Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When deciding an 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) motion, a district court may supplement the original sentencing court's quantity findings only when supplemental findings are necessary to determine the defendant's eligibility for a sentence reduction in light of a retroactive Guidelines amendment. However, the district court may not make supplemental findings that are inconsistent with the findings made by the original sentencing court. A district court has broad discretion in how to adjudicate section 3582(c)(2) proceedings, including whether to hold a hearing when making supplemental findings of drug quantity. In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2), based on Guidelines Amendment 782, which raised the threshold amount of methamphetamine to trigger the maximum base offense level from 1.5 kilograms to 4.5 kilograms. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, without a hearing, that defendant was ineligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2) because Amendment 782 did not lower his applicable guideline range. View "United States v. Mercado-Moreno" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's 90 month sentence after he was convicted of two counts of being a felon in possession of firearms. The panel held that defendant's prior Washington crime of second-degree assault was not categorically a crime of violence where it criminalized more conduct than the generic federal definition of a crime of violence under USSG 2K2.1. The panel also held that the Washington statute was indivisible, because the statute defined a single crime—second-degree assault—and provided seven different "means" by which a person could commit that crime. Accordingly, the panel remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for health care fraud and conspiracy. The panel held that defendant failed to establish that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to counsel because, although she established a conflict of interest, she failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington; the district court did not erroneously fail to grant a continuance; the jury instructions as a whole properly conveyed the government's burden of proof; it was not error to give a deliberate ignorance charge; the district court properly calculated loss under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1); the district court properly applied a leadership role enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(a); and the district court did not err in calculating restitution based upon the entire amount of reimbursements received by defendant from Medicare and Medi-Cal. View "United States v. Walter-Eze" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended majority opinion and concurrence, denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in petitioner's appeal from the denial of his pre-AEDPA habeas corpus petition.The panel affirmed the district court's denial of the writ with respect to petitioner's conviction; reversed with respect to petitioner's death sentence; and held that admission of Dr. Lynn Gerow's psychiatric testimony during the penalty phase violated petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), and that the violation had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's decision to impose the death sentence. In this case, Gerow was acting at the request of the prosecutor when he went to visit petitioner in jail to determine petitioner's competency to stand trial, Gerow failed to give petitioner his Miranda warnings, and Gerow did not seek or obtain permission from defense counsel to visit or evaluate petitioner. View "Petrocelli v. Baker" on Justia Law

The "term of imprisonment," as used in 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), can include time spent in state custody. If the district court at the original sentencing gave credit for time spent in state custody in determining the defendant's sentence, the "term of imprisonment" on the motion for sentence reduction can include the time spent in both federal and state custody. Defendant filed a motion seeking a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, based on retroactive Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had the discretion to give defendant credit for the four months he served in state custody, thereby reducing his sentence to 66 months in federal custody and resulting in a total "term of imprisonment" of 70 months. Accordingly, the panel vacated the sentence and remanded. View "United States v. Brito" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion vacating the restitution order, denied defendant's petition for panel rehearing, and on behalf of the court denied his petition for rehearing en banc.The panel held that the government's decision not to appeal the district court's evidentiary hearing did not bar the panel's review of its appeal from the district court's restitution order under 18 U.S.C. 3742(b)(1). Therefore, in this case, the government was not foreclosed from challenging the district court's limitation on the restitution order and the panel had jurisdiction to review the order. The panel held that, under 18 U.S.C. 3663A and Ninth Circuit precedent, the district court could properly order restitution for all victims harmed by defendant's scheme, including those harmed by conduct beyond the count of conviction. The panel remanded for the district court to make factual findings to determine whether defendant's activities beyond the BBBS event were sufficiently related to be included for restitution purposes in his overall scheme to defraud. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for attempted illegal reentry, holding that the supplemental instruction the district court provided the jury was erroneous and prejudicial. In this case, the jury was confused with respect to the meaning of specific intent to enter free from official restraint, and asked the district court for clarification. The panel held that the district court's confusing and legally inaccurate supplemental instruction failed to remove the jury's confusion. Consequently, it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted defendant on this record. The panel remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Castillo-Mendez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's application for permission to file a second or successive petition as unnecessary and transferred the matter to the district court with instructions to treat petitioner's habeas petition as a first petition. The panel held that the current habeas petition did not attempt to challenge petitioner's underlying conviction. Rather, petitioner sought only to challenge a new and intervening judgment denying him relief with respect to his sentence. The panel also held that cognizability plays no role in the panel's adjudication of such an application, and that it was the province of the district court to consider cognizability of a habeas petition. View "Clayton v. Biter" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision, holding that petitioner's California conviction for second degree murder on an aiding and abetting theory qualified as an aggravated felony. The panel explained that the Supreme Court, in 2007, reviewed California's law on aiding and abetting, which like that of many jurisdictions looks to the natural and probable consequences of an act the defendant intended. Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 191–93 (2007). The Supreme Court concluded that absent a showing that the law has been applied in some "special" way, a conviction in California for aiding and abetting a removable offense was also a removable offense. The panel held that California law has not materially changed since Duenas-Alvarez was decided and was not applied in any "special" way in petitioner's case. View "Sales Jr. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A criminal forfeiture action does not constitute an "alternate remedy" to a civil qui tam action under the False Claims Act, entitling a relator to intervene in the criminal action and recover a share of the proceeds pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(5). In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly denied relators' motion to intervene in the criminal forfeiture proceeding because the proper remedy was through their FCA civil action. The panel rejected relators' arguments claiming otherwise. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing or in declining to impose sanctions on the government. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Van Dyck" on Justia Law