Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit money laundering and money laundering, as well as failure to appear. The court concluded that, although the district court should have acted more promptly in granting defendant's request to appear pro se, defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated at the March 6, 2009 initial appearance and arraignment. The court found no Sixth Amendment violation in the record as a whole where the district court's actions during the July 28 initial appearance and arraignment on the failure-to-appear charges ensured that there was no constitutional violation. When the court granted defendant's request to proceed pro se, he was given more time to prepare for trial than if his motion had been granted at the original March 6 initial appearance and arraignment. Further, the court found no violation of defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial where his trial began 54 non-excludable days after his January 12, 2012 appearance, well within the 70-day statutory limit. In this case, the government concedes that the sentence, restitution, and forfeiture imposed by the district court were based on a loss amount that included money laundered before defendant joined the conspiracy. Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing and recalculation of restitution and forfeiture. The court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Rice" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a postrevocation sentence of twenty months of supervised release, arguing that the new term exceeds the maximum period that can be imposed under 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). Section 3583(h) authorizes a district court to impose a postrevocation term of supervised release up to the statutory maximum, but requires the court to reduce the length of supervised release by "any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release." The court held that the text of section 3583(h) and the structure of section 3583 support the government's argument that "any term of imprisonment" means any "terms of imprisonment imposed with respect to the same underlying offense." The court rejected defendant's rule of lenity of argument, concluding that there is no "grievous ambiguity," and no "reasonable doubt persists" regarding the court's construction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the postrevocation sentence. View "United States v. Hertler" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which prohibits a deported alien from being "found in" the United States after reentering without permission. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that defendant failed to meet his burden in collaterally attacking his underlying deportation proceeding where the district court reasoned that both of defendant's convictions (kidnapping in violation of California Penal Code 207(a) in 1994 and methamphetamine possession in 2000) rendered him removeable. Even if the IJ erred in failing to advise defendant of his ability to apply for relief from removal, defendant suffered no prejudice. The court held that defendant's "found in" offense under section 1326 was not complete when he reentered in 2001 because his presentation of an invalid green card as if it were valid did not place authorities on notice that his presence in the United States would be illegal. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's argument concerning a constructive knowledge jury instruction with regard to his statute of limitations theory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Zamudio" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to 15 counts of wire fraud and subsequently appealed his 120 month sentence, which was below the appropriate Guidelines range. Defendant argued that his sentence would have been even lower if the district court had considered his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims as a mitigating factor under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court concluded that the district court did not err when it declined to vary downward based on defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim where ineffective assistance of counsel is not a section 3553(a) sentencing factor and a downward variance at sentencing is not the proper remedy for the ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Dibe" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. 1521, for filing, attempting to file, or conspiring to file a false document of the sort regularly used to create liens or encumbrances against the real or personal property of a United States officer or employee. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that defendant knowingly attempted to file false documents, intending to harass the USP-Atwater employees, and Congress enacted section 1521 precisely to prevent this type of conduct; the district court did not commit plain error in failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte before allowing defendant to represent himself at all stages of the proceedings; the district court's application of a two level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) for multiple liens against multiple victims was not clearly erroneous; the district court did not plainly err in applying multiple sentencing enhancements; and the district court did not plainly err in imposing defendant's sentence, despite his presentence report incorrectly listing the lengths of his previous sentences. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Neal" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government, argues that there is insufficient evidence to convict him, the district court failed to give jury instructions for entrapment by estoppel, and the district court failed to give instructions concerning a buyer-seller relationship. The court held that regulating the registration and transfer of firearms is a lawful function of the government; in this case, defendant and his co-conspirators agreed to submit, and did submit, machine gun registration and transfer forms with false information to the ATF, thereby impairing and obstructing the ATF's lawful government function of regulating the transfer of firearms; the district court did not err in declining to give the requested jury instructions because the lack of an authorized government official precludes entrapment by estoppel; and there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to obstruct a lawful function of the government to eliminate the possibility of a simple buyer-seller transaction. The court affirmed the conviction. The court addressed defendant's and co-defendant's remaining claims in two memorandum dispositions filed concurrently with this opinion. View "United States v. Rodman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pro se California prisoner, filed suit against defendants alleging violations of her constitutional rights to due process of law and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff alleged that prison officials started rumors that she was a convicted sex offender and changed her prison records. As a result, gang members threatened plaintiff and, when plaintiff reported the problem, prison officials refused to file her grievance and rejected her appeal. The court concluded that, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), a court of appeals may require a three strike prisoner seeking in forma pauperis status to show an imminent danger at the time the notice of appeal is filed; the Andrews v. Cervantes standard is the appropriate one to be applied in determining whether a prisoner has shown an imminent danger on appeal, and that applying that standard to plaintiff’s case, she may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal; and the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the issue of exhaustion because defendants have not met their burden of establishing that defendant did not exhaust available administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff's right to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The court vacated the order of the district court and remanded for further proceedings on the issue of exhaustion. View "Williams v. Paramo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a special condition of supervised release prohibiting him from possessing depictions of "sexually explicit conduct" involving children or adults and from patronizing any place where such depictions are available. The court agreed with the district court that the condition is generally necessary to achieve the goals of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3583. However, the court concluded that the record does not support the restriction of defendant's access to non-pornographic depictions of adults where that speech is protected by the First Amendment. The court affirmed the judgment, construing the condition not to apply to such materials. View "United States v. Gnirke" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering two men, appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on his guilt phase claim for ineffective assistance of counsel because, under either version of the facts, counsel's decision not to call petitioner as a witness was strategic. Therefore, the decision fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance deemed constitutionally adequate under Strickland v. Washington. However, the district court erred in determining that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), bars habeas relief on petitioner's claim that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate and present reasonably available mitigating evidence at sentencing. The district court erred in determining, even if AEDPA does not bar relief, that petitioner failed to establish that counsel's performance prejudiced him under Strickland. The court further concluded that defense counsel's decision not to call petitioner to testify at the guilt phase of his trial was within the wide range of reasonable professional management. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Mann v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery under Washington law, RCW 9A.56.190, for stealing a wallet and sentenced to prison for at least one year. Subsequently, defendant illegally reentered the United States three times. On the final and third time, he was indicted on one count of illegal reentry and defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his prior removal orders had been entered in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The district court denied the motion and defendant was convicted of illegal reentry. The court concluded that a conviction for Washington second degree robbery, where accompanied by a sentence of at least one year, qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). Because defendant was sentenced to a 14-month prison term, he was convicted of an aggravated felony. Because he is ineligible for relief, he suffered no prejudice from any procedural defects that may have occurred and the district court correctly denied his motion to dismiss his indictment. View "United States v. Alvarado-Pineda" on Justia Law