Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 1365(a), which prohibits, inter alia, tampering with any consumer product that affects interstate commerce. Defendant, a pharmacist at a grocery store, moved to dismiss the counts for failure to state an offense. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed. The court concluded that, in light of Congress' clear statements upon enacting section 1365(a), and consistent with the rule of lenity, the more restrictive definition of "tamper" - one that requires alteration or adulteration of the item tampered - should apply. In this case, the indictment sufficiently alleged "tampering" by alleging that defendant opened a box containing Fentanyl patches, removed the patches, and re-glued the box. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Lyle, Jr." on Justia Law

In 2009, defendant pleaded guilty to receiving a stolen motorcycle in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2313. While on supervised release, defendant pleaded guilty to an assault charge in violation of Washington state law. Because of his plea, defendant was charged with violating the mandatory condition of federal supervised release. Defendant argued that his Alford plea was not probative evidence of the commission of a crime and instead proved only his conviction, which was not itself a violation of any condition of his supervised release. The court concluded that an Alford plea was insufficient evidence to prove commission of a state crime for purposes of a federal supervised release violation when the state itself did not treat it as sufficiently probative of the fact that the defendant actually committed the acts constituting the crime or crimes of conviction. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's order revoking supervised release and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Because of petitioner's gang activities, he had been confined for many years to a security housing unit (SHU), to protect other prisoners from him and his gang underlings. This appeal addressed the enforcement of orders regarding petitioner's conditions of confinement. In 2006, because petitioner claimed that he was no longer an active gang member, the district court ordered him released from the SHU. Petitioner was then returned to the SHU based on allegations of gang activity. The district court subsequently issued orders in 2009 and 2011 enforcing its 2006 order to release petitioner. The court concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the district court abused its discretion by finding violations of its 2006 order in 2009 and 2011. Accordingly, the court concluded that prison officials did not violate the 2006 order. The court concluded, however, that the 2009 and 2011 orders must be vacated as an abuse of discretion where they improperly impeded state prison management. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to dismiss the 2009 and 2011 orders. View "Griffin v. Gomez, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's entry of a final order of removal. In 1989, petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after police officers pulled over a truck in which petitioner was the driver and the sole occupant and where the truck contained 900 pounds of cocaine. The conviction was overturned on appeal because the officers lacked sufficient suspicion to make a traffic stop. As a general rule, a voluntary guilty plea to criminal charges was probative of evidence that the petitioner did, in fact, engage in the charged activity, even if the conviction was later overturned for a reason unrelated to voluntariness. The court concluded that the BIA did not violate due process or otherwise err in holding that petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) where there was "reason to believe" that he "is or has been an illicit trafficker" in a controlled substance or knowingly has assisted others in trafficking. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chavez-Reyes v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for online enticement of a female minor to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The court held that section 2422(b) clearly and unambiguously criminalized attempted sexual activity where the object of the attempt would amount to either a misdemeanor or a felony under state law; because the statutory language of section 2422(b) was not ambiguous, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance was inapplicable as well; section 2422 was not void for vagueness where a person of ordinary intelligence would have no doubt that criminal liability under the statute did not depend on whether the conduct constituted a misdemeanor or a felony under state law; and the court rejected defendant's argument that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and the court refused to apply the categorical approach to defendant's ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that the continuous twenty-four-hour illumination of his cell violated the Eighth Amendment. The court reversed, concluding that there were material issues of fact remaining as to the brightness of the continuous lighting in plaintiff's cell, as to the effect on plaintiff of the continuous lighting, and as to whether the defendant officials were deliberately indifferent. Even if it were possible for a defendant to defeat an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim at summary judgment by showing a legitimate penological interest, defendants have failed to make such a showing in this case. Because the district court did not consider the question of qualified immunity, the court left the issue for the district court to determine in the first instance. The court also remanded for the district court to consider the issue of filing fee deductions. View "Grenning v. Miller-Stout, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, in custody of the CDC since 2004, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting twenty actions stemming from his validation as a gang member. The court concluded that the district court properly determined that the claim-preclusive effect of California's denial of plaintiff's habeas petition barred nineteen of his twenty counts; the district court erred, however, by dismissing plaintiff's Eighth Amendment challenge to the debriefing process (process to renounce gang membership) for lack of standing where construed liberally, plaintiff's complaint alleged that he would attempt to debrief, which he is eligible to do, but for the risk of retaliation; and as the condition precedent to plaintiff's motion to amend was not met, the court reversed the district court's denial of that motion and remanded for reconsideration. View "Gonzales v. CDC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court concluded that defendant's primary contention - that amended U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b) exceeded the Commission's statutory authority - was foreclosed by United States v. Tercero. The court also concluded that Section 1B1.10(b) did not offend separation of powers principles because it was simply the result of an exercise of Congress's power to control the scope of judicial discretion regarding sentencing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former prison inmate, filed suit alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count I), and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts II and III). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count I, dismissal of Counts II and III, and denial of appointment of counsel and informa pauperis (IFP) status. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by his release from prison. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Count I where the record indicated that prison mental healthcare professionals were incredibly responsive to plaintiff's needs and no reasonable trier of fact could find that there was deliberate indifference to plaintiff's complaints; affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for counsel where plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits and he has been able to articulate his legal claims; vacated the dismissal of Counts II and III because it was based on the determination that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to the filing of his initial complaint, rather than his amended complaint; and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Cano v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion where the request that family members and spectators leave the courtroom until seats became available was at most a trivial courtroom closure that did not implicate defendant's Sixth Amendment right. The failure to object to the courtroom closure request or to appeal the conviction on that ground was not deficient performance on the part of trial counsel. Finally, defendant was not prejudiced. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Dharni" on Justia Law