments. Anten’s emails persisted despite warnings, culminating in his arrest in December 2023. A search of his residence uncovered no weapons or bomb-making materials.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over Anten’s trial. The jury convicted him on two counts of transmitting threats to injure others via interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). During trial, Anten contested the jury instructions, arguing they failed to include an objective element for what constitutes a “threat,” and challenged the court’s response to a jury note about which exhibits were referenced in the indictment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether the statute requires both an objective “threat” element and a subjective mental state element. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) indeed requires: (1) an objective element—meaning the communication must be viewed as a threat by a reasonable person—and (2) a subjective element—requiring at least recklessness as to whether the statement would be perceived as a threat. The court found that, while the jury instructions could have been clearer, they sufficiently included both elements. It also concluded that the district court’s response to the jury’s note was not improper. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "USA V. ANTEN" on Justia Law

The defendant, a state supervisee subject to warrantless search conditions, was found by police in a trailer located near his girlfriend’s parents’ home. Officers searched both the trailer and a nearby Ford F-150 pickup truck believed to be used by the defendant. The trailer yielded ammunition, while the truck contained drugs. The defendant had reported his parents’ home as his residence, but GPS monitoring indicated he frequently stayed at the Goleta address, near the trailer. Officers had also previously conducted home visits at the Goleta address, and Pereda’s supervising officer had admonished him for not updating his reported residence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in both the trailer and the pickup truck. The district court found that the officers lacked probable cause to believe either that the trailer was the defendant’s residence or that the truck was property under his control. Consequently, the district court granted the motion to suppress and excluded all evidence recovered from the searches.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the searches were consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements, specifically the parolee exception to the warrant requirement. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe the defendant resided in or controlled the trailer and owned or controlled the pickup truck. Accordingly, the panel held that both searches were valid under the defendant’s supervised release conditions and the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. PEREDA" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident from Mexico pleaded guilty in Oregon state court to two counts of felony fourth-degree assault for physically assaulting his wife in the immediate presence of their minor children. The events occurred in 2013, and the charges were brought under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c), which enhances misdemeanor assault to a felony when committed in the presence of a minor child. He was sentenced to two years in prison, followed by probation.After his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), arguing his conviction constituted a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” An Immigration Judge found him removable on this ground, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that decision. The individual then petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Oregon statute was overbroad and indivisible, and thus not a categorical match to the federal offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that, although the Oregon statute covered conduct unrelated to children and was therefore overbroad, it was divisible into alternative elements. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the petitioner’s conviction was specifically for assault in the presence of his minor children. The court held that this offense matched the definition of a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under federal law, as interpreted in Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche, because committing assault in a child’s presence places the child at real risk of bodily or mental harm and requires at least criminal negligence. The Ninth Circuit therefore denied the petition for review. View "DIAZ-BOYZO V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law