Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that correctional officers used excessive force in restraining him while he was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. After defendants prevailed at trial, plaintiff appealed. The court rejected the government's argument that plaintiff waived his right to appeal the magistrate's findings on exhaustion because plaintiff did not specifically object to them; plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies against Defendant Turner; Heck v. Humphrey did not require the challenged jury instruction that he resisted the officers and the likelihood of prejudice was difficult to overcome; and, therefore, the court reversed as to summary judgment for Turner, and vacated and remanded for a new trial. View "Wilkerson v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a motion for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court concluded that defendant's argument that he is eligible for sentence reduction under Amendment 759 is foreclosed by the court's decision in defendant's previous appeal. The court rejected defendant's argument that the 2011 amendment to Application Note 6 of U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by directing district courts to "use the version of this policy statement that is in effect on the date on which the court reduces the defendant's term of imprisonment." The court concluded that the application of the 2011 version of section 1B1.10 to defendant's case may have prevented him from benefiting from recent reductions in the harsh crack cocaine penalties, but because application of the amendments would not increase the punishment for his crime over what was imposed when he was sentenced, there is no post facto problem. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Waters, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession and subsequently appealed his sentence imposed under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that his prior conviction under California Vehicle Code 2800.2 for vehicle flight from a pursuing peace officer was a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause. Further, Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed defendant's argument that the ACCA's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his prior conviction; the rule of lenity is not applicable; and there is no plain error on the basis of Apprendi v. New Jersey. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to illegal reentry after having been removed and subsequently appealed his conviction, contending that his expedited removal proceedings did not comport with due process where, among other things, the immigration officer who entered the removal order failed to provide defendant with notice of the charge against him and an opportunity to respond. The court concluded that defendant exhausted all available administrative remedies and was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review; the Supreme Court has categorically declared that once an individual has entered the United States, he is entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause; in this case, there is no dispute that defendant had entered the United States before he was apprehended and he was entitled to expedited removal proceedings that conformed to the dictates of due process; any failure to inform defendant of the charge against him and to provide him the opportunity to review the sworn statements constituted a violation of his due process rights; defendant's due process rights to notice and an opportunity to respond were violated during his expedited removal proceedings; the court rejected the Government's argument that it should have been obvious to defendant that he was scrutinized for his presence in the United States without valid documentation; and, because defendant could plausibly been granted relief in the form of withdrawal of his application for admission, his removal order is invalid and cannot serve as the predicate for his conviction. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's motion to dismiss the information and his conviction. View "United States v. Raya-Vaca" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming a final order of removal, holding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Petitioner was convicted under California Vehicle Code 10851(a), which criminalizes the act of driving or taking a vehicle not one's own. The California statute proscribes both conduct that does not amount to a CIMT (temporary taking) and conduct that would constitute a CIMT (permanent taking). Therefore, petitioner's conviction is not categorically a CIMT. The court also concluded that the modified categorical approach is not applicable because the California statute is not divisible, and the BIA erred in its application of the modified categorical approach. In light of Moncrieffe v. Holder, the court concluded that the record is inconclusive as to whether petitioner was convicted for intending to permanently or temporarily take a vehicle, the court must presume that he was convicted of joyriding, which is not a crime of moral turpitude. The circuit's precedent in Young v. Holder is clearly irreconcilable with Moncrieffe. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Almanza-Arenas v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to being a deported alien found in the United States and subsequently appealed his sentence. The district court applied the modified categorical approach and concluded that defendant's prior conviction for possession of cocaine for sale, in violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11351, was for a "drug trafficking offense" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). In Coronado v. Holder, the court held that, because a similar California statute contains a "listing of alternative controlled substances," that statute was divisible within the meaning of Descamps v. United States. The California drug law at issue here also covers a list of controlled substances, and no meaningful distinction exists between the two statutes. Because there is no irreconcilable conflict between Coronado and any other case, the court must follow Coronado. Accordingly, the court concluded that section 11351 is divisible with respect to the type of controlled substance. Because the criminal complaint specified that Count 1 involved cocaine and the abstract of judgment specified that defendant pleaded to Count 1, the district court correctly concluded that defendant had been convicted under the modified categorical approach of a "drug trafficking offense" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. De La Torre-Jimenez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to reentering the United States after removal and without permission and subsequently appealed his sentence. The district court applied the modified categorical approach and concluded that defendant's prior conviction for possession and transportation of cocaine for sale, in violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11352(a), was for a "drug trafficiking offense" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The court affirmed in light of Coronado v. Holder and United States v. De La Torre-Jimenez, concluding that the district court did not err where section 11352(a) is "divisible," and the modified categorical approach was applicable in this case. View "United States v. Huitron-Rocha" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Brown pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and Brown's partner, Duane Eddings, was convicted of six counts of mail fraud, one count of wire fraud, three counts of money laundering, and three counts of tax evasion. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their operation of a Ponzi scheme. The court concluded that the denial of the government's motion to reduce Brown's sentence under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 was proper; Brown's 188-month sentence is not substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a); Eddings's mail fraud convictions related to the bankruptcy fraud were based on a legally valid theory; the evidence was sufficient to sustain Eddings's convictions on the Ponzi scheme mail fraud charges; Eddings's bankruptcy fraud convictions were properly grouped for sentencing with his Ponzi scheme convictions; applying a leadership role adjustment to Eddings's sentence under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c) was erroneous; increasing both defendants' sentences under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(15)(B)(iii) for endangering the solvency or financial security of 100 or more victims was erroneous; increasing Eddings's sentence under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) for having 250 or more victims was erroneous; remand will be to the same district court judge; and, therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Brown, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of a final order of removal. Petitioner pled guilty to felony endangerment and misdemeanor driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor under Arizona law. Applying Chevron deference, the court held that the BIA reasonably determined that felony endangerment in Arizona is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Although the crime requires only reckless conduct, the level of harm resulting from the conduct is grave. The court agreed with the BIA that the creation of a substantial, actual risk of imminent death is sufficiently reprehensible, or in terms of the court's case law "base, vile, and depraved," to establish a CIMT, even though no actual harm need occur. The court held that excessive voluntary intoxication combined with the conduct at issue - creation of a substantial, actual risk of imminent death of another person - constitutes morally turpitudinous conduct. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Leal v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for wearing military medals without authorization in violation of 18 U.S.C. 704(a). Defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Alvarez, which struck down section 704(b)'s prohibition on making false claims regarding medals as facially unconstitutional, applies equally to section 704(a)'s prohibition on the unauthorized wearing of medals. The court concluded that defendant's argument that his conduct in wearing the medals qualifies as expressive conduct has been foreclosed by United States v. Perelman, which held that section 704(a) was not a content-based suppression of pure speech but rather criminalized the harmful conduct of wearing a medal without authorization and with intent to deceive. Because section 704(a) can be constitutionally applied to defendant's conduct, there was no violation of the Constitution or its laws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Swisher" on Justia Law