Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant participated in a drug distribution operation in Hawaii and charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court should not have applied the leader-or-organizer enhancement under Section 3B1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines because no evidence suggests that he “exercised control over others” in the organization.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the level of control required to be an organizer is only “the ability and influence necessary to coordinate the activities of others to achieve the desired result.” United States v. Doe, 778 F.3d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 2015). View "USA V. DANIEL VINGE" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death after a California jury found her guilty of attempted murder and first-degree murder, finding true the special circumstances of lying in wait and murder for financial gain. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d) habeas petition. In the petition, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during penalty-phase closing arguments by referencing Biblical verses to persuade the jury to impose a death sentence. Applying the extremely deferential standard required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The panel granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) as to Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After conducting a comparative juror analysis, the panel concluded that, under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the California Supreme Court’s finding that the trial court did not err in determining there was no purposeful discrimination was an objectively reasonable determination of the facts. View "MAUREEN MCDERMOTT V. DEBORAH JOHNSON" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He argued that his Section 924(c) conviction and its mandatory 15-year consecutive sentence should be vacated because his predicate crime, voluntary manslaughter, does not qualify as a crime of violence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. The panel wrote that for purposes of Section 924(c), voluntary manslaughter has the same mental state as murder—intent to commit a violent act against another or recklessness with extreme indifference to human life. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter requires at least an “extreme and necessarily oppositional” state of mind. The panel held that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant’s Section 2255 motion. View "USA V. DANIEL DRAPER" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an Idaho prisoner facing execution by lethal injection. He challenged Idaho’s execution practices. He alleged that these practices: 1) interfere with his ability to challenge the State’s method of execution as cruel and unusual punishment; 2) inhibit his ability to seek clemency; 3) inflict mental anguish; 4) increase the risk of an unconstitutionally painful execution; 5) treat similarly situated prisoners unequally; 6) violate the separation of powers under the Idaho Constitution; and 7) contravene Idaho Code Section 19-2716’s requirement that the director of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) establish procedures governing executions. On remand, and in light of then-co-plaintiff’s scheduled execution, the district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the district court violated the rule of mandate by denying leave to amend in connection with the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint. The court explained that although its decision in Pizzuto I noted parenthetically that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend the complaint, the court did not foreclose the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or address whether, in connection with such a dismissal, further amendment would be futile. The court agreed with the district court that amendment of several of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the First Amendment claims based on access to execution-related information. View "THOMAS CREECH, ET AL V. JOSH TEWALT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—five individuals and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.—filed this action in the Southern District of California challenging the constitutionality of Section 32310 under the Second Amendment. On September 22, 2023, the district court issued an order declaring Section 32310 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and enjoining California officials from enforcing the law. Defendant Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California, filed an emergency motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The Attorney General seeks to stay “all portions of the order except those regarding Sections 32310(c) and (d), which relate to large-capacity magazines that were acquired and possessed lawfully prior to the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction.”   The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. First, the court concluded that the Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits. The court explained that the Attorney General makes strong arguments that Section 32310 comports with the Second Amendment under Bruen. Second, the Attorney General has shown that California will be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal by presenting evidence that large-capacity magazines pose significant threats to public safety. Third, it does not appear that staying portions of the district court’s order while the merits of this appeal are pending will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings. Finally, the court concluded that the public interest tips in favor of a stay. View "VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murders. He was also convicted of one count of mutilation of human remains and one count of attempted murder and mayhem. The jury found a multiple murder special circumstance allegation and sentenced Petitioner to death. The California Supreme Court reversed Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder and mayhem and affirmed Petitioner’s murder convictions and death sentence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition challenging his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of first-degree murder. The panel held that Petitioner’s pre-AEDPA October 1992 pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an “actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by appointed counsel in April 1997. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the district court properly concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Petitioner’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court View "DOUGLAS CLARK V. RON BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an open guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2246(2) & 1152. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated the sentence using the 2004 version of the Guidelines, applied a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and added a four-level enhancement because “the victim was abducted.” Defendant objected based on his claim that there was no significant change in locations during or prior to the offense.The evidence presented showed that Defendant grabbed the victim, put his hands over her mouth, and dragged her 35-40 feet into a cornfield, where he sexually assaulted her. Overruling Defendant's objection, the district court concluded that the forced movement of the victim from the roadside into the cornfield was sufficient to support the abduction enhancement. Defendant appealed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Under the plain language of the text of Sec. 2A3.1(b)(5), the court found that Defendant “abducted” the victim when he forced her from the roadside where he encountered her into a nearby cornfield. View "USA V. JOSHUA SCHEU" on Justia Law

Defendant filed two appeals with the Ninth Circuit, which were consolidated in a single opinion. Regarding Defendant's felony child abuse case, the court held that the Major Crimes Act granted federal jurisdiction. Although there is no "felony child abuse" statute under federal law, the Major Crimes Act permits prosecutors to charge a defendant in "accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed. Here, Montana Code 45-5-212 provided a sufficient basis for the charge.Regarding Defendant's aggravated sexual abuse case, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, finding that USSG 1B1.1 provides different definitions of “serious bodily injury”—a Harm Definition and a Conduct Definition. Because Defendant made no argument that the district court failed to apply the Harm Definition or that the victim’s injuries resulting from the sexual abuse or from Defendant's other conduct surrounding the offense failed to meet the Harm Definition, Defendant failed to prove the district court erred. View "USA V. LUKE SCOTT, SR." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He was sentenced to 77 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant raised three challenges to the district court’s sentencing calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court’s application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States. The panel wrote that the determination of a sentencing enhancement based on a new offense can be made by a judge without a jury and by a standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no mandatory minimum sentence at play, and the enhancement still placed Defendant’s Guidelines range within the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty; and that Defendant received all the notice that is required for the enhancement.   The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that he used or possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense under Montana law for purposes of applying the enhancement. The panel concluded that the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. View "USA V. JOHN BARLOW" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of attempted illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1325 and attempted illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. On appeal, he argued that the district court violated his rights to a fair trial and sentence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a statement he made to a Border Patrol agent about coming to the United States to find work. Defendant argued that the statement, which he made while between border fences, should have been suppressed because he was “in custody” and was not given a Miranda warning prior to his admission. The panel held that the stop here met the requirements of Terry, and the agent’s question about Defendant’s purpose for being in the United States did not exceed the scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403, the testimony of Defendant’s only proposed witness, a Tijuana immigration attorney, whom Defendant intended to call as a lay witness to testify about the “factual situation in Tijuana in November 2019”. The panel wrote that neither the record nor the witness’s testimony could establish that Defendant knew of the long lines, and the district court’s concern about distracting the jury was reasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions on the requisite intent for a Section 1326 conviction. View "USA V. JUAN CABRERA" on Justia Law