Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegally importing weapons into the United States. The Ninth Circuit held that the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted by the provisions within the weapons importation statute and the legislative history accompanying the statute; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; the motion to suppress was properly denied; in regard to the motion to dismiss the indictment, the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant failed to establish bad faith; the district court acted within its discretion when it elected to issue a curative instruction rather than granting a mistrial for the purported violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence regarding defendant's previous smuggling conduct, and any error in admitting the evidence was harmless; the district court adequately instructed the jury regarding the elements of causing the importation of weapons into the United States; and there was no merit to the contention that the district court's willfulness instruction was incomplete or potentially allowed the jury to convict defendants for merely facilitating or brokering deals. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Ubaldo" on Justia Law

California Vehicle Code 2800.2 is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision concluding that his conviction for fleeing from a police officer under section 2800.2 was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that made him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Given the flaws in the BIA's analysis, the Ninth Circuit accorded minimal deference to the agency's determination that section 2800.2 constitutes a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. The panel held that, under the categorical approach, the conduct criminalized in section 2800.2 does not necessarily create the risk of harm that characterizes crimes of moral turpitude, even though subsection (a) standing alone would appear to contain elements of a dangerous crime. The court explained that, in this case, it did not apply the modified categorical approach because the elements of section 2800.2 were clearly indivisible. View "Ramirez-Contreras v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The en banc court overruled United States v. Hernandez-Franco, 189 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 1999), and held that a Sentencing Guideline other than USSG 2X1.1 expressly covers an inchoate offense only if the Guidelines themselves so indicate. In this case, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and of other federal crimes. Defendant received sentencing enhancements under USSG 2X1.1 for conduct that he contemplated and intended, but did not carry out: abduction, carjacking, and theft. The en banc court affirmed the sentence and clarified how to determine when another Guidelines section "expressly" covers an inchoate offense. The en banc court explained that a sentencing court should begin with Application Note 1 to section 2X1.1, but also may look to the title and content of other Guidelines provisions, or other relevant intra-Guidelines context. Sentencing courts should not, however, rely exclusively on the underlying substantive offense in the United States Code, because statutory language sheds no light on the question of whether a Guidelines section expressly covers the offense, for purposes of section 2X1.1(c). Here, the district court correctly applied section 2X1.1 to determine defendant's sentence and relevant sentencing enhancements because USSG 2B3.1, the Robbery provision, did not expressly cover conspiracies under the Hobbs Act. View "United States v. Simon" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), a defendant may discharge a restitution judgment based on a private settlement between the victim and the defendant. Restitution is a criminal sentence that cannot be extinguished by a victim’s disclaimer of benefits. A district court may redirect restitution payments to the federal Crime Victims Fund when a victim later disclaims restitution without making a direct assignment to the Fund. The statute provides leeway for the court to fashion this practical solution. In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion seeking full satisfaction of a restitution judgment entered after conviction for bank fraud and submitting a false loan application. View "United States v. Hankins" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an order denying Christopher Sherrod's application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The panel joined its sister circuits in holding that an 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction does not qualify as a new, intervening judgment. Therefore, Sherrod must obtain authorization from this court to proceed on a second or successive section 2255 motion. In this case, Sherrod has failed to make a prima facie showing under section 2255(h) of newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law. Therefore, the panel denied his application. View "Sherrod v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence from a stop of a tractor-trailer driven by defendant. The panel held that it did not matter that a Nevada administrative scheme that allowed law enforcement officers to make stops of commercial vehicles and conduct limited inspections without reasonable suspicion was valid on its face, because the objective evidence established beyond doubt that this stop was a pretext for a stop to investigate information of suspected criminal activity short of that necessary to give rise to reasonable suspicion. The panel explained that the consent to search that was obtained after defendant had been detained for approximately an hour was the fruit of the unlawful stop. The evidence found pursuant to the consent search was also fruit of the unlawful stop. View "United States v. Orozco" on Justia Law

If the government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular defendant. Before a presumptively innocent defendant may be shackled, the court must make an individualized decision that a compelling government purpose would be served and that shackles are the least restrictive means for maintaining security and order in the courtroom. The Ninth Circuit construed defendants' appeal as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority and found that it had jurisdiction to consider them. The en banc court held that there was still a live controversy over the shackling policy and the case was not moot because of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness. The en banc court clarified the right to be free from shackles and held that it applies whether the proceeding is pretrial, trial, or sentencing, with a jury or without. Although the en banc court held that the policy was unconstitutional, the court withheld the issuance of a formal writ of mandamus. View "United States v. Sanchez-Gomez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit joined the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that a victim may not directly appeal the restitution component of a criminal defendant's sentence under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. In this case, defendants were convicted of charges related to their involvement in a scheme to receive kickbacks based on overpayments made by the Twenty-Nine Palms Band of Mission Indians. The district court ordered defendants to pay restitution to the Tribe. The Tribe subsequently challenged the "direct loss" and the "other fees" amount of the restitution order. The panel held that the Tribe had Article III standing to appeal an award under the MVRA, but that neither the MVRA nor the Due Process Clause confers a right on the Tribe to challenge restitution awards except as provided in 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3). Accordingly, the panel dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Kovall" on Justia Law

Section 1915A of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915A, applies only to claims brought by individuals incarcerated at the time they file their complaints. Plaintiff, a former prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment and various state laws for injuries he suffered, and the medical treatment he received, after he was struck by shotgun pellets that officers fired. The district court dismissed the complaint. In this case, plaintiff was not incarcerated at the time he filed the complaint and thus should not have been subjected to Section 1915A screening. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. View "Olivas v. Nevada" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a death row inmate, appealed the dismissal of his claims that the ADC policy and practice of inspecting inmates' outgoing legal mail violates his Sixth and First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that ADC's current inspection policy does not satisfy the standard articulated in Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014) (Nordstrom I). The panel explained that the standard was not satisfied because the policy calls for page-by-page content review of inmates' confidential outgoing legal mail. The policy also does not satisfy the four-part test identified in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987), because ADC did not produce evidence of a threat to prison security sufficient to justify its policy, and because feasible, readily available alternatives were apparent. View "Nordstrom v. Ryan" on Justia Law