Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial based in part on the district court's denial of his attorney's motion to withdraw. United States v. Rivera-Corona held that an indigent criminal defendant need not establish a conflict with his attorney amounting to the constructive denial of counsel as a prerequisite to substituting appointed counsel for his retained attorney. The court reiterated Rivera-Corona's intertwined rules: (1) A defendant enjoys a right to discharge his retained counsel for any reason “unless a contrary result is compelled by ‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice,’” and (2) if the court allows a defendant to discharge his retained counsel, and the defendant is financially qualified, the court must appoint new counsel for him under the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”), 18 U.S.C. 3006A. In this case, the district court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to discharge retained counsel where the district court prevented defendant from discharging his retained lawyer and so refused to appoint counsel. Neither the reasons the district court offered after its own detailed inquiry, the additional reasons the government has suggested in its briefing, nor any reason the court can infer from the record, provide any ground necessary to the fair, efficient, and orderly administration of justice to justify the denial of the motion. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's transportation and advertising convictions. The court vacated the convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Nathan Stoliar was convicted and sentenced for crimes related to fraudulent schemes involving the false generation of renewable fuel credits under United States law, false representations regarding the type of fuel being sold, and the export of biodiesel without retiring or purchasing renewable energy credits adequate to cover the exported amount as required under United States law. Canada filed a petition for restitution from Soliar but the district court denied the order. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. Because a petitioner seeking restitution under the CVRA must also rely on a substantive restitution statute, Canada sought restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1). The court concluded that Canada's claim for restitution is based on events that are insufficiently related to the schemes set forth in the indictment and the facts supporting Stoliar's guilty plea. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his habeas petition. The district court, however, granted a certificate of appealability on petitioner's Brady v. Maryland claim. Petitioner was found guilty of possessing stolen property - a ring commemorating Randy Street's 1991-1992 national college wrestling championship. Petitioner received a 10-25 year sentence under Nevada's habitual offender statute. Street told the prosecutor and the detective that he may have taken the ring off outside and left it there. Rather than share this evidence with the defense, the prosecution suppressed it. The court concluded that Street's recollections that he shared with the State before trial were favorable to petitioner and suppressed to petitioner's prejudice. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "Comstock v. Humphries" on Justia Law

After a lockdown was imposed on African American inmates at a California state prison, plaintiff filed suit against prison officials under the Eighth Amendment for injuries he suffered related to shower restrictions and under the Equal Protection Clause for the race-based classification of the lockdown. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, the court considered the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. California, which held that strict scrutiny applies to claims challenging racial classifications in prison, and the line of authorities, such as Turner v. Safley, that instruct courts to give deference to correctional officials with respect to constitutional claims involving prison regulations. The court affirmed as to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim where the district court correctly stated the knowledge requirement outlined in Farmer v. Brennan. The court affirmed as to the district court's decision not to appoint counsel because there was no abuse of discretion. The court reversed, vacated, and remanded as to plaintiff's equal protection claim where the district court erred when it instructed the jury that the prison's obligations under the Eighth Amendment compete with its obligations under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A prisoner's success on an equal protection claims is not dependent on whether the government met its obligations under the Eighth Amendment. In light of Johnson's clear direction, the district court also erred by allowing the jury to defer generally to officials when considering plaintiff's equal protection claim, rather than assessing whether the challenged race-based actions were narrowly tailored. Finally, the error was prejudicial. View "Harrington v. Scribner" on Justia Law

The South Korean government seeks to prosecute petitioner for murder and requests that he be extradited from the United States. Petitioner had served a prison term in South Korea after being convicted of destroying evidence in connection with the murder. A magistrate judge certified the extradition and petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the certification order. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition where the lapse-of-time provision in the 1998 extradition treaty between the United States and South Korea did not impose a mandatory bar on petitioner's extradition. Further, the double-jeopardy provision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing American military personnel and their dependents in South Korea does not provide a basis for a court to bar petitioner's extradition where the individual rights established through the SOFA are not judicially enforceable. The court's decision does not foreclose petitioner from seeking relief from the Secretary of State. View "Patterson v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of 14 counts of wire fraud, making false statements to a financial institution and tax evasion. During the jury deliberation, one juror became ill and was excused. The district court denied defendant's request to seat an alternate juror and directed the 11-person jury to continue its deliberations under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3). The court held that courts have discretion under Rule 23(b)(3) to proceed with 11 jurors after excusing a juror for good cause during deliberations, even when alternates are available; the district court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding with 11 jurors where the jury had deliberated for more than a day and had asked and received answers to five substantive questions and where substituting an alternate likely would have imposed substantial additional work on the jury, the parties and the district court; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant, age eighteen, aimed a green laser pointer at an incoming seven-passenger Cessna Citation jet as it approached the airport near his home. The laser struck the pilot’s eye, momentarily blinding him, but the pilot was able to safely land the aircraft. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to aiming a laser at the Cessna Citation Jet. The U.S. Probation Office concluded that Defendant “recklessly endangered” the safety of an aircraft within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2A5.2(a)(2). The district court agreed with the Probation Office and imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment. The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) the government did not show by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant was aware of the risks created by his conduct; and (2) thus, the district court materially erred in applying the recklessness enhancement, which resulted in a miscalculated Guidelines range. View "United States v. Gardenhire" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiring to smuggle undocumented immigrants into the United States. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court committed plain error by not instructing the jury on how to evaluate dual role testimony of the case agent, who offered both lay and expert testimony, but the error was not prejudicial; (2) the district court did not err in allowing an expert witness to testify about common practices of alien smuggling organizations; (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (4) the district court did not err in admitting redacted I-213 immigration forms. View "United States v. Torralba-Mendia" on Justia Law

Appellant, a California state prisoner serving a life sentence for first-degree murder and attempted robbery, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court more than six years after the statutory filing deadline had passed. Appellant sought equitable tolling on the basis of his previous counsel’s handling of the case. The district court dismissed the habeas petition as time-barred, concluding that Appellant had not met his burden of proving entitlement to equitable tolling. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment dismissing Appellant’s federal habeas petition, holding (1) this Court’s cases holding that egregious attorney misconduct may serve as a basis for equitable tolling, even if the misconduct falls short of abandonment, remain good law; and (2) the professional misconduct of Appellant’s former counsel constituted an extraordinary circumstance, and that misconduct prevented Appellant from filing his federal habeas petition on time. Remanded for a determination of whether Appellant diligently pursued his rights through the date of filing. View "Luna v. Kernan" on Justia Law

Appellant, an Idaho state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and capital sentence for two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of grand theft. The district court denied the petition. Appellant subsequently filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 60(d) for relief from the district court’s judgment, arguing (1) Martinez v. Ryan gives cause for the state-law procedural default of three of the claims he raised in his initial federal habeas petition; and (2) he was entitled to relief under Rules 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3) because the state’s attorneys perpetrated a fraud on the federal district court. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s claims related to judicial bias were not the type of claims that could be pursued under Martinez; (2) Appellant’s claim relating to his counsel’s conflict of interest did not satisfy this circuit’s test for establishing cause to excuse procedural default under Martinez; and (3) Appellant failed to establish a factual basis to show that the state Attorney General’s office perpetrated a fraud on the court during Appellant’s federal habeas proceedings. View "Pizzuto v. Ramirez" on Justia Law