Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for killing a police officer, appealed the district court's denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner alleged that the prosecution violated his due process rights by calling a witness who served as a courtroom bailiff and security officer during a portion of petitioner's trial. The court concluded that the state court's denial of petitioner's Turner v. Louisiana claim was not unreasonable because Turner only applies where the testifying deputy was both a key witness and had continuous and intimate contacts with jurors. The court concluded that the state court did not unreasonably apply Batson v. Kentucky in upholding the prosecutor's strike of two African American jurors. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, concluding that counsel's performance was not deficient for failure to present mitigating evidence where the mitigating effect of the evidence that the jury did not hear was limited in scope and would have opened the door to inflammatory and prejudicial aggravating evidence. Accordingly, the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington in this case. The court denied the petition for habeas relief. View "Cummings v. Martel" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her sentence and conviction for violating the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801-5872, alleging that the district court failed to instruct the jury on the mens rea element of the charge. The court agreed, concluding that, if Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 9.34 is strictly followed, as it was here, it may result in an erroneous instruction. The Model Instruction is susceptible of being unwittingly misinterpreted as calling for the inclusion of a description of the weapon’s identifying characteristics (such as make, caliber and serial number). Because such error is not harmless, the court reversed the conviction and sentence, remanding for a new trial. View "United States v. Montoya-Gaxiola" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of unregistered destructive devices and appealed his sentence of 60 months' imprisonment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in including defendant's prior convictions for the severed counts in its computation of defendant's criminal history score. In this case, the district court’s inclusion of defendant's convictions for use of a chemical weapon and for making a false statement in the calculation of his criminal history complied with U.S.S.G. 4A1.2. Defendant's prior concurrent sentences for use of a chemical weapon and making false statements were prior sentences under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(1) because they involved conduct that was unrelated to his possession of unregistered destructive devices. However, the court concluded that they did not constitute multiple sentences under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(2). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Fries" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her convictions for subscribing false federal tax returns and her sentence for those convictions and several fraud-related convictions. The court agreed with defendant that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence about her audits by Idaho state tax authorities. The evidence was not relevant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b); and, even if it was relevant, introducing the evidence fails the Rule 403 balancing test. Because such error is not harmless, the court vacated defendant's convictions for subscribing false tax returns. Defendant is entitled to a new trial on the tax charges, but not on the other convictions. The court also vacated defendant's sentence, concluding that defendant must be resentenced after liability on a potential retrial for tax violations is resolved. The court concluded that the district court misinterpreted the Sentencing Guidelines and applied the wrong rule. On remand, the losses resulting from defendant’s fraud should be calculated under the general rules of application note 3(A) of section 2B1.1 rather than under any of the special rules of application note 3(F), and re-sentencing should be on an open record to permit both the government and defendant to submit evidence supporting their theories of loss. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her convictions for subscribing false federal tax returns and her sentence for those convictions and several fraud-related convictions. The court agreed with defendant that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence about her audits by Idaho state tax authorities. The evidence was not relevant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b); and, even if it was relevant, introducing the evidence fails the Rule 403 balancing test. Because such error is not harmless, the court vacated defendant's convictions for subscribing false tax returns. Defendant is entitled to a new trial on the tax charges, but not on the other convictions. The court also vacated defendant's sentence, concluding that defendant must be resentenced after liability on a potential retrial for tax violations is resolved. The court concluded that the district court misinterpreted the Sentencing Guidelines and applied the wrong rule. On remand, the losses resulting from defendant’s fraud should be calculated under the general rules of application note 3(A) of section 2B1.1 rather than under any of the special rules of application note 3(F), and re-sentencing should be on an open record to permit both the government and defendant to submit evidence supporting their theories of loss. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine (Count One), and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant challenged his conspiracy conviction. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant on the conspiracy count. The court concluded, however, that defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because the district court failed to give a specific unanimity instruction. Because the district court plainly erred, the court reversed defendant's conviction as to Count One. View "United States v. Lapier, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine (Count One), and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant challenged his conspiracy conviction. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant on the conspiracy count. The court concluded, however, that defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because the district court failed to give a specific unanimity instruction. Because the district court plainly erred, the court reversed defendant's conviction as to Count One. View "United States v. Lapier, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder of Kevin Thorpe and second degree murder of Laura Craig, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. The court held that the prosecution's suppression of a material part of its deal with a key witness violated Brady v. Maryland, with respect to petitioner’s conviction for the first degree murder. The court granted the writ as to that conviction because the witness's testimony was central to the prosecution's case that petitioner premeditated and deliberated regarding Thorpe's murder. Had the jury known of the prosecution's serious doubt as to the witness's mental competence and of its successful efforts to prevent him from obtaining a competency test until after he testified, it would have reached a different result on that count. However, the court concluded in a memorandum disposition filed along with this opinion that, had the witness been impeached by evidence of the secret deal with the prosecution regarding his competency, there is not a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result with respect to petitioner's convictions for the second-degree murder of Craig, kidnapping, and theft. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to those counts. View "Shelton v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder of Kevin Thorpe and second degree murder of Laura Craig, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. The court held that the prosecution's suppression of a material part of its deal with a key witness violated Brady v. Maryland, with respect to petitioner’s conviction for the first degree murder. The court granted the writ as to that conviction because the witness's testimony was central to the prosecution's case that petitioner premeditated and deliberated regarding Thorpe's murder. Had the jury known of the prosecution's serious doubt as to the witness's mental competence and of its successful efforts to prevent him from obtaining a competency test until after he testified, it would have reached a different result on that count. However, the court concluded in a memorandum disposition filed along with this opinion that, had the witness been impeached by evidence of the secret deal with the prosecution regarding his competency, there is not a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result with respect to petitioner's convictions for the second-degree murder of Craig, kidnapping, and theft. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to those counts. View "Shelton v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, appealed the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial and request for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that defendant was not entitled to a new trial or evidentiary hearing based on a juror’s affidavit alleging that other jurors discussed the evidence against him and made up their minds about his guilt before the start of deliberations. The court rejected defendant's contention that Rule 606(b) provides leeway for a court to delve into the internal affairs of the jury simply because the discussions took place before deliberations commenced. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shiu Lung Leung" on Justia Law