Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and other charges and sentenced to death. This court subsequently found that the Arizona Supreme Court had erred in not considering certain mitigation evidence, because it found such evidence was not connected to petitioner’s actions at the time of the murder. The court reversed and remanded to the district court to issue a conditional writ ordering petitioner's release from his death sentence unless the State were to initiate proceedings either to correct the constitutional error or to vacate the death sentence and impose a lesser sentence. The district court so ordered and the state court affirmed the death sentence. Petitioner then moved the district court for an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Arizona Supreme Court was powerless to correct the constitutional error, because the law had changed since Styers I. Petitioner made a Ring v. Arizona claim before the state court, arguing that the conditional writ of habeas corpus required that petitioner be re-sentenced and that a jury must find the aggravating factors rendering him eligible for the death penalty. The state court denied the claim on the ground that petitioner's sentence was final. The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus necessarily renders non-final a conviction or sentence that was predicated on constitutional error, and the conditional writ of habeas corpus in this case did not vacate petitioner’s death sentence. Therefore, the court concluded that the state court's determination that petitioner's sentence remained final at the time of the second independent review was not contrary to federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Finally, the state court considered the mitigating evidence and decided to give it little weight. Neither Tennard v. Dretke, nor Eddings v. Oklahoma, requires more. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Styers v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of seven counts of making false statements to a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014, and six counts of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a). Defendant's convictions stemmed from a tax evasion scheme in which defendant used false identities to open bank accounts in order to obtain cashier's checks to buy gold. The court joined the Fourth Circuit in holding that section 1014 does not contain any requirement of a risk of loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute heroin, distribution of heroin, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and a special finding that the quantity of heroin was at least one kilogram. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard, the court concluded that the district court did not err in declining to apply the multiplier method given the facts of this case; the district court did not err in disregarding the circumstantial evidence of the secret storage compartment in defendant’s vehicle, capable of holding 30 pounds of drugs; and the testimonial and physical evidence cannot support a finding of one kilogram. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this issue. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred by concluding that the pattern of transactions constituted circumstantial evidence that defendants must have agreed to distribute as much heroin as they could and that the distribution would have continued in a similar fashion; it would be speculative to infer that defendants agreed to any future transactions such that they would reach the one kilogram mark; and the court's conclusion is further supported by the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v. Hickman. Because this error was not harmless, the court reversed the jury’s quantity finding, vacated defendant’s sentence on all counts, and remanded for resentencing. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's evidentiary ruling permitting the government to ask defendant's sister about his prior state convictions for drug trafficking and escape. View "United States v. Navarrette-Aguilar" on Justia Law

Defendant, an undocumented alien, was convicted in 2009 of violating California narcotics laws and was subsequently placed in administrative removal proceedings. Defendant was subsequently ordered removed in 2010 and was criminally charged with illegal reentry in 2011. The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and defendant was convicted of illegal reentry. The court held that the ICE agent who conducted defendant’s administrative removal proceeding violated her due process rights by telling her that an attorney would not have been able to help her when she was facially eligible for a U-visa, a form of hardship relief available to a person convicted of an aggravated felony. The court also held that defendant was prejudiced by the due process violation because it was plausible that defendant would have obtained a U-visa had she applied for one in 2010, notwithstanding the fact that she had already been placed in administrative removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment and vacated the conviction. View "United States v. Cisneros-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In Appeal No. 15-50033, the government challenged the district court’s pretrial order granting motions in limine to exclude certain pieces of evidence in a case in which Defendant DeCinces, Mazzo, and others are charged with insider-trading offenses relating to the stock of Advanced Medical Optics. In Appeal No. 15-50058, Mazzo challenged the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a securities fraud charge under 18 U.S.C. 1348 for failing to state an offense and for violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. In regard to Appeal No. 15-50033, the court concluded that it has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3731 to entertain the government's interlocutory appeal where the district court's order granting the motions in limine was sufficiently final, and the district court abused its discretion when it granted the motions in limine excluding the IntraLase and Bausch and Lomb evidence. In regard to Appeal No. 15-50058, the court concluded that it lacked pendant appellate jurisdiction over Mazzo's interlocutory appeal, and the court lacked jurisdiction over Mazzo's interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of defendants' motions in limine in Appeal No. 15-50033 and dismissed Appeal No. 15-50058. View "United States v. DeCinces" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of one count of forcible rape of a minor and eight counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor. The court affirmed the district court's grant of petitioner's writ of habeas corpus where an interrogating officer read him his Miranda rights and confirmed that petitioner understood those rights. The officer then asked if petitioner wanted to talk to him and petitioner answered, "no." The court held that 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) does not bar habeas review of petitioner’s Miranda claim, and the court concluded, on de novo review, that petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated when his interrogation tape was played and his apology letter was read at trial. In this case, the state court's decision that the "no" response was ambiguous and equivocal in light of other statements is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, and it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court further concluded that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus. View "Garcia v. Long" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his civil rights action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). A motions panel granted plaintiff's motion for in forma pauperis (IFP) status on appeal. Defendant filed a motion to revoke plaintiff's IFP status under the "three strikes" provision of the Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Defendant cites the Supreme Court's recent decision in Coleman v. Tollefson, where the Supreme Court left open the question presented in this case. The court held that a prisoner is entitled to IFP status on appeal from the trial court's dismissal of a third complaint instead of in an attempt to file several additional complaints. In Thaut I, failure to exhaust was not “clear on the face of the complaint,” and the magistrate judge considered a declaration about the prison grievance system submitted by defendant Thaut when making her decision. The court concluded that Thaut I was not dismissed for failure to state a claim, but was rather a grant of summary judgment to defendant. Consequently, it was not a strike under the PLRA. The court concluded that Thaut II and Thaut III constitute two strikes. The court denied defendant's motion to revoke the IFP status on appeal, holding that dismissal of the complaint in the action underlying this appeal does not constitute a “prior occasion” under the PLRA, and plaintiff had not accumulated a third strike before he filed this appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to revoke plaintiff's IFP status. View "Richey v. Dahne" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief. The court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s ruling that no Miranda violation occurred was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. In this case, the state court unreasonably applied Miranda v. Arizona and Davis v. United States by concluding that petitioner's invocation of the right to counsel was ambiguous or equivocal. The state court also contravened or unreasonably applied Smith v. Illinois when it used petitioner’s post-invocation responses to cast doubt on the clarity of his request for counsel. The court concluded, however, that the state court's finding that any Miranda violation was harmless was not unreasonable in light of a witness's statements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mays v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of the production of child pornography, transportation of a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, and obstruction of justice. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as time barred. Under section 2255(f), there is a one-year period of limitation to file a collateral attack on a federal conviction that runs from the latest of four events, including the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. The court held that when a judgment imposes a sentence but leaves the amount of restitution to be determined, the one-year statute of limitations to file a section 2255 motion does not restart when the specific amount of restitution is later entered. In this case, defendant waived his claim for equitable tolling. Even assuming defendant's counsel did give erroneous advice on the filing deadline, this is not the kind of extraordinary circumstance that compels equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Defendants Lloyd, Keskemety, Nelson, Baker, and Greenhouse appealed their convictions and sentences for selling unregistered securities when they worked in "boiler rooms" soliciting investments in partnerships to finance the production and distribution of movies. The court affirmed Lloyd's sentence but concluded that Keskemety’s sentence for managing the Florida telemarketing boiler room improperly included fraud losses from the California boiler room that Lloyd managed. Therefore, the court vacated Keskemety's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court reversed Nelsons' conviction based on evidentiary rulings, vacated the sentence, and remanded. The court affirmed Baker's conviction due to the overwhelming evidence against him, making the evidentiary errors harmless, but the court vacated Baker’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because of an error in calculating the Guidelines sentence. Finally, the court found no error as to Greenhouse's sentence and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Lloyd" on Justia Law