Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in refusing him cataract surgery to restore his vision. The court held that blindness in one eye caused by a cataract is a serious condition. The court also held that the blanket, categorical denial of medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of an administrative policy that "one eye is good enough for prison inmates" is the paradigm of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials and remanded for trial.View "Colwell v. Bannister, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted in Nevada state court of first degree murder, argued that his conviction was invalid due to the trial court's use of the Kazalyn instruction, which did not separately define the terms "willful," "deliberate," and "premeditated." After petitioner was convicted, but before his conviction became final, the Nevada Supreme Court invalidated the Kazlyn instruction and replaced it with an instruction separately defining the terms "willful," "deliberate," and "premeditated." The district court subsequently granted petitioner habeas corpus relief and the State appealed. The court held that White v. Woodall's clarification of the unreasonable-refusal-to-extend rule is "clearly irreconcilable" with Babb v. Lozowsky's conclusion that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent by failing to apply a change in state law to Babb's pending conviction; Woodall thus "effectively overruled" Babb with respect to petitioners for whom, like Babb, the relevant state court decision pre-dated Bunkley v. Florida; and, for those convictions, the court was no longer bound by Babb. In this case, petitioner's conviction became final in 2001 upon the denial of his direct appeal. Because there can be fairminded disagreement regarding whether Griffith v. Kentucky and Fiore v. White (Fiore II) apply to post conviction changes in state law, the Nevada Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it declined to apply the Byford v. State instruction to petitioner's case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanded with directions to enter judgment for the State, denying the petition. View "Moore v. Helling" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for manufacturing 1,000 or more marijuana plants and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. The court concluded that a deputy's single reference to a consulate did not convey anything about defendant's legal status. The court also rejected the argument that the testimony regarding the right to a consulate was undisclosed 404(b) evidence because the testimony did not reveal anything, let alone defendant's status as illegally present in the United States. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial and new trial. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to reopen the evidence to allow defendant to testify. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that a defendant must generally invoke the right to testify before the close of evidence and the court considered the Walker factors to determine whether a district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen. In this case, considering each of the Walker factors in light of the record, the court could not say that the district court abused its discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Orozco" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the state court's holding that a retrospective competency determination was feasible and that he was competent at the time of his penalty-phase trial. The district court concluded that exhaustion of state remedies was a prerequisite to its review of petitioner's challenge and the district court stayed and held in abeyance petitioner's challenge pending exhaustion in state court. Petitioner appealed. The court concluded that the stay-and-abeyance order was not an appealable collateral order and was not appealable under Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. as an order that put petitioner "effectively out of court." The court declined to construe the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Stanley v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Defendant, a juvenile male, appealed the district court's adjudication of delinquency on six counts of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2241(c). The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile delinquency proceedings and that section 2241(c) is not unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court erred applying the means rea element of section 2241(c), denying the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 3 and 5 because there was insufficient evidence of anal penetration, and admitting the hearsay statements of a victim through the testimony of a social worker under Rule 803(4). The court remanded the portion of the district court's judgment to allow specific consideration of defendant's suspension request where Rule 35(a)'s fourteen-day time limit had expired and there was no record of whether the district court weighed factors bearing on the suspension while it had jurisdiction to do so. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's disposition decision, remanded for consideration of all disposition options, including a suspension of delinquency, and affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of knowingly joining and participating in a drug conspiracy because she translated telephone calls for her godson, a leader of a methamphetamine conspiracy. The court held that when a government representative concedes that there was a substantial error in the trial court proceedings involving prosecutorial misconduct, and the court concluded that the plain error standards laid out in United States v. Olano are otherwise met, the court may consider the error and, if otherwise appropriate, reverse the conviction. In this case, the court concluded that the Olano factors have been met and the court found it reasonably probable that defendant was convicted based on the prosecutors' false account of the grandson's testimony. Because the error was plain, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Mageno" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a death row prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Department of Corrections officials and a prison guard, alleging that the prison guard read a confidential letter he sent to his attorney, rather than merely scanning it to inspect the letter for contraband. The court concluded that plaintiff stated a Sixth Amendment claim when he alleged that prison officials read his legal mail, that they claim entitlement to do so, and that his right to private consultation with counsel has been chilled; plaintiff's allegations also support a claim for injunctive relief; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nordstrom v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendants Carr, Anderson, and Franklin appealed their convictions and sentences for three counts related to the armed robbery of a federal credit union. The government cross-appealed defendants' sentences. The court concluded that: (1) if the district court vacated Anderson's conviction for false accompaniment under 18 U.S.C. 2113(e), it erred and the court reversed this portion of the judgment and granted the government's cross appeal; (2) if the district court vacated Franklin's conviction for false accompaniment under section 2113(e), it erred and the court reversed this portion of the judgment and granted the government's cross-appeal; (3) the government's cross-appeal regarding Franklin's gun conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and corresponding sentencing enhancement under section 2113(d) is denied; (4) on remand, the district court shall enter a corrected judgment reflecting its acquittal of Franklin on the section 924(c) gun charge and the section 2113(d) gun enhancement; and (5) the court affirmed remainder of the district court's judgments. View "United States v. Carr" on Justia Law

Defendant, a commercial snowmobile operator, appealed his conviction on two counts of conducting a "work activity or service" on United States Forest Service land without a special use authorization and one count of interfering with a Forest Service officer engaged in the performance of his official duties, both in violation of 36 C.F.R. part 261. The court concluded that defendant's activities both took place in the National Forest System and affected, threatened, or endangered National Forest land. Therefore, the court held that the Forest Service had jurisdiction over defendant's activities on the highway under both section 261.1(a)(1) and (a)(2). The court concluded that defendant's vagueness challenge to section 261 was without merit; the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the officer's testimony regarding the absence of defendant's special use authorization; and there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of Count 5. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's motion to suppress after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that defendant's detention did not amount to an arrest where defendant was in the vicinity of an area where there was reported gunfire and the officer's legitimate safety concerns justified their on-the-spot decision to use intrusive measures to stabilize the situation before investigating further; the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant where an anonymous 911 call from an eyewitness reporting an ongoing and dangerous situation and a detailed description of the suspect provided sufficient indicia of reliability to give the officers reasonable suspicion; and, therefore, the officers properly conducted an investigatory stop and had reasonable suspicion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law