Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended majority opinion and concurrence, denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in petitioner's appeal from the denial of his pre-AEDPA habeas corpus petition.The panel affirmed the district court's denial of the writ with respect to petitioner's conviction; reversed with respect to petitioner's death sentence; and held that admission of Dr. Lynn Gerow's psychiatric testimony during the penalty phase violated petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), and that the violation had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's decision to impose the death sentence. In this case, Gerow was acting at the request of the prosecutor when he went to visit petitioner in jail to determine petitioner's competency to stand trial, Gerow failed to give petitioner his Miranda warnings, and Gerow did not seek or obtain permission from defense counsel to visit or evaluate petitioner. View "Petrocelli v. Baker" on Justia Law

The "term of imprisonment," as used in 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), can include time spent in state custody. If the district court at the original sentencing gave credit for time spent in state custody in determining the defendant's sentence, the "term of imprisonment" on the motion for sentence reduction can include the time spent in both federal and state custody. Defendant filed a motion seeking a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, based on retroactive Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had the discretion to give defendant credit for the four months he served in state custody, thereby reducing his sentence to 66 months in federal custody and resulting in a total "term of imprisonment" of 70 months. Accordingly, the panel vacated the sentence and remanded. View "United States v. Brito" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion vacating the restitution order, denied defendant's petition for panel rehearing, and on behalf of the court denied his petition for rehearing en banc.The panel held that the government's decision not to appeal the district court's evidentiary hearing did not bar the panel's review of its appeal from the district court's restitution order under 18 U.S.C. 3742(b)(1). Therefore, in this case, the government was not foreclosed from challenging the district court's limitation on the restitution order and the panel had jurisdiction to review the order. The panel held that, under 18 U.S.C. 3663A and Ninth Circuit precedent, the district court could properly order restitution for all victims harmed by defendant's scheme, including those harmed by conduct beyond the count of conviction. The panel remanded for the district court to make factual findings to determine whether defendant's activities beyond the BBBS event were sufficiently related to be included for restitution purposes in his overall scheme to defraud. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for attempted illegal reentry, holding that the supplemental instruction the district court provided the jury was erroneous and prejudicial. In this case, the jury was confused with respect to the meaning of specific intent to enter free from official restraint, and asked the district court for clarification. The panel held that the district court's confusing and legally inaccurate supplemental instruction failed to remove the jury's confusion. Consequently, it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted defendant on this record. The panel remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Castillo-Mendez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's application for permission to file a second or successive petition as unnecessary and transferred the matter to the district court with instructions to treat petitioner's habeas petition as a first petition. The panel held that the current habeas petition did not attempt to challenge petitioner's underlying conviction. Rather, petitioner sought only to challenge a new and intervening judgment denying him relief with respect to his sentence. The panel also held that cognizability plays no role in the panel's adjudication of such an application, and that it was the province of the district court to consider cognizability of a habeas petition. View "Clayton v. Biter" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision, holding that petitioner's California conviction for second degree murder on an aiding and abetting theory qualified as an aggravated felony. The panel explained that the Supreme Court, in 2007, reviewed California's law on aiding and abetting, which like that of many jurisdictions looks to the natural and probable consequences of an act the defendant intended. Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 191–93 (2007). The Supreme Court concluded that absent a showing that the law has been applied in some "special" way, a conviction in California for aiding and abetting a removable offense was also a removable offense. The panel held that California law has not materially changed since Duenas-Alvarez was decided and was not applied in any "special" way in petitioner's case. View "Sales Jr. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A criminal forfeiture action does not constitute an "alternate remedy" to a civil qui tam action under the False Claims Act, entitling a relator to intervene in the criminal action and recover a share of the proceeds pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(5). In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly denied relators' motion to intervene in the criminal forfeiture proceeding because the proper remedy was through their FCA civil action. The panel rejected relators' arguments claiming otherwise. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing or in declining to impose sanctions on the government. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Van Dyck" on Justia Law

A criminal forfeiture action does not constitute an "alternate remedy" to a civil qui tam action under the False Claims Act, entitling a relator to intervene in the criminal action and recover a share of the proceeds pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(5). In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly denied relators' motion to intervene in the criminal forfeiture proceeding because the proper remedy was through their FCA civil action. The panel rejected relators' arguments claiming otherwise. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing or in declining to impose sanctions on the government. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Van Dyck" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. The panel held, after supplemental briefing regarding the impact of McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), that neither the Arizona Supreme Court nor the trial court applied an impermissible causal-nexus test to exclude mitigating evidence. In this case, both courts considered all of petitioner's evidence offered in mitigation and found it insufficient to outweigh the serious aggravating factors. Therefore, there was no violation of clearly established federal law. View "Greenway v. Ryan" on Justia Law

In this case, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its previous opinion, denied as moot a petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc; and filed a superseding opinion.Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of all but one of the claims raised in his petition for writ of habeas corpus and the state cross-appealed the district court's grant of relief on petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial. The panel dismissed as unripe the claim the district court certified for appeal, and denied petitioner's motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include uncertified claims. The panel reversed the district court's grant of relief on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim because, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that petitioner was not prejudiced by any deficient performance by his counsel. View "Andrews v. Davis" on Justia Law