Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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A petitioner is entitled to use the full one-year statute-of-limitations period for the filing of his state and federal habeas petitions and he need not anticipate the occurrence of circumstances that would otherwise deprive him of the full 365 days that Congress afforded him for the preparation and filing of his petitions. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing the petition for habeas relief in this case and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that it was improper for the district court to fault the petitioner for filing his state petition for postconviction relief late in the statute-of-limitations period in reliance on his having a full year to file both his state and federal petitions, as promised by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244. It was obvious in this instance that petitioner was diligent after the extraordinary circumstance had ended. Therefore, petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling from the time he requested his prison account certificate until he received that certification. View "Grant v. Swarthout" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief, in which plaintiff sought a custody redetermination as he awaits the outcome of administrative proceedings to determine whether he has a reasonable fear of returning to his native country of El Salvador. The panel held that, because plaintiff's reinstated removal order remains administratively final, he was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1231(a); section 1226(a) has no application in this case; and thus plaintiff was not entitled to a bond hearing. View "Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of defendants' motions for sentence reductions under United States Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782 and 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The panel held that USSG 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) does not impermissibly conflict with 28 U.S.C. 991(b) and defendants have not shown that section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) violates equal protection or due process. Under section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), defendants who originally had lower sentences may be awarded the same sentences in section 3582(c)(2) proceedings as offenders who originally had higher sentences. Sentences that were initially tailored to avoid unwarranted disparities and to account for individualized circumstances will now converge at the low end of the amended guideline range. The panel explained that this anomalous result did not create an irreconcilable conflict with section 991(b). Furthermore, while section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) will sometimes produce unequal and arguably unfair results, defendants have not shown that it fails rational basis review. As to due process, defendants' failure to receive a benefit from Amendment 782 was not a result of a retroactive deprivation of a pre-existing benefit. Rather, it was the result of a prospective grant of a limited benefit. View "United States v. Padilla-Diaz" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his confession, holding that the booking exception can apply to questioning even after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel. In this case, the booking exception applied to the questioning of defendant where the questions asked were biographical questions and were not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. View "United States v. Zapien" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, sought habeas relief, raising an instructional error claim regarding California Jury Instruction Criminal 2.15, which allowed the jury to infer guilt of murder from evidence that defendants were in possession of recently stolen property plus slight corroborating evidence. Petitioner quit pursuing his petition because he believed that he "co-submitted" another habeas petition with his codefendant. The codefendant was granted habeas relief. The district court subsequently granted petitioner's motion to reopen his original habeas proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and granted petitioner habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the 60(b) motion was not inconsistent with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) bar on second or successive petitions, AEDPA's statute of limitations, or AEDPA's exhaustion requirement; the district court did not err in reviewing petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion and it did not abuse its discretion in reopening the case under Rule 60(b)(6); and habeas relief was warranted. View "Hall v. Haws" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for panel rehearing, withdrew its memorandum disposition filed December 14, 2016, denied a petition for rehearing en banc as moot, and filed this opinion reversing defendant's conviction for illegal reentry.After defendant was convicted of conspiracy to export defense articles without a license and was removed from the United States, he returned and was convicted of illegal reentry. The panel held that defendant was not originally removable as charged, and so could not be convicted of illegal reentry. In this case, because the statute was overbroad and indivisible, defendant's conviction under 22 U.S.C. 2778 could not serve as a proper predicate for removal—either as an aggravated felony or a firearms offense. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of second degree murder. Petitioner claimed that there was improper outside influence on the jury. The en banc court held that the state appellate court's decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149, and Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229. In denying relief because petitioner's evidence did not prove prejudice, the state court acted contrary to Mattox and Remmer; it was error to rely on the very same statement from Juror 10's declaration both to raise the presumption of prejudice and to rebut it; and the state court denied petitioner a hearing on prejudice under the wrong legal standard. Accordingly, the en banc court remanded with instructions to hold a hearing to determine the circumstances of Juror 10's misconduct, the impact on the jury, and whether it was prejudicial. View "Godoy v. Spearman" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's 21 month sentence after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. The panel held that the district court did not err by applying a 16 level enhancement after determining that defendant's prior aggravated assault conviction in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 39-13-102 was a crime of violence for purposes of USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), because it entailed the use or threatened use of physical force. The panel also held that defendant waived his ability to contest the revocation of his supervised release and thus the appeal must be dismissed. View "United States v. Perez-Silvan" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's 54 month sentence after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. The panel held that the district court did not err by concluding that defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under Texas Penal Code 22.01 and 22.02 was a crime of violence for purposes of USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), because both means of committing aggravated assault entailed the use of violent, physical force. Finally, defendant waived his ability to contest the district court's revocation of his supervised release and the appeal must be dismissed. View "United States v. Calvillo-Palacios" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence, holding that his prior third degree robbery conviction under Oregon law was not a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The panel explained that the term "physical force" as used in the Oregon statute is not coextensive with the term's use in the ACCA. View "United States v. Strickland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law