Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas petition challenging the application of amended California Penal Code Section 2933.6 against him as a violation of his right against ex post facto application of the law. That amended Section 2933.6 applies only prospectively, only to intervening conduct, and does not result in the forfeiture of credits already earned makes it factually distinguishable from the ex post facto holdings in Weaver v. Graham and Lynce v. Mathis. In this case, petitioner's only intervening conduct - continued gang affiliation - triggered the reduction in time credits. Greenfield v. Scafati also does not support petitioner's position. Accordingly, the state court's denial of relief was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Nevarez v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Defendant is a United States citizen with a history of convictions for smuggling illegal aliens. At issue was whether defendant encouraged or induced an illegal alien to reside in the United States or aided and abetted the commission of this crime merely by escorting that alien from a fast food restaurant near the border to a nearby vehicle. The court concluded that encouraging an illegal alien to reside in the United States must mean something more than merely transporting such an alien within this country. On this scant record, no rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant encouraged an illegal alien to reside in the United States. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to prove that defendant aided and abetted the commission of the crime. The court vacated the district court's judgment revoking defendant's supervised release and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "United States v. Thum" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal reentry following deportation, seeking a judgment of acquittal. The court concluded that so long as the documents in an A-file have been properly admitted in the criminal case, and the jury has been instructed as to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, which is higher than the standard required in a deportation hearing, such documents may be considered by the jury and, depending on their contents, may constitute sufficient proof of alienage if the jury so concludes. Under Jackson v. Virginia, the jury verdict must stand where, as here, after receiving proper instructions, the jury concluded that defendant was guilty on all elements of illegal reentry and the verdict was supported with sufficient evidence. A rational trier of fact could certainly come to the conclusion that the Form I-213 was accurate. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying a judgment of acquittal and affirmed. View "United States v. Ruiz-Lopez" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from his state murder conviction on the ground that his right against self-incrimination under Miranda v. Arizona was violated. At issue was whether a mid-trial conversation between a court bailiff and petitioner constituted an interrogation that must be preceded by a Miranda warning. The trial court concluded that there was no Miranda violation because there was no interrogation. The court concluded that the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply Miranda or its Supreme Court progeny. Despite the Warden's failure to brief the issue, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), deferential standard of review still applied. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hernandez v. Holland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that petitioner's leg restraint was not imposed based on a clearly unreasonable determination of the facts, nor was its imposition contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law; the use of dual juries at trial was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law; the trial court complied with clearly established federal law when it determined no juror bias was present; there was no clearly established law governing implied bias, and petitioner had not shown that implied bias should apply here; the state post-conviction relief court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington during the plea process and during the penalty phase; and the Arizona Supreme court properly applied Lockett v. Ohio, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and their progeny in regards to mitigation evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hedlund v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 based on defendant's false and misleading testimony at a bond revocation hearing. The court affirmed the sentence, holding that a defendant who willfully provides materially false testimony to a judge during a bond revocation hearing may be subject to a sentence enhancement under section 3C1.1; because defendant's testimony, if believed, could have affected his custodial status pending trial, his statements were material under section 3C1.1; and the district court made sufficient findings to support an obstruction enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for refusing to submit to a test of blood alcohol content. The court concluded that it was fundamentally unfair to convict defendant on the refusal charge when he was told time and again that his refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test was not in itself a crime, even though it was. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction. View "United States v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of attempted murder, assault, kidnapping, and coercion of his former wife, appealed the district court's rejection of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The court concluded that petitioner's unique mental illness made it impossible for him to timely file his federal habeas petition and in fact caused him to fail to meet the filing deadline. Therefore, the court concluded that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), one-year statute of limitation. The court reversed and remanded. View "Forbess v. Franke" on Justia Law

Defendant, an immigrant, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentencing, claiming that a statement by the district judge at sentencing evidenced an anti-immigrant bias in violation of his constitutional rights. The court was not persuaded that the statement by the district court in this case reflected such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. It appears that the district court's statement was in response to arguments made by defendant and was offered to explain why the district court was not persuaded by them. The court concluded that defendant waived his remaining challenges where none of the exceptions in his plea agreement applied in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "United States v. Odachyan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for two counts of transmitting through interstate commerce email communications containing threats to injure the person of another. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding defendant's expert witness solely because he examined defendant for competency rather than for diminished capacity; instead of focusing exclusively on the different legal standards governing the conclusions the expert was asked to draw, the district court should have evaluated whether the substance of the expert's testimony would have helped the jury decide whether defendant could form the specific intent to threaten the recipients of his emails; and although the record did not allow the court to determine whether the expert’s testimony should have been admitted, the district court should not have excluded such testimony without conducting a voir dire or otherwise giving the expert an opportunity to explain how he could provide meaningful and relevant testimony on diminished capacity from the competency evaluation he had conducted. The court also held that the rule requiring a new trial when a district court erroneously admitted prejudicial expert testimony in a civil trial also applied to the erroneous exclusion of expert testimony from a criminal trial. Finally, the court held that the district court acted within its diminished discretion by denying defendant's request for a diminished capacity instruction on this record. The court vacated and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law