Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial, Appellant was convicted for felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Appellant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the firearm and that the district court erred by failing to call for closing arguments from the parties before rendering its guilty verdict. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) waiver of the right to give a closing argument may be implicit and inferred from counsel’s conduct, and Appellant in this case implicitly waived his right to give a closing argument. View "United States v. Richter" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of his stepdaughter. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence on direct appeal. Defendant later filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, listing thirteen purported errors by the Washington state courts. The district court denied habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Washington Supreme Court did not act unreasonably on rejecting Defendant’s claim that his shackling on the first day of jury selection for the sentencing trial deprived him of the constitutional right to due process; (2) the Washington Supreme Court reasonably rejected Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (3) the Washington Supreme Court was not unreasonable in rejecting Defendant’s claims that he was deprived of his right to trial by an impartial jury because a juror lied during voir dire; and (4) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s challenges to his conviction and death sentence. View "Elmore v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of murder and two counts of burglary in California state court and sentenced to death. Defendant sought habeas relief in California courts, to no avail. Defendant subsequently filed a federal habeas petition. The district court affirmed the conviction, concluding (1) Defendant’s guilt-phase challenges failed; and (2) counsel for Defendant at the penalty phase of trial had performed deficiently by failing to investigate and present certain mitigating evidence, but Defendant failed to establish that he had been prejudiced as a result. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction but reversed as to Defendant’s sentence, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase; but (2) erred in concluding that counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice Defendant with respect to the penalty-phase claim. Remanded. View "Doe v. Ayers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive use of force by prison guards. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the guards. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by permitting three prisoner-witnesses to refuse to answer his questions because, according to the prisoner-witnesses, they were simply unwilling to testify, among other proffered explanations. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion as a matter of law by disclaiming any authority to compel the prisoner-witnesses to answer Plaintiff’s questions and by permitting the prisoners to opt out of testifying; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Barnett v. Norman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced for using a chemical weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 229(a), and making false statements to the FBI. Defendant’s convictions arose from his detonation of chlorine bombs, which required the evacuation of an entire neighborhood. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) prosecution pursuant to section 229 is within the federal government’s prosecutorial authority, and Defendant’s conviction is entirely distinguishable from prosecution of the purely local crime at issue in Bond v. United States; (2) the district court properly rejected Defendant’s requested jury instruction that section 229(c) requires the government to prove that Defendant’s criminal act was against property owned, leased, or used by the United States; (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant; (4) the district court correctly held that statements of Defendant’s co-participant were admissible pursuant to Fe. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) as co-conspirator statements; (5) the district court did not err in rejecting Defendant’s proffered missing evidence instruction; and (6) the district court did not err in applying a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Fries" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to having illegally re-entered the United States after having previously been deported. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-four months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that his prior conviction for violation of Cal. Penal Code 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence in an opinion filed January 12, 2015. Here the panel amended its opinion and denied Defendant’s petitions for panel rehearing and panel rehearing en banc, holding (1) contrary to Defendant’s contention, United States v. Grajeda, which held that a conviction under section 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence, remains good law; and (2) there was justification for the district court’s exercise of discretion in imposing supervised release. View "United States v. Jimenez-Arzate" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted scheming to defraud a financial institution in violation of 18.U.S.C. 1344(1). Defendant’s scheme was to use PayPal to convince banks that he was a certain bank customer and thus had authority to transfer money out of the customer’s bank accounts and into the PayPal account in Defendant’s control. Defendant sought a jury instruction that, under section 1344(1), the government had to prove not only that he intended to target the bank but that he also intended to target the bank as the principal financial victim of the fraud. The district court refused to give the proffered instruction, concluding that section 1344(1) required proof only that Defendant intended to deceive the bank and not that he intended the bank to bear the loss. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) for a violation of section 1344(1), the government need not prove that a defendant intended the bank to be the principal financial victim of the fraud; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly refused jury instructions that included such a requirement. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant’s arguments on appeal rested on the so-called “buyer-seller rule,” under which a conviction for conspiracy cannot be based solely on the purchase of an unlawful substance but, rather, requires proof of an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime consisting the sale itself. Defendant argued that the evidence presented to the jury established only a buyer-seller transaction, not that she was engaged in a conspiracy with the seller in connection with subsequent distribution. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) the district court did not err by not giving a jury instruction regarding the buyer-seller rule, as the instruction was not necessary under the circumstances of this case; and (3) Defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal were not persuasive. View "United States v. Moe" on Justia Law

Defendant, a California death row inmate, was convicted of the murders of four people. For the murders, the California courts imposed two death sentences, one in Orange County and one in Riverside County. Defendant filed habeas corpus petitions in both cases, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at various phases of each trial. The district court denied the petitions. The Ninth District affirmed, holding (1) counsel in the Orange County trial did not render deficient performance; (2) any deficient performance in the Riverside County trial did not result in prejudice to Defendant; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a stay to determine Defendant’s competency while the Orange County petition was pending. View "Medina v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Pursuant to plea agreements, Aaron and Tiffany Hymas were each convicted of one count of wire fraud in connection with making false statements in a mortgage loan application. The Fourth Circuit (1) vacated Aaron’s sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment, holding that the district court in sentencing should have applied the clear and convincing standard of proof, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard, to determine the extent of losses that were not the subject of Aaron’s conviction, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the district court did not err calculating the defendants’ respective restitution amounts. View "United States v. Hymas" on Justia Law