Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Reves and Bedford appealed the denial of their motions to vacate their sentence. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in a scheme in ensuring that Sunlaw Energy received a bid to construct a plant in the Port of Stockton instead of Sunlaw's competitor. The court concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider Bedford's 18 U.S.C. 2255 motion where Bedford was not actually in custody at the time he filed his motion. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of Bedford's section 2255 motion to vacate his sentence and remanded with instructions to dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that Reves's section 2255 motion was untimely and that he did not qualify for the actual innocence or equitable tolling exceptions. Further, Reves expressly waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence through a section 2255 motion in his plea agreement and during his change of plea colloquy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment as to Reves. View "United States v. Reves" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress images of child pornography found on his cell phone. Defendant's cell phone was searched without a warrant at a Border Patrol checkpoint's security offices. The court concluded that the search of the phone was not roughly contemporaneous with arrest and, therefore, was not a search incident to arrest given both the passage of one hour and twenty minutes between arrest and search and the seven intervening acts between arrest and search that signaled the arrest was over; the search of the cell phone is not excused under the exigency exception to the warrant exception; cell phones are non-containers for purposes of the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement and the search of defendant's cell phone cannot be justified under that exception; the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is not applicable in this case pursuant to United States v. Mejia; and the good faith exception is inapplicable where the government failed to assert that the agent relied on anyone or anything in conducting his search of the phone, let alone that any reliance was reasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Camou" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an enrolled member of the Gila River Indian Community, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court concluded that petitioner failed to exhaust his claims, and failed to show that the unavailability or futility of direct appeal excuses the exhaustion requirement. Further, petitioner has not shown that the Community's appeals process did not comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. 1303. The court concluded that its application of the exhaustion rule is consistent with Wood v. Milyard and Granberry v. Greer. Comity and tribal self-government concerns warrant application of the doctrine, despite the Community's failure to raise the direct appeal issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alvarez v. Tracy" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to being a removed alien found in the United States, a violation of the terms of his federal supervised release. Reviewing for plain error because defendant did not raise his Sixth Amendment objections before the district court, the court held that the revocation of supervised release and the imposition of additional prison time do not violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial, even when the revocation and sentencing take place years after the original conviction; Alleyne v. United States does not affect the validity of the court's determination in United States v. Huerta-Pimental, that the revocation of supervised release and the imposition of additional prison time under 18 U.S.C. 3583 do not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial; and the court addressed defendant's other arguments in an unpublished memorandum. Accordingly, the court affirmed the revocation of supervised release and the sentence imposed upon revocation. View "United States v. Gavilanes-Ocaranza" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted for being a felon in possession. The court concluded that the district court did not err by determining that defendant's prior California conviction for robbery was a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1)-(2)(B), because attempted robbery presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and it is roughly similar, in kind and in degree of risk posed, as burglary and extortion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute and two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of out-of-court statements by a nontestifying post officer supervisor and photographs of a seized package that was the subject of the statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. The court concluded that the photographs did not violate the Confrontation Clause because they were not witnesses against defendant; the statements violated defendant's rights because the postal supervisor did not testify and there is no contention of unavailability or that defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the supervisor; and the error was not harmless. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gant and Ventura filed over twenty federal and state law claims against various defendants, alleging that defendants issued flawed warrants, improperly arrested plaintiffs, or improperly detained them. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err by dismissing Gant's Fourth Amendment section 1983 claim against the L.A. City defendants where Gant did not show that failure to enter his judicial clearance form rendered the warrant abstract insufficiently particular or that the absence of such an entry was the proximate cause of his mistaken arrest; Gant's Fourth Amendment particularity claim failed against L.A. County defendants where the Third Amended Complaint alleged that L.A. City defendants, not L.A. County defendants, obtained the warrant for Gant's brother; Ventura's Fourth Amendment claims against L.A. City defendants was foreclosed by Rivera v. County of Los Angeles; Ventura's Fourth Amendment claim against Chino defendants failed because he failed to meet his burden of showing that the mistaken arrest was more than a single, isolated or sporadic incident; Rivera also foreclosed Ventura's claims against San Bernardino defendants; because post-arrest incarceration is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment alone, the district court did not err by dismissing Ventura's Fourth Amendment claim against L.A. County defendants; because Gant did not allege that he told the L.A. County defendants he had a judicial clearance form or that he otherwise called this case of mistaken identity to their attention, and because he was detained for the purpose of receiving process and did receive a prompt hearing, the district court correctly dismissed Gant's Fourteenth Amendment claim against L.A. County defendants; and the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Chino defendants and San Bernardino defendants on Ventura's Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court reversed the dismissal of Ventura's Fourteenth Amendment claim against L.A. County defendants because there are genuine issues of material fact about whether Ventura complained to L.A. County defendants that they had the wrong person. The court also reversed that district court's grant of summary judgment for Chino defendants on Ventura's claim under the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code 52.1(a), (b), where a trier of fact could conclude that the officers intended to coerce Ventura. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Gant v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for violating a VA regulation prohibiting disorderly conduct that creates loud, boisterous, and unusual noise, 38 C.F.R. 1.218(a)(5) and (b)(11). The court held that disorderly conduct creates sufficiently loud, boisterous, and unusual noise to be prohibited under section 1.218(a)(5) and (b)(11) when such conduct would tend to disturb the normal operation of a VA facility. In this case, the evidence established that defendant's conduct would tend to disturb the normal operation of the hospital and that the hospital's operation was actually disturbed where the altercation between defendant and his son could be heard inside the facility 25 yards away, and a VA nurse and social worker were drawn away from their ordinary tasks to monitor the situation. View "United States v. Agront, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to six counts of harboring and concealing illegal aliens for financial gain and subsequently appealed his sentence. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.1(b)(4) for harboring unaccompanied minor aliens where it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that unaccompanied minors would be smuggled. The district court's finding comports with due process and defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that his sentence was based on false or unreliable information. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.1(b)(8)(A) for involuntarily detaining aliens through coercion or threat or in connection with a demand for payment where this particular smuggling organization detained aliens both in connection with a demand for payment and through coercion or threat. Further, it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that the organization would detain aliens through coercion or threat or in connection with a demand for payment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gamez Reyes" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of felony murder predicated on attempted robbery. The State subsequently believed petitioner that he was not the actual shooter and the state trial court resentenced petitioner as an aider and abettor to a term of imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Petitioner objected to resentencing, contending that the jury had not found him guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery, and that he was entitled to a new trial. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The court concluded that the right to a jury in this case means that petitioner had the right to have a jury decide what conduct he committed. Resentencing on the basis of facts that the jury did not find, and that conflicted with what the jury did find, violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. Further, there was no trial error that could be subject to harmless error analysis. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Taylor v. Cate" on Justia Law