Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes. View "RANA V. JENKINS" on Justia Law

In December 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted Victor Gaspar Chichande and his co-defendants on a small boat near the Galapagos Islands, carrying approximately 1,230 kilograms of cocaine. The defendants attempted to evade capture by throwing items overboard and fleeing, but the Coast Guard disabled their boat. The discarded packages were later found to contain cocaine. Chichande was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute cocaine on a vessel, possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California initially sentenced Chichande to 180 months in prison. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to an error in the district court's analysis of whether Chichande was entitled to a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court had incorrectly compared Chichande to a single average participant rather than the average of all participants in the crime.Upon remand, the district court again denied the minor role reduction, finding that Chichande was not substantially less culpable than the average participant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, clarifying that the district court correctly identified all participants, calculated a rough average level of culpability using the five factors from the Mitigating Role Guideline, and compared Chichande’s culpability to that average. The court also declined to remand for resentencing based on a retroactive amendment for zero criminal history points, noting that Chichande could seek relief through the established protocol in the Southern District of California. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the minor role reduction and affirmed the 180-month sentence. View "USA V. CHICHANDE" on Justia Law

A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion. View "Chong v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1984, Roger Scott Helm, Jr., then 14 years old, murdered his adoptive parents and stepsister. He was arrested and charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder. Helm pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree murder, and one count of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder with eligibility for parole after 25 years, followed by consecutive sentences totaling an additional 42 years for the other counts.Helm's case was transferred from juvenile to adult court, and he was sentenced after a detailed hearing where the court considered mitigating factors such as his age and drug influence, as well as aggravating factors like his lack of remorse and dangerousness. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the consecutive sentences on direct appeal.Helm later filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles. The Arizona trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected his claim, stating that Miller does not apply to consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Helm's habeas corpus petition. The court assumed, for argument's sake, that Helm's sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole. However, it concluded that Helm's sentence complied with Miller because the trial judge had discretion and considered Helm's youth before imposing the sentence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Helm's habeas corpus petition, holding that Helm's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller and clarified in Jones v. Mississippi. View "Helm v. Thornell" on Justia Law

Charles Clements was convicted by a California state jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of second-degree robbery, and related enhancements. His convictions were based in part on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, Donald Boeker, who claimed Clements had solicited him to murder a key witness. Boeker testified that he received no benefits for his cooperation and that his motives were altruistic. However, it was later revealed that Boeker did receive parole consideration for his testimony, which the prosecution knew or should have known.Clements appealed the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition, which was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The district court had denied his claims, including one under Napue v. Illinois, which asserts that the prosecution knowingly used false testimony. The district court reviewed the Napue claim de novo but ultimately denied it, finding no reasonable likelihood that Boeker’s false testimony affected the jury’s judgment.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Clements’s Napue claim, holding that the prosecution violated Napue by allowing Boeker to falsely testify about not receiving any benefits for his cooperation. The court found that Boeker’s testimony was highly probative of Clements’s consciousness of guilt and identity on the aggravated kidnapping counts. The court concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to grant Clements’s habeas petition with respect to the aggravated kidnapping charges. The court did not address Clements’s Brady claim or his request for an evidentiary hearing, as the relief sought was already granted under the Napue claim. The court also affirmed the denial of Clements’s Massiah and prosecutorial misconduct claims, finding that the state court’s determinations were not objectively unreasonable. View "Clements v. Madden" on Justia Law

Heraclio Osorio-Arellanes was involved in a firefight with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in Arizona, resulting in the death of Agent Brian Terry. Osorio fled to Mexico, where he was later arrested and interrogated by U.S. officials in a Mexico City prison. During this interrogation, he confessed to key elements of the government's case on the advice of a Mexican attorney, Juan Salvador Pimentel. Osorio's confession was later used against him in court.The District Court for the District of Arizona initially suppressed Osorio's confession on Sixth Amendment grounds but later reversed this decision following a government motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the confession was admitted at trial, leading to Osorio's conviction on multiple charges, including first- and second-degree murder, conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, and assault on a federal officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Pimentel's advice during the interrogation was deficient and prejudicial under the framework established in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, Pimentel erroneously advised Osorio that robbing drug smugglers was not a crime, leading Osorio to confess. The court held that this advice was legally unjustifiable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent this advice, Osorio would not have been convicted.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order reconsidering the suppression of Osorio's confession, vacated his convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Osorio's Fifth Amendment claim, as the Sixth Amendment claim was sufficient to decide the case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the conviction and required Osorio to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court. View "United States v. Osorio-Arellanes" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Cambodian villagers, alleged they were victims of human trafficking while working at seafood processing factories in Thailand. They claimed the factories, owned by Thai corporations Phatthana Seafood Co., Ltd. and S.S. Frozen Food Co., Ltd., subjected them to abusive conditions. Rubicon Resources, LLC, a U.S. company, was accused of knowingly benefiting from these violations by attempting to sell shrimp processed at these factories.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Rubicon, holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that Rubicon knowingly benefited from the trafficking venture. The court also found no evidence that Rubicon knew or should have known about the violations. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, interpreting the statute to exclude liability for attempts to benefit from trafficking violations.Subsequently, Congress amended the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) through the Abolish Trafficking Reauthorization Act (ATRA), which expanded liability to include those who "attempt or conspire to benefit" from trafficking violations. The plaintiffs filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen the judgment based on this legislative change, arguing that the amendment clarified the original intent of the TVPRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The Ninth Circuit held that ATRA did not apply retroactively to events that occurred before its enactment. The court reasoned that the lack of an express statutory command for retroactive application and the forward-looking nature of the amendment indicated that ATRA was not intended to clarify the original statute but to change it. Therefore, the district court did not err in declining to reopen the final judgment. View "RATHA V. RUBICON RESOURCES, LLC" on Justia Law

Darrel Eston Lee, an Arizona prisoner sentenced to death for murder and other offenses, filed a federal habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Lee argued that his counsel allowed him to testify falsely and failed to present mitigating evidence. He sought to introduce new evidence not presented in state court.The Arizona state postconviction relief court held a four-day evidentiary hearing and rejected Lee's claims. The court found no evidence that Lee had confessed to his attorney, Stephen Politi, and concluded that Politi's actions were reasonable given Lee's conflicting stories. The court also determined that Politi had conducted a reasonable mitigation investigation and that the lack of mitigating evidence was due to its nonexistence rather than Politi's incompetence. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Lee's habeas petition, refusing to consider new evidence Lee presented for the first time in federal court. The court found that Lee's postconviction counsel had not acted diligently in state court, thus triggering the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The district court concluded that the state court's findings were reasonable based on the state-court record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the state court reasonably rejected Lee's claim that Politi was ineffective for allowing him to testify falsely, as there was no clear evidence that Politi knew the alibi was false. The court also found that Lee failed to show that Politi's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by it. Regarding the failure to present mitigating evidence, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lee did not qualify for an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) and that the state court's rejection of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. View "LEE V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

Roberto Yepez, while serving a state sentence, was transferred to federal custody to face a federal drug trafficking charge. He was later convicted and sentenced in federal court. While serving his federal sentence, Yepez filed a pro se motion arguing for sentence credit for the time spent in federal custody before his federal sentencing. He later argued through counsel that this motion should be construed as one for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court held that a legal claim for sentence miscalculation must be brought through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, not a compassionate release motion. The court dismissed the motion, noting it could not proceed as a § 2241 petition because Yepez was incarcerated in a different jurisdiction.Yepez appealed the district court's decision. However, before the appeal was fully briefed, he was released from prison and began serving his term of supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Yepez’s appeal became moot upon his release from prison. The court noted that the compassionate release provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) could not be used to shorten Yepez’s term of supervised release. The court also rejected Yepez’s argument that the appeal was not moot because its outcome could affect a later motion under § 3583(e) for modification of his term of supervised release.The Ninth Circuit concluded that since Yepez was no longer incarcerated, the relief he sought—a reduction in his term of imprisonment—was no longer available. Additionally, the court determined that the compassionate release provision could not be used to alter the term of supervised release. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as moot. View "USA V. YEPEZ" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Socorro Colin-Villavicencio, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States lawfully in 1988. Her mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. Colin-Villavicencio applied for adjustment of status but missed fingerprint appointments, leading to the abandonment of her application. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after she was convicted of multiple felonies, including child abuse and drug possession. Representing herself, she claimed derivative citizenship based on her mother’s naturalization, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this claim, finding she did not become a lawful permanent resident as a minor. The IJ also denied her relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Colin-Villavicencio did not establish a likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. The BIA found that the country conditions and her brother’s attack did not sufficiently demonstrate a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that her prior convictions precluded asylum and withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Colin-Villavicencio’s derivative citizenship claim, concluding she did not meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) because her parents never married, and her father’s paternity was established by legitimation under Baja California law. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, noting she did not show a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit thus denied her petition for review. View "COLIN-VILLAVICENCIO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law