Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to plea agreements, Aaron and Tiffany Hymas were each convicted of one count of wire fraud in connection with making false statements in a mortgage loan application. The Fourth Circuit (1) vacated Aaron’s sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment, holding that the district court in sentencing should have applied the clear and convincing standard of proof, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard, to determine the extent of losses that were not the subject of Aaron’s conviction, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the district court did not err calculating the defendants’ respective restitution amounts. View "United States v. Hymas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of committing and conspiring to commit wire fraud in connection with a scheme to secure mortgages by using false information in loan applications and supporting documents. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the district court’s decision to exclude, as highly prejudicial and possessing no probative value, all evidence of Defendant’s alleged abuse at the hands of her then-boyfriend (and alleged co-conspirator), and to instruct the jury to disregard this evidence in its entirety, was error; and (2) the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded. View "United States v. Haischer" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful reentry into the United States. In sentencing Defendant, the district court determined, using the modified categorical approach, that Defendant’s prior state conviction for aggravated assault was a “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In determining that Defendant had pled to the generic elements of aggravated assault, the court relied upon a single statement by defense counsel, during the state court plea colloquy, concerning the factual basis for the defendant’s plea. The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding that the district court’s application of the modified categorical approach contravened the principles underlying Descamps v. United States. Specifically, the Court held that in this case, where the Shepard documents did not prove that Defendant was convicted of the crime of intentional (or knowing) aggravated assault, the modified categorical approach was inappropriate. Remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Marcia-Acosta" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a California state prisoner who was serving a forty-year “three strikes” sentence for first-degree burglary. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), arguing that her attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of mental illness in Petitioner's Romero motion asking the sentencing court to disregard two of her strikes. The district court denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) even assuming that the applicability of Strickland v. Washington to noncapital sentencing is clearly established such that federal courts can afford relief from a state court’s flawed application of Strickland in that context, Petitioner could not prevail under the review standard imposed by the AEDPA; and (2) the state court’s findings that trial counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and that submission of Petitioner’s medical evidence would not have resulted in a successful Romero motion and a concomitantly reduced sentence were not unreasonable applications of the Strickland standard. View "Daire v. Lattimore" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner was convicted by a California superior court jury of first-degree murder and street terrorism. After unsuccessfully appealing to the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court, Petitioner filed several state habeas petitions in the trial court and the California Court of Appeal. All of the petitions were denied. In 2010, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 in district court. The court dismissed the petition with prejudice on the ground that it was untimely. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner was not entitled statutory tolling of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year statute of limitations during the pendency of his state court petitions; and (2) Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling due to the actions of his former trial counsel, as he had ample time to file a protective federal petition and his pro se status did not change the result. View "Curiel v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted of importing heroin and methamphetamine. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment due to the government’s destruction of potentially useful evidence - video footage of a Port of Entry pedestrian line on the morning of Defendant’s arrest - that might have supported her claim of duress. The district court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the government’s failure to preserve the video footage violated her due process right to present a complete defense. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Defendant’s due process rights were violated because (1) a Homeland Security agent, whose probable cause statement omitted any reference to Defendant’s claims of duress, knew of the apparent exculpatory value of the of the video and acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it; and (2) Defendant was unable to find comparable evidence to support her defense of duress. Remanded with directions to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Zaragoza-Moreira" on Justia Law

Leroy Cropper, an Arizona prisoner, stabbed a correctional officer to death. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of conspiring with Cropper to commit a deadly or dangerous assault by a prisoner. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction. The trial court denied the petition. The Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petitions for review. Petitioner later sought federal habeas relief, alleging, for purposes of this appeal, that the evidence adduced at trial was constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction. The district court denied relief. The Ninth Circuit remanded. On remand, the district court again rejected Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner’s pro se filings before the Arizona courts fairly presented his sufficiency of the evidence claim, which was sufficient to exhaust his state remedies and avoid a procedural default of that claim; and (2) the Arizona trial court did not apply Jackson v. Virginia in an objectively unreasonable fashion when it rejected Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. View "Kyzar v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Nevada state prisoner, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging her convictions. Here, the Ninth Circuit withdrew an opinion filed on September 10, 2014 and filed a new opinion reversing the district court’s order dismissing Petitioner’s application as untimely. The Ninth Circuit held that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner from filing her application for federal habeas relief, and therefore, she was entitled to equitable tolling of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) statute of limitations. Specifically, the Court held (1) Petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling under 2244(d)(2) for the duration of her state post-conviction proceedings; (2) Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling during a significant period of time in which she was pursuing her rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way; and (3) because Petitioner filed her petition within the tolled limitations period, her petition was timely filed. View "Rudin v. Myles" on Justia Law

The government of Mexico requested extradition certification of Appellant on kidnapping charges. Based on the statements of five witnesses implicating Appellant in the alleged kidnapping for ransom of a mother and her two children, the magistrate judge, serving as the extradition court, found that there was probable cause to believe that Appellant was guilty of the alleged kidnapping and, accordingly, certified extradition. Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, arguing that the extradition court’s probable cause determination was not supported by competent evidence because it failed to consider evidence of torture. The district court denied relief. The Ninth circuit affirmed, holding (1) the magistrate judge properly excluded from its probable cause determination evidence that two witnesses, who had provided key inculpatory statements, later recanted and declared that their statements were obtained by torture; and (2) the district court properly denied Appellant’s habeas petition because the extradition court’s probable cause determination was supported by competent evidence. View "Santos v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unauthorized reentry into the United States after deportation. In sentencing Defendant, the district court assessed a 16-level enhancement based on its conclusion that Defendant was previously convicted in New Jersey of an offense the district court concluded was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in imposing the 16-level sentencing enhancement, as (1) Defendant, who pled guilty to the New Jersey offense, was “convicted of an offense” under Chapter Four of the sentencing guidelines; and (2) the conduct for which Defendant was convicted fit within the guideline definition of a forcible sex offense and thus the definition of a crime of violence. View "United States v. Mendez-Sosa" on Justia Law