Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged the district court’s finding that she lied to her probation officer when she denied using any “illicit drugs” (Standard Condition No. 3) and a special condition of supervised release that prohibits her from knowingly using or possessing any substance that she “believe[s] is intended to mimic” the effects of a controlled substance (Special Condition No. 9). The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to uphold Standard Condition No. 3 because the government never demonstrated that defendant in fact lied when she denied consuming an “illicit drug,” as it never established that the variety of spice that she smoked contained a controlled substance. In this case, defendant cannot be punished because her probation officer asked the wrong question and the district court was also wrong to suggest that defendant’s failure to be more forthcoming was a “material omission.” The court also concluded that Special Condition No. 9's restriction was impermissibly vague because it could cover innocuous substances such as chocolate and coffee. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Aquino" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter, applied for permission to file a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, seeking to bring a Brady claim and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court concluded that United States v. Buenrostro forecloses petitioner's argument that his new petition is not “second or successive," where the factual predicate of petitioner's claim could have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence. The also court concluded that petitioner cannot make out a prima facie case of satisfying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2), because he did not exercise due diligence by failing to include the Brady claim in his original petition. Further, the actual innocence exception articulated in Schlup v. Delo does not abrogate section 2244(b)(2)(B). Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Gage v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) for the pipe bomb explosion of the Diversity Office in which three people were injured and property was damaged. Section 844(i) makes it a crime to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive, property that is “used in” interstate commerce or in “activity affecting” interstate commerce. The court concluded that an intrinsically noneconomic building can qualify under section 844(i) if the building actively engages in interstate commerce or activity that affects interstate commerce, as there is no categorical exclusion of any type of building. In this case, the Diversity Office regularly engaged in activities that affected interstate commerce. Because the Diversity Office had a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to support defendant’s prosecution under section 844(i), and his facial and as-applied contentions lack merit, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Mahon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegally reentering the United States after deportation, arguing that his deportation violated due process because the IJ incorrectly determined he had previously been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). The court held that defendant's prior conviction under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., for possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute, resulting in a sentence exceeding one year, was for an aggravated felony under the INA; because the INA incorporates felony violations of the CSA into its definition of “aggravated felony,” and because defendant was convicted of a felony violation of the CSA, his conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony on its face; and therefore, there is no need to compare the elements of his conviction to the elements of a generic federal offense of possession with intent to distribute marijuana to determine if his conviction was for an aggravated felony, as set forth in Taylor v. United States and Moncrieffe v. Holder. The court also held that the district court did not err when it instructed the jury on the evidence it could consider to determine alienage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Corn" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two murders, appealed the denial of his federal habeas petition. The court concluded that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it determined that federal law did not require a live evidentiary hearing to assess the reliability of a witness’s testimony; fair minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision that the evidence that petitioner committed the murder was sufficient; it was not unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude that petitioner’s counsel conducted a thorough investigation into his mental state and that such investigation satisfied the performance prong of Strickland v. Washington; petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice on his Strickland claim; petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel’s alleged deficient performance in failing to investigate adequately the possibility of organic brain damage prejudiced him at the penalty phase; and the court rejected petitioner's claims regarding California's death penalty procedures. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court declined to certify two claims. The court certified three previously-uncertified claims and held that petitioner is not entitled to relief. View "Boyer v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the money that was seized via Western Union transfers was unconstitutional. At the time, Arizona officials executed warrants to seize wire transfers that they claimed were highly likely to be connected to criminal conduct. The court joined its sister circuits and held that absolute immunity is available to prosecutors in the context of civil forfeiture proceedings; Holmes’s service and execution of the seizure warrants were not protected by absolute immunity; and the court remanded to the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether Holmes's actions in serving and executing the warrants are protected by qualified immunity. The court also concluded that Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard's supervision of the preparation of and application for seizure warrants are protected by absolute immunity. However, the court concluded that Goddard's supervision of the service and execution of the seizure warrants are not protected by absolute immunity because his supervision was a function of a supervising police officer, not a supervising prosecutor. The court further concluded that plaintiffs waived their official capacity claim against the successor Arizona Attorney General Thomas Horne. The court expressed no opinion as to the issue of class certification. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Torres v. Goddard" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court’s grant of partial habeas corpus relief to petitioner, a death row inmate. Petitioner cross-appealed the district court's decision not stay habeas corpus proceedings and challenged the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief on other claims. The court concluded that the depravity of mind aggravating factor and jury instruction are contrary to law clearly established by the Supreme Court, and that the jury’s consideration of the unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor was not harmless. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to stay proceedings due to his alleged incompetency. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief related to petitioner's death sentences; affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion for a stay based on competency; and vacated in part the district court's denial of guilt-phase habeas relief, remanding for further proceedings. View "Rogers v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and related charges, appealed the district court's order denying his motion for relief from judgment pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). Petitioner properly filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court in 2001; the district court denied the petition in 2004; and petitioner's counsel, forgetting that he represented petitioner, did not inform petitioner of the denial. Petitioner discovered that his petition was denied six years later when he sent a letter inquiring about his status. The court concluded that the district court erred by finding that petitioner was not abandoned by his attorney; counsel's failure to communicate with petitioner, to preserve petitioner's ability to appeal, and to withdraw from the case clearly constituted abandonment; the district court abused its discretion to the extent the district court relied on lack of diligence or failure to file within a reasonable time to deny the motion for relief; and petitioner's motion for relief was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Foley v. Biter" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of a sex crime, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to order DNA testing of the victim's clothing. At issue was whether new DNA tests that make previously useless DNA capable of identification amount to “newly discovered DNA evidence” under the Innocence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3600. The court concluded that defendant identified a theory of defense that would establish his actual innocence and that the identity of the perpetrator was at issue in the trial. The court also concluded that defendant successfully rebutted the rebuttable presumption of untimeliness where the DNA evidence must be deemed “newly discovered.” Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Watson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her convictions relating to the provision of false information on a passport application in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1542, arguing that the district court’s jury instructions erroneously failed to condition her convictions on a finding that she intended to violate the passport laws. The court joined its sister circuits and held that a conviction under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 1542 does not require specific intent. Because all of defendant's arguments about purported flaws in the jury instructions depend on the notion that specific intent is required by section 1542, her arguments fail. The court also concluded, under United States v. Nazemian, that defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated when the government introduced translated statements without calling the translators to testify. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Aifang Ye" on Justia Law