Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for 32 counts of health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1347. Defendant challenged the Second Superseding Indictment on several grounds. The court rejected defendant's statute of limitations claims, concluding that the district court did not err by allowing the government to proceed on revised Count 41 where the alleged scheme was executed less than five years before the original indictment was filed. So long as the “indictment was written so as to allege only one execution of an ongoing scheme,” the court held that the government may charge a single health care fraud scheme in violation of section 1347 even when several acts in furtherance of the scheme fall outside the statute of limitations. The court rejected defendant's other challenges to the indictment, concluding that Count 41 did not improperly broadened the charges against him; Count 41 did not allege an execution of a fraudulent scheme, and the Second Superseding Indictment did not improperly expand the indictment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Holden" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. Defendant claims that the district court erred procedurally by failing to state on the record the applicable sentencing guidelines range and erred substantively in calculating the applicable sentencing guidelines range. The court held, however, that defendant was sentenced according to the plea agreement and that his waiver of appellate rights is valid and enforceable. The court rejected defendant's argument that the waiver is unenforceable because the requirement that he be sentenced “in accordance with” the plea agreement is ambiguous, such that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary, and that he was not sentenced “in accordance with” the plea agreement because his aggravated assault conviction was not a conviction for a crime of violence. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Medina-Carrasco" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-Indian who lives on tribal land with his common-law wife, was convicted of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court applied a 4-level sentencing enhancement for defendant's use of a firearm in connection with another felony offense, as well as his condition of supervised release permitting searches of his computers and other electronic devices by a U.S. Probation Officer. The court held that due to the Assimilative Crimes Ac (ACA), 18 U.S.C. 13, 1152, it does not matter whether the requisite felony offense occurred on tribal lands or within the state’s jurisdiction in order to apply an enhancement for discharging a firearm under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); so long as a district court makes a properly supported factual finding from the record before it, establishing some nexus between computer use and the need for the sentence imposed to accomplish deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the defendant, it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose a condition of supervised release permitting the search of a defendant’s personal computers; and the court affirmed the judgment because the district court made such a permissible factual finding establishing nexus in this case, and because defendant is subject to punishment for committing the felony offense of disorderly conduct involving weapons in connection with his felon in possession conviction. View "United States v. Bare" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court found that defendant had three prior convictions for violent felonies pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B); two robbery convictions under California Penal Code (CPC) 211, and one assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction under Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 200.471. Defendant challenged the district court’s imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence, contending that his prior convictions are not “violent felony” convictions as defined by the ACCA. The court held that a violation of CPC 211 is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA because it criminalizes conduct not included within the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony." Therefore, the district court incorrectly determined that it was required to apply the mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first and second degree robbery, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief. The court concluded that the state court acted contrary to clearly established law when it based its prima facie analysis on the discredited, pre-Johnson v. California standard articulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Box. In this case, it was appropriate for the district court to determine de novo whether petitioner had raised an inference of racial bias; the court also agreed with the district court that, contrary to the state court’s conclusion, petitioner did raise an inference of discrimination more than sufficient to meet his “minimal” burden at Batson Step One; the fact that a prosecutor peremptorily strikes all or most veniremembers of the defendant’s race – as was the case here – is often sufficient on its own to make a prima facie case at Step One; if a prosecutor testifies both to his general jury selection approach and that he is confident one of these race-neutral preferences was the actual reason for the strike, this is sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy Batson Step Two; this evidence alone will seldom be enough at Step Three to overcome a prima facie case unless the prosecutor has a regular practice of striking veniremembers who possess an objective characteristic that may be clearly defined; and, in this case, petitioner's prima facie case was sufficient to carry his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike of an African American juror was motivated in substantial part by race. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Shirley v. Yates" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry into the United States. The district court increased defendant's base offense level because of a prior aggravated assault conviction in New Jersey. The court concluded that the provision of the New Jersey statute under which defendant was convicted does not qualify as federal generic aggravated assault and therefore is not a “crime of violence." In this case, the New Jersey statute punishes conduct committed with only extreme indifference recklessness and is therefore broader than the general federal offense, and New Jersey’s definition of “attempt” is broader than the federal generic definition. Because this error was not harmless, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Garcia-Jimenez" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of petitioner's habeas petition. Petitioner argued that California’s post-conviction system of judicial review creates such a long period of delay between sentencing and execution that only an “arbitrary” few prisoners actually are executed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Under Teague v. Lane, federal courts may not consider novel constitutional theories on habeas review. The court concluded that, in this case, petitioner's claim asks the court to apply a novel constitutional rule and therefore, the claim is barred by Teague. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Jones v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The court rejected petitioner's argument that he was denied due process when a prosecution investigation destroyed the defense strategy tape; petitioner's confrontation rights were not violated when the trial court admitted various statements from petitioner's sister; petitioner's confrontation rights were not violated by the introduction at trial of multi-level hearsay testimony; the court rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase; and petitioner's right to an impartial jury was not violated when the trial court failed to dismiss a juror who admitted to hearing a news report that suggested petitioner would hurt his guards if he were given the death penalty. Because the California Supreme Court's decision was reasonable, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Zapien v. Martel" on Justia Law

After the district court conducted two competency hearings, the district court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and referred defendant to a federal medical center for further evaluation. On appeal, defendant challenged the second commitment order, arguing that the second competency hearing violated his constitutional rights. The court held that, as a person whose competence to stand trial was in question, defendant could not legally waive his right to counsel; thus he was entitled to be represented by an attorney at his competency hearing. Therefore, the district court was required to provide defendant with an attorney during his competency proceedings. Applying the meaningful adversarial testing standard, the court concluded that the district court's appointment of amicus counsel satisfied this requirement of the right to counsel. Accordingly, defendant was sufficiently represented by counsel at the competency hearing to overcome his denial of counsel claim. The court further concluded that any potential abuse of discretion in not allowing defendant to speak at a hearing on supplemental briefing was harmless, there are no clear procedural violations under 18 U.S.C. 4241, and there is no reason to reassign this case to a different district court judge. The court affirmed the judgment and remanded. View "United States v. Kowalczyk" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for distribution of child pornography and possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's restitution order. The court agreed that the district court erred when it failed to disaggregate losses caused to the victim due to the crimes perpetrated against her by the original abuser and those caused to her by others who possessed or distributed images of the abuse which were made by the original abuser. Accordingly, the court vacated the restitution order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Galan" on Justia Law