Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's finding of removeability and determination that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The court affirmed the BIA’s finding that petitioner's violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.690(2) and 199.480, possession of a credit card or debit card without the consent of the cardholder, is a categorical CIMT. Further, petitioner is not entitled to a petty offense exception in section 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) because the exception is only available to aliens whose CIMT conviction did not have a maximum possible penalty of imprisonment for a year or more. The court concluded that a conspiracy conviction under Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.480 is a gross misdemeanor potentially punishable by one year imprisonment, and is covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Although petitioner was not sentenced to a year imprisonment, the court deferred to the BIA’s reasonable approach of considering the sentence that could have been imposed, not the actual sentence. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner's reliance on the Fourth Circuit decision in Soliman v. Gonzales is unavailing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Petitioner's first habeas petition, arguing that the prosecutor excluded an African-American prospective juror on account of her race, was denied by the district court, but this court remanded in light of Cook v. LaMarque, which clarified that a peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause if it is “motivated in substantial part” by race “regardless of whether the strike would have issued if race had played no role.” On remand, the district court found that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race and granted petitioner habeas relief. On appeal, the state raised several challenges. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that Cook merely clarified the standard of proof for Batson claims, but it did not set forth a new rule for purposes of Teague v. Lane; the California Supreme Court’s decision is not owed deference under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254, because it was contrary to clearly established federal law, and the presumption of correctness afforded to the state trial court’s factual findings is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence; the district court was not required to conduct its own evidentiary hearing, because it did not reject the magistrate judge’s credibility determination; and the district court’s finding that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race was not clearly erroneous View "Crittenden v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to bank fraud after stealing $264,824.10 from her employer, RBS. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's restitution order. The court concluded that the textual reach of 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4) manifestly covers the entirety of the attorneys’ fees awarded to RBS, not just those incurred leading up to and during the grand jury proceedings; the district court was manifestly aware of the law governing an award of attorneys’ fees; the district court properly concluded that RBS’s taxes and penalties were foreseeable and directly and proximately caused by defendant’s embezzlement, with no break in the chain of causation; the negotiated amount of the IRS’s abatement did not relieve the district court of its responsibility to determine the amount of loss; and in reducing RBS' requested attorneys' fees, the district court did not conclude in making this reduction that the fees incurred were not reasonably necessary, just that the billing rate charged was too high. The court also concluded that there was no statutory error and no violation of due process. The court rejected defendant's remaining argument under Paroline v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Eyraud" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his two-year sentence for violating his supervised release conditions. The court held, consistent with the rule adopted by other circuits, that “a sentence is not final—and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a) does not apply—when there is no formal break in the proceedings from which to logically and reasonably conclude that sentencing had finished. . . .” In this case, the court held that the district court’s initial, twelve-month-and-a-day sentence was not a binding sentence within the meaning of Rule 35. Accordingly, neither 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) nor Rule 35 deprived the district court of jurisdiction to alter defendant's sentence due to his apparently disrespectful conduct during the ongoing sentencing hearing. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence for bankruptcy fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United States, scheme to commit wire fraud against the United States and the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, and conspiracy to submit false claims. Defendant's conviction on Count 1 rested on a charge for which the jury instructions did not match the indictment. At issue is whether an error in jury instructions here amounted to “plain error” under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The court overruled United States v. Caldwell to the extent that it held that the failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime is per se prejudicial. The court held that Caldwell is inconsistent with the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Neder v. United States, which does not permit a jury instruction error to be considered a structural error. In this case, although defendant did not object to the invalid jury instructions at trial regarding Count 1, he has not intentionally relinquished or abandoned his ability to challenge them on appeal, and such error was plain or obvious because the jury instructions clearly do not match the indictment. However, the court concluded that the prosecution adequately proved the missing element of the crime, and that there is not a “reasonable probability” that the error in jury instructions affected the outcome. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Conti" on Justia Law

Defendant and his two cousins were convicted of various crimes arising out of their attempt to rob a federal officer, who was posing as a buyer of illegal firearms. The court rejected defendant's contention that no reasonable jury could have rejected his claim of self-defense with respect to the assault charge under 18 U.S.C. 111(b) where the evidence does not support defendant's version of events so decisively that a rational jury would have been compelled to believe him; there was sufficient evidence to support the robbery conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2114(a) where the agent actually had the buy money in his charge, control, or custody; there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371 where the jury could reasonably have concluded that the scope of the conspirators’ agreement was not limited to assaulting and robbing an acquaintance; and the court concluded that defendant did not need to know that the buy money the agent had in his custody belonged to the United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Mobley" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's decision holding that his conviction for possessing child pornography under California Penal Code 311.11(a) is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(I). The court held, however, that petitioner's conviction under section 311.11(a) does not qualify as an aggravated felony because it is categorically broader than the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). Further, section 311.4(d) is indivisible, and the modified categorical approach was not applicable in this instance where section 311.11(a)’s reference to “sexual conduct” does not create different crimes, each one depending on the particular sexual conduct depicted in an alleged image of child pornography. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavez-Solis v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and participation in criminal-street-gang activity. Petitioner subsequently appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the application of California Penal Code 2933.6 to change his credit earning status violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inform him of the chance he would lose his credit-earning status. The court agreed and reversed, concluding that amended section 2933.6 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to prisoners, like petitioner, who committed their underlying criminal conduct before the amendment’s enactment. The court remanded with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "Hinojosa v. Davey" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction and sentence for importation of marijuana. The court concluded that, although the government misstated the law by erroneously telling the jury that it could convict her based on her admission of carrying Marijuana to Mexico on the date of her arrest, such misstatements did not substantially prejudice her and do not warrant reversal. The court also concluded that defendant failed to show that she suffered prejudice from vouching; highlighting the weakness of a defense, characterizing it as incredible, and noting the defendant’s failure to produce evidence is not improper, particularly where the government correctly states the burden of proof; the prosecutor's comments on defendant's demeanor were permissible because she testified; and there was no cumulative error warranting reversal of her conviction and sentence. Finally, the court rejected her claims of evidentiary errors and upheld the district court's obstruction of justice enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty for being a removed immigrant found in the United States and subsequently appealed his 27-month sentence. The parties jointly requested a fast-track departure but the district court did not grant the requests. The court held that the fast-track departure is purely discretionary, such that a joint request does not necessitate departure under the Guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentencing and judgment because defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Rosales-Gonzales" on Justia Law