Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Vance and Shane conditionally pled guilty to knowingly and willfully conspiring to kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles, in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. 703(a) and 707(b), (Count I) and unlawfully trafficking in migratory bird parts, in violation of 16 U.S.C. 703(a), 707(b) (Counts II–IV). On appeal, defendants challenged the district court’s denial of their pretrial Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Felony Claim. The court concluded that that even under defendants’ interpretation of the MBTA, Count I, which charges a conspiracy to kill, transport, and offer for sale and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles, charges a felony; and that, in regard to Count II, the allegations state a misdemeanor only, not a felony. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part as to Count I, but reversed in part as to Count II. The court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Crooked Arm" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of kidnapping and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Both parties appealed the district court's grant in part and denial in part of petitioner's federal habeas petition. The court upheld petitioner's conviction for the kidnappings and murder but overturned his sentence of death; the court rejected the State's request that the court invoke its discretion to sua sponte apply the non-retroactivity bar under Teague v. Lane to bar petitioner’s instructional error claim; the court rejected the State’s challenge to the district court’s holding that the trial court violated petitioner’s constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte in accordance with People v. Green; and the court rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his trial counsel’s failure to request a Green instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of partial habeas relief. View "Pensinger v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment alleging that he was found in the United States subsequent to an order of removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court concluded that defendant was not removable based on his conviction for third-degree child molestation in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 9A.44.089 where the conviction does not categorically meet the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor due to the missing elements of the statutory provision. Because the Washington statute is indivisible, the court may not resort to the modified categorical approach in determining whether defendant’s conviction constituted an aggravated felony that would warrant his removal. The court reversed the district court's judgment where the government is unable to demonstrate, as required for a violation of section 1326, that defendant was removed pursuant to a valid removal order. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Petitioners Nettles and Santos appealed the district court's dismissal of their habeas petitions. At issue was the appropriate standard for determining whether a claim is cognizable under the federal habeas statute. Applying Skinner v. Switzer, the court concluded that a claim challenging prison disciplinary proceedings is cognizable in habeas only if it will “necessarily spell speedier release” from custody, meaning that the relief sought will either terminate custody, accelerate the future date of release from custody, or reduce the level of custody. To the extent the court's prior decisions held that a claim is cognizable in habeas if success on the claim is likely to, or has the mere potential to, affect the length of a petitioner’s confinement, they are overruled as irreconcilable with Skinner. In Nettle's case, the court held that his claim is not cognizable under the federal habeas statute because neither expungement of the 2008 rules violation report nor restoration of the lost good-time credits would necessarily accelerate the future date of his release from custody. In Santos's case, the remedy Santos seeks of expungement of the gang validation from his record and release to the general prison population, “can fairly be described as a quantum change in the level of custody.” Further, success on his claim would result in his immediate release to the general prison population. Therefore, the court held that his claim that he has been subjected to greater restrictions of his liberty without due process of law is properly brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the district court erred in dismissing his petition. View "Nettles v. Grounds" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession and receipt of child pornography, as well as conspiracy to produce child pornography and to travel internationally to engage in illicit sex. The court reiterated, in light of United States v. Davenport and other circuit precedent, that the offense of possession of child pornography is a lesser included offense of receipt of child pornography. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is constitutional error to enter a conviction against a defendant for both receipt and possession of child pornography for the same conduct. In this case, defendant's conviction for possession of child pornography must be vacated. The court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict; the search of defendant's computer did not exceed the scope of the search warrant; and the district court's comments at sentencing do not constitute procedural or constitutional error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions for receipt of child pornography and conspiracy to produce pornography and to travel internationally to engage in illicit sex. The court remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate the conviction for possession of child pornography. View "United States v. Johnston" on Justia Law

The United States appealed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of illegal drugs and a firearm found in a search of his car after a traffic stop. Applying Rodriquez v. United States, the court held that the officer’s prolongation of the traffic stop to conduct both an ex-felon registration check and a “dog sniff” violated the Fourth Amendment unless the officer had independent reasonable suspicion to support the prolongations. The court vacated and remanded for the district court to address whether the officer had such reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas corpus petition, challenging the district court's conclusion that his detention by immigration authorities never constitutes "official detention" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 3585(b), the statute governing the calculation of a term of imprisonment. Petitioner was detained by ICE prior the commencement of his criminal sentence of illegal reentry. The court held that when immigration officials detain an alien pending potential prosecution, the alien is entitled under section 3585(b) to credit toward his criminal sentence; an alien is entitled to credit for all time spent in ICE detention subsequent to his indictment or the filing of formal criminal charges against him; and where a factual dispute exists, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing as to whether an alien’s detention by ICE prior to the date of his indictment or the filing of criminal charges against him constituted detention pending prosecution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether and when during the pre-indictment period petitioner's detention status changed from detention pending deportation to detention pending potential prosecution. On remand, the government has the burden of proving that the pre-indictment detention was for the purpose of deportation rather than potential prosecution. View "Zavala v. Ives" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five counts of distribution of methamphetamine, one count of distribution of cocaine, and one count of conspiracy to distribute. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on Count Six, one of the counts for distribution and challenged his sentence. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of Count Six where there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that defendant aided and abetted the distribution of methamphetamine. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by not finding the FBI memo at issue to be a basis for a charge of sentencing manipulation. Although the court is deeply troubled by the participation of a law enforcement officer, the investigation fell just shy of constituting outrageous government conduct. Here, there was evidence that the government extended its investigation to build a stronger case against defendant. Of particular concern was that the government’s first two confidential sources were both convicted of serious offenses during the period they were acting as confidential sources against defendant. Thus, it was reasonable for law enforcement to extend the investigation with more controlled purchases by a more credible confidential source. Further, the existence of the FBI memo did not require the district court to conclude that the investigators extended the investigation solely to enhance defendant’s potential sentence. The court also concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to determine these incidents were properly calculated in determining defendant’s criminal history. Finally, the district court did not err in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for firearm possession and the court rejected defendant's argument that the drug quantity attributed to him was unforeseeable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Boykin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of robbery and murder, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Petitioner argued, inter alia, that one of the guilt-phase instructions given at his trial violated his due process rights by advising the jury that if it finds “premeditation,” it has necessarily found “deliberation.” Petitioner contended that this instruction relieved the state of its burden to prove every element of the offense. The district court found that the state trial court had committed constitutional error, but that the error was harmless. The court concluded, however, that the error was prejudicial where the court had no reason to believe that the jury in fact decided to convict petitioner based on a felony-murder theory rather than on the more traditional first-degree murder charge. The evidence of petitioner’s cocaine intoxication and emotional agitation might well have created reasonable doubt as to the third element of first-degree murder, the one the court’s instructions failed to identify as an independent element: deliberation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the writ unless the State of Nevada elects to pursue a new trial within a reasonable time. View "Riley v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for, inter alia, committing a violent crime in aid of a racketeering enterprise (“VICAR”): conspiracy to murder rival gang members (Count Two). The court assumed, without deciding, that a specific unanimity instruction was required for Count Two because the breadth of the indictment, in conjunction with the nature of the evidence, raised the specter of different jurors concluding that defendant participated in different conspiracies to murder different rival gang members.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion where the effect of the district court’s additional unanimity instruction was to ensure juror unanimity on all of the elements of the violent crime underlying Count Two and to prevent different jurors from finding defendant guilty based on different conspiracies to murder different gang members. The court joined its sister circuits and held that, so long as jurors in a federal criminal trial unanimously agree that the Government has proven each element of a conspiracy, they need not unanimously agree on the particular overt act that was committed in furtherance of the agreed-upon conspiracy. In this case, even though the additional unanimity instruction in this case did not require unanimous agreement on a particular overt act, defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated. Further, the vast majority of the evidence on Count Two provided the jury with discrete groups of potential intended victims on which it could unanimously agree. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law