Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Darrel Eston Lee, an Arizona prisoner sentenced to death for murder and other offenses, filed a federal habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Lee argued that his counsel allowed him to testify falsely and failed to present mitigating evidence. He sought to introduce new evidence not presented in state court.The Arizona state postconviction relief court held a four-day evidentiary hearing and rejected Lee's claims. The court found no evidence that Lee had confessed to his attorney, Stephen Politi, and concluded that Politi's actions were reasonable given Lee's conflicting stories. The court also determined that Politi had conducted a reasonable mitigation investigation and that the lack of mitigating evidence was due to its nonexistence rather than Politi's incompetence. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Lee's habeas petition, refusing to consider new evidence Lee presented for the first time in federal court. The court found that Lee's postconviction counsel had not acted diligently in state court, thus triggering the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The district court concluded that the state court's findings were reasonable based on the state-court record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the state court reasonably rejected Lee's claim that Politi was ineffective for allowing him to testify falsely, as there was no clear evidence that Politi knew the alibi was false. The court also found that Lee failed to show that Politi's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by it. Regarding the failure to present mitigating evidence, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lee did not qualify for an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) and that the state court's rejection of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. View "LEE V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

Roberto Yepez, while serving a state sentence, was transferred to federal custody to face a federal drug trafficking charge. He was later convicted and sentenced in federal court. While serving his federal sentence, Yepez filed a pro se motion arguing for sentence credit for the time spent in federal custody before his federal sentencing. He later argued through counsel that this motion should be construed as one for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court held that a legal claim for sentence miscalculation must be brought through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, not a compassionate release motion. The court dismissed the motion, noting it could not proceed as a § 2241 petition because Yepez was incarcerated in a different jurisdiction.Yepez appealed the district court's decision. However, before the appeal was fully briefed, he was released from prison and began serving his term of supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Yepez’s appeal became moot upon his release from prison. The court noted that the compassionate release provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) could not be used to shorten Yepez’s term of supervised release. The court also rejected Yepez’s argument that the appeal was not moot because its outcome could affect a later motion under § 3583(e) for modification of his term of supervised release.The Ninth Circuit concluded that since Yepez was no longer incarcerated, the relief he sought—a reduction in his term of imprisonment—was no longer available. Additionally, the court determined that the compassionate release provision could not be used to alter the term of supervised release. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as moot. View "USA V. YEPEZ" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Socorro Colin-Villavicencio, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States lawfully in 1988. Her mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. Colin-Villavicencio applied for adjustment of status but missed fingerprint appointments, leading to the abandonment of her application. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after she was convicted of multiple felonies, including child abuse and drug possession. Representing herself, she claimed derivative citizenship based on her mother’s naturalization, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this claim, finding she did not become a lawful permanent resident as a minor. The IJ also denied her relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Colin-Villavicencio did not establish a likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. The BIA found that the country conditions and her brother’s attack did not sufficiently demonstrate a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that her prior convictions precluded asylum and withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Colin-Villavicencio’s derivative citizenship claim, concluding she did not meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) because her parents never married, and her father’s paternity was established by legitimation under Baja California law. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, noting she did not show a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit thus denied her petition for review. View "COLIN-VILLAVICENCIO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Paul Rundo and Robert Boman, who were charged with conspiracy to violate the Anti-Riot Act and with substantively violating the Act. The indictment alleges that Rundo is a founding member of the "Rise Above Movement" (RAM), a militant white supremacist group. Rundo and Boman, along with other RAM members, attended several political rallies where they violently attacked counter-protesters. The indictment details their involvement in rallies in Huntington Beach, Berkeley, San Bernardino, and Charlottesville, where they engaged in organized violence and later boasted about their actions online.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the indictment, finding the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Act was not facially overbroad except for certain severable portions. On remand, the district court dismissed the indictment again, this time based on a claim of selective prosecution. The district court concluded that the government selectively prosecuted RAM members while ignoring the violence of Antifa and related far-left groups, suggesting that the prosecution was based on the offensive nature of RAM's speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Rundo did not meet his burden to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted and that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive. The court found that the district court erred by comparing collective conduct to individual conduct and by holding that individual Antifa members were similarly situated to Rundo. The Ninth Circuit also held that Rundo failed to show that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive, noting that timing and other factors cited by the district court were insufficient. The court reinstated the indictment and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. RUNDO" on Justia Law

Adam Lloyd Livar was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender, a requirement stemming from a prior conviction. He pled guilty and entered a plea agreement with the government, which included a joint recommendation for a mid-range sentence if he demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. However, after making threatening statements during a phone call from prison, the government argued that Livar breached the plea agreement by committing a new crime and recommended a higher sentence.The District Court for the District of Oregon sentenced Livar to thirty months in prison and five years of supervised release, despite the plea agreement. The court found that Livar had accepted responsibility but did not adjudicate whether he committed a new crime. The court also determined that the government had not breached the plea agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether the appeal was moot due to Livar's release from prison. It concluded that the appeal was not moot because the district court could modify or terminate Livar's supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).The Ninth Circuit held that the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes when the government seeks to be relieved of its obligations under a plea agreement. The court unanimously agreed that Livar's sentence should be vacated because the district court did not adjudicate whether he committed a new crime. A majority of the panel concluded that due process does not require the government to seek a judicial determination before submitting a different sentencing recommendation. Another majority determined that the proper remedy is to remand with instructions to enter judgment with a term of imprisonment of time served and maintain the original terms of supervised release. The court vacated Livar’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "USA V. LIVAR" on Justia Law

The case involves Delaney Marks, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in California in 1994. Marks appealed his conviction, arguing that he was incompetent to stand trial and that he is intellectually disabled, making him ineligible for the death penalty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment denying Marks's federal habeas petition.Marks's claim that he was incompetent to stand trial was denied. The court found that although Marks presented substantial evidence of incompetence, there was a reasonable basis in the record for the California Supreme Court to deny this claim.However, the court held that the district court erred by denying relief on Marks's claim that he is intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for the death penalty. Marks had shown that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.The court also held that the district court properly denied relief on Marks's claim that the judge adjudicating his Atkins claim was biased against him. The California Supreme Court reasonably could have concluded that the judge did not display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief on Marks's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court reasonably could have concluded that a second competency hearing would have reached the same conclusion as a jury which had already found Marks competent.In sum, the court vacated the district court’s denial of Marks’s Atkins claim and remanded for de novo review of that claim. The court otherwise affirmed the district court's decision. View "Marks v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves Keith Atherton, who pleaded guilty to one count of using or attempting to use a minor to produce a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct. His plea agreement contained an appeal waiver with certain exceptions. Atherton was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 30 years. He appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights during sentencing by relying on false or unreliable information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court held that a due process challenge to sentencing, like Atherton’s, falls within the appeal waiver limitation set forth in United States v. Wells, for “a challenge that the sentence violates the Constitution.” The court rejected the government’s contention that the Wells exception is limited to constitutional claims targeting the substantive terms of the sentence.Reviewing for plain error, the court held that Atherton’s due process rights were not violated. The court concluded that Atherton did not demonstrate that it is clear or obvious that the challenged information was patently false or unreliable or that the court relied upon the information in imposing sentence. View "United States v. Atherton" on Justia Law

The case involves Sergio Manrique Gutierrez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of carjacking under California law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that Gutierrez was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence and for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.The BIA held that Gutierrez's conviction for carjacking under California law is a categorical crime of violence. The BIA did not address the second ground for removal, concluding that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. Gutierrez separately petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California carjacking under Cal. Penal Code § 215(a) is not a categorical crime of violence. The court also concluded that the BIA erroneously determined that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, in the first instance, whether Gutierrez is removable for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. The court dismissed Gutierrez’s petition for review of the IJ’s sua sponte reopening of his case to consider a change in the law. The court denied Gutierrez’s petition as to his remaining claims concerning the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the discretionary denial of his application for waiver of admissibility, the denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case to consider new evidence that he was incompetent and to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves Katie Garding, who was convicted by a Montana jury of vehicular homicide while under the influence, failure to stop immediately at the scene of an accident involving an injured person, and driving without a valid driver’s license. Garding filed a habeas petition, arguing that her counsel was ineffective for not hiring an accident reconstruction expert and that the prosecution violated her rights by not disclosing certain evidence.The Montana Supreme Court rejected Garding's arguments. It held that her counsel's decision not to hire an accident reconstruction expert was within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. The court also found that the state had not suppressed evidence concerning x-rays of the victim and that Garding did not show that the non-disclosure of photos from a different car crash was material.Garding then sought federal habeas relief. The United States District Court for the District of Montana partially granted and partially denied her petition. It held that there was ineffective assistance of counsel but denied the Brady claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Garding’s Brady claims and reversed its grant of Garding’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The court held that the Montana Supreme Court reasonably determined that Garding’s trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient and that her Brady claims lacked merit. View "Garding v. Montana Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves Vladimir Hernandez, who pleaded guilty to felony meth distribution charges. As part of his plea, Hernandez agreed to provide the government with all the information he knew about the crime in exchange for a potential lower sentence under the safety-valve sentencing provision. However, after entering his plea, Hernandez learned that other inmates might retaliate against him for his cooperation with the government. He then sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he would not have agreed to the plea deal if he had known about the potential danger in prison.The district court denied Hernandez's motion to withdraw his plea. The court accepted that Hernandez did not know about the potential danger at the time of his plea and that his request to withdraw was made in good faith. However, the court concluded that Hernandez could avoid the consequences of the safety-valve proffer by not proffering, and thus his concerns were not "fair and just" reasons for withdrawal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case. The appellate court held that a defendant must first offer in good faith a "new" basis for seeking to withdraw his plea, meaning that he subjectively did not know this "new" reason for withdrawal at the time of his plea. He then must show that objectively he could not have known or anticipated this "new" material reason. The appellate court found that the district court did not err in concluding that Hernandez offered in good faith a subjectively new basis for withdrawing his plea. However, the district court did not decide whether objectively Hernandez could have known about or anticipated this new and material reason for withdrawing the plea. The appellate court remanded the case for the district court to decide that issue. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law