Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of the production of child pornography, transportation of a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, and obstruction of justice. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as time barred. Under section 2255(f), there is a one-year period of limitation to file a collateral attack on a federal conviction that runs from the latest of four events, including the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. The court held that when a judgment imposes a sentence but leaves the amount of restitution to be determined, the one-year statute of limitations to file a section 2255 motion does not restart when the specific amount of restitution is later entered. In this case, defendant waived his claim for equitable tolling. Even assuming defendant's counsel did give erroneous advice on the filing deadline, this is not the kind of extraordinary circumstance that compels equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Defendants Lloyd, Keskemety, Nelson, Baker, and Greenhouse appealed their convictions and sentences for selling unregistered securities when they worked in "boiler rooms" soliciting investments in partnerships to finance the production and distribution of movies. The court affirmed Lloyd's sentence but concluded that Keskemety’s sentence for managing the Florida telemarketing boiler room improperly included fraud losses from the California boiler room that Lloyd managed. Therefore, the court vacated Keskemety's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court reversed Nelsons' conviction based on evidentiary rulings, vacated the sentence, and remanded. The court affirmed Baker's conviction due to the overwhelming evidence against him, making the evidentiary errors harmless, but the court vacated Baker’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because of an error in calculating the Guidelines sentence. Finally, the court found no error as to Greenhouse's sentence and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for 32 counts of health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1347. Defendant challenged the Second Superseding Indictment on several grounds. The court rejected defendant's statute of limitations claims, concluding that the district court did not err by allowing the government to proceed on revised Count 41 where the alleged scheme was executed less than five years before the original indictment was filed. So long as the “indictment was written so as to allege only one execution of an ongoing scheme,” the court held that the government may charge a single health care fraud scheme in violation of section 1347 even when several acts in furtherance of the scheme fall outside the statute of limitations. The court rejected defendant's other challenges to the indictment, concluding that Count 41 did not improperly broadened the charges against him; Count 41 did not allege an execution of a fraudulent scheme, and the Second Superseding Indictment did not improperly expand the indictment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Holden" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. Defendant claims that the district court erred procedurally by failing to state on the record the applicable sentencing guidelines range and erred substantively in calculating the applicable sentencing guidelines range. The court held, however, that defendant was sentenced according to the plea agreement and that his waiver of appellate rights is valid and enforceable. The court rejected defendant's argument that the waiver is unenforceable because the requirement that he be sentenced “in accordance with” the plea agreement is ambiguous, such that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary, and that he was not sentenced “in accordance with” the plea agreement because his aggravated assault conviction was not a conviction for a crime of violence. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Medina-Carrasco" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-Indian who lives on tribal land with his common-law wife, was convicted of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court applied a 4-level sentencing enhancement for defendant's use of a firearm in connection with another felony offense, as well as his condition of supervised release permitting searches of his computers and other electronic devices by a U.S. Probation Officer. The court held that due to the Assimilative Crimes Ac (ACA), 18 U.S.C. 13, 1152, it does not matter whether the requisite felony offense occurred on tribal lands or within the state’s jurisdiction in order to apply an enhancement for discharging a firearm under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); so long as a district court makes a properly supported factual finding from the record before it, establishing some nexus between computer use and the need for the sentence imposed to accomplish deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the defendant, it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose a condition of supervised release permitting the search of a defendant’s personal computers; and the court affirmed the judgment because the district court made such a permissible factual finding establishing nexus in this case, and because defendant is subject to punishment for committing the felony offense of disorderly conduct involving weapons in connection with his felon in possession conviction. View "United States v. Bare" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court found that defendant had three prior convictions for violent felonies pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B); two robbery convictions under California Penal Code (CPC) 211, and one assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction under Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 200.471. Defendant challenged the district court’s imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence, contending that his prior convictions are not “violent felony” convictions as defined by the ACCA. The court held that a violation of CPC 211 is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA because it criminalizes conduct not included within the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony." Therefore, the district court incorrectly determined that it was required to apply the mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first and second degree robbery, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief. The court concluded that the state court acted contrary to clearly established law when it based its prima facie analysis on the discredited, pre-Johnson v. California standard articulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Box. In this case, it was appropriate for the district court to determine de novo whether petitioner had raised an inference of racial bias; the court also agreed with the district court that, contrary to the state court’s conclusion, petitioner did raise an inference of discrimination more than sufficient to meet his “minimal” burden at Batson Step One; the fact that a prosecutor peremptorily strikes all or most veniremembers of the defendant’s race – as was the case here – is often sufficient on its own to make a prima facie case at Step One; if a prosecutor testifies both to his general jury selection approach and that he is confident one of these race-neutral preferences was the actual reason for the strike, this is sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy Batson Step Two; this evidence alone will seldom be enough at Step Three to overcome a prima facie case unless the prosecutor has a regular practice of striking veniremembers who possess an objective characteristic that may be clearly defined; and, in this case, petitioner's prima facie case was sufficient to carry his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike of an African American juror was motivated in substantial part by race. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Shirley v. Yates" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry into the United States. The district court increased defendant's base offense level because of a prior aggravated assault conviction in New Jersey. The court concluded that the provision of the New Jersey statute under which defendant was convicted does not qualify as federal generic aggravated assault and therefore is not a “crime of violence." In this case, the New Jersey statute punishes conduct committed with only extreme indifference recklessness and is therefore broader than the general federal offense, and New Jersey’s definition of “attempt” is broader than the federal generic definition. Because this error was not harmless, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Garcia-Jimenez" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of petitioner's habeas petition. Petitioner argued that California’s post-conviction system of judicial review creates such a long period of delay between sentencing and execution that only an “arbitrary” few prisoners actually are executed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Under Teague v. Lane, federal courts may not consider novel constitutional theories on habeas review. The court concluded that, in this case, petitioner's claim asks the court to apply a novel constitutional rule and therefore, the claim is barred by Teague. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Jones v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The court rejected petitioner's argument that he was denied due process when a prosecution investigation destroyed the defense strategy tape; petitioner's confrontation rights were not violated when the trial court admitted various statements from petitioner's sister; petitioner's confrontation rights were not violated by the introduction at trial of multi-level hearsay testimony; the court rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase; and petitioner's right to an impartial jury was not violated when the trial court failed to dismiss a juror who admitted to hearing a news report that suggested petitioner would hurt his guards if he were given the death penalty. Because the California Supreme Court's decision was reasonable, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Zapien v. Martel" on Justia Law