Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, convicted of three counts of perjury, brought a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the district court, seeking to withdraw her guilty plea. Defendant supported her petition with one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), alleging that defense counsel affirmatively misrepresented the adverse immigration consequences of her conviction. The court held that United States v. Kwan's holding that affirmative misrepresentations by counsel regarding immigration constitutes deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington clearly survives Padilla v Kentucky. Therefore, Kwan retroactively applied to defendant's case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition and remanded for the district court to evaluate the merits of the petition in the first instance. View "United States v. Chan" on Justia Law

Defendant, owner of All Metals Processing Company, appealed his conviction of one count of storing and causing the storage of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6928(d)(2)(A). The court concluded that even accepting defendant's argument based on the technical definitions of “storage” and “disposal” contained in the RCRA, he was clearly engaged in storing hazardous waste in the sealed and intact containers left in the premises at issue. Therefore, it is not necessary for the court to resolve the issue whether, if he had been so charged, defendant could not have been found guilty of both storage and disposal of the containers that were leaking. The court also concluded that, while defendant may have abandoned the premises in which the containers were stored, the containers were not abandoned. Thus, defendant is guilty for "causing the storage of waste" under 18 U.S.C. 2(b). The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Roach" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of failing to provide notice of a change of address as a registered sex offender, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state superior court two days before the one year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). The superior court denied the petition and, under California law, petitioner had the right to present a new state habeas petition to the next level of the California court system. However, petitioner chose not to file any further in state court and, instead, filed a petition for habeas corpus in district court. The district court subsequently dismissed the petition as time-barred. The court concluded that the period during which this “properly filed” state petition was “pending” was not counted against the year that petitioner had to file his federal petition; this uncounted period ended on May 7, 2012, when the superior court denied his state habeas petition, leaving him two days to file for federal habeas relief; and because petitioner waited until May 15, 2012, to file a federal petition, the district court properly dismissed it as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maes v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry after deportation or removal. The court concluded that the new definition in section 321(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), made theft offenses aggravated felonies so long as the defendant was sentenced to one year or more in prison, rather than five years or more; that new definition applies to convictions “before, on, or after the date of enactment;” in this case, the IJ correctly decided that defendant's robbery conviction was an aggravated felony because the term of imprisonment for his offense exceeded one year; the IJ correctly decided that defendant’s robbery conviction was an aggravated felony, and did not err when she failed to inform him that he might be entitled to relief under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h); but, the IJ erred when she failed to tell defendant of the possibility that 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) relief was available and that violated his due process rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Guzman-Ibarez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy and insider trading, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction under United States v. Newman. The court determined that defendant has not waived his argument where the failure to raise the issue properly did not prejudice the Government because both parties have had a full opportunity to brief the issue and address it at oral argument. The court found that the evidence was more than sufficient for a rational jury to find both that the inside information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty, and that defendant knew of that breach at the time he traded on it. The court declined to follow Newman, which defendant reads to hold that evidence of a friendship or familial relationship between tipper and tippee, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate that the tipper received a benefit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Salman" on Justia Law

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 3565(c), conditions the “power of the court” to adjudicate probation violations after the probation period expires on the issuance of “a warrant or summons” before the expiration date. The court held that section 3565(c) is jurisdictional and that when Congress used the words “warrant or summons,” it meant them. If the government suspects wrongdoing and wants to extend the probation period, section 3565(c) provides easy-to-follow instructions: get a warrant or summons before the probation expires. Because the government did not do so, the district court lacked jurisdiction to extend defendant's probation beyond its termination date. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court’s post-termination order revoking defendant’s probation and imposing penalties for purported probation violations. View "United States v. Pocklington" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to being a previously removed alien illegally found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate that his expedited removal in 2012 was fundamentally unfair; and in refusing to order the government to produce statistics about the numbers of individuals with a background similar to his who were granted a form of discretionary relief. The court concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate that his 2012 expedited removal was fundamentally unfair where, even assuming the existence of a due process violation, defendant has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice flowing from such violation. Defendant failed to demonstrate that absent such violation, relief in the form of withdrawal of application of admission was plausible. Further, the statistics defendant sought are not presently available and can not be accurately compiled even with the expenditure of significant resources. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, appealed the denial of his motion to stay and abey his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition while he exhausted some of his claims in state court. The court held that, in the context of a section 2254 habeas petition, this type of motion is generally (but not always) dispositive as to the unexhausted claims. When it is dispositive, a magistrate judge is without authority to “hear and determine” such a motion, but rather must submit a report and recommendation to the district court. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Petitioner moved to stay and abey his petition while he exhausted a claim that was not yet a part of his federal habeas petition. The court held that petitioner’s motion was likewise dispositive of that new unexhausted claim, such that the magistrate judge was without authority to “hear and determine” it, but rather was required to submit a report and recommendation to the district court. Further, the court rejected petitioner’s argument that the magistrate judge lacked authority to grant petitioner's request to remove two unexhausted claims from his petition. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bastidas v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Petitioner, charged in a fifty-count indictment, petitioned for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order directing the district court not to condition its acceptance of the parties’ plea agreement on the government’s obtaining consent from alleged victims before dismissing the remaining counts and seeking an order that would prevent the district court from conditioning the United States Attorney’s dismissal of the remaining counts in the indictment on a showing that the government would struggle to prove petitioner’s guilt on those counts, as well as seeking reassignment to a different district judge to preserve the appearance of justice. The court concluded that the district court erred by adding a particular term to the plea agreement and inserting itself into the parties' plea discussions and concluded that the Bauman v. United States District Court factors weigh in favor of granting mandamus relief. In this case, the court concluded that the appearance of justice will best be served by reassignment to a different judge. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and ordered that the case be reassigned to another district judge. View "Benvin v. USDC NVR" on Justia Law