Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. As part of a reverse sting operation, an ATF undercover agent, working with a confidential informant, recruited defendants to carry out an armed robbery of a fictional cocaine stash. Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the fake robbery was the product of outrageous government conduct. The court affirmed the denial of defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that defendants have not met the extremely high standard of demonstrating that the facts underlying their arrest and prosecution were so extreme as to violate fundamental fairness or were so grossly shocking as to violate the universal sense of justice. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting their sentencing entrapment arguments were any error was harmless. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner was charged with seventeen counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon children in violation of various provisions of the California Penal Code. The court denied the petition, holding that petitioner was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) because petitioner's state crime of conviction, California Penal Code section 288(c)(1), was a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) where it posed a substantial risk of the use of physical force. View "Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Arizona death row prisoner, appealed from the district court's order dismissing his motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Petitioner alleged three ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that were neither presented in state post-conviction proceedings nor included in his initial federal habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that none of petitioner's arguments amounted to an allegation of a "defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings" that constituted grounds for a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, petitioner was arguing in essence that he deserved "a second chance to have the merits determined favorably" in the context of a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court held that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's successive section 2254 habeas petition. Even if petitioner's motion was permissible under Rule 60(b), petitioner failed to satisfy the standards for relief from judgment under that rule. Likewise, petitioner failed to meet the stringent standards of a section 2254 habeas petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion in No. 13-16928 and denied petitioner's motion to seek relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The court denied petitioner's as construed application in No. 13-16928 and his separate application in No. 13-73647 to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. View "Jones, Jr. v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of wire fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence of 60 months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error by engaging in impermissible double-counting where the district court was not prohibited from considering the extent to which the Guidelines did not sufficiently account for the nature and circumstances of defendant's offense. Further, the court had no basis for questioning whether the district court did, both in word and in fact, award defendant a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court also concluded that the district court did not plainly err as to defendant's remaining contentions that he failed to preserve. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Christensen" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiring to import marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 963 and importation of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 952 and 960. The court concluded that the district court's decision to give a deliberate ignorance instruction to the jury was not "illogical, implausible, or without support in inference that may be drawn from facts in the record." The court also concluded that the district court correctly denied Defendant Ramos's Rule 29 motion where a rational jury could believe Ramiro Gallegos's testimony, concluded that it was consonant with that of the border patrol agents, and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ramos knew, or was deliberately ignorant of, the objective of importing marijuana. Further, the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant Ramos-Atondo's prior smuggling crime where the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice. View "United States v. Ramos-Atondo" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to life in prison, appealed the district court's dismissal of part of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argued that, because he was raising a Brady claim, he was not bound by the holdings of Coleman v. Thompson, which precluded relief when a claim was not exhausted during the post-conviction review process on account of lack of counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel. In Martinez v. Ryan, the court declared that where ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction relief proceeding resulted in a failure to assert that there was ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial proceedings, the claim would be cognizable. The court rejected petitioner's claim and concluded that the court was bound by Coleman and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hunton v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine (Count 1), conspiracy to affect commerce by robbery and extortion (Count 2), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting (Count 3). The court held that the district court erred in its characterization of the United States v. Spentz holding where the district court should have told the jury that the amount of drugs or the profit that would be derived from their sale could not on its own establish an inducement supporting entrapment. Accordingly, the court reversed Count 1 and remanded for a retrial. The court also held that, under certain circumstances, a sentencing entrapment instruction must be given to the jury. The court offered suggested entrapment and sentencing entrapment instructions that it believed would provide greater clarity. The court affirmed Count 2, rejecting the argument that the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, was limited to the stealing of lawful property and excluded contraband. The court did not reach the remaining challenges, which were moot in light of the remand. View "United States v. Cortes" on Justia Law

Schad is scheduled to be executed in Arizona on October 9, 2013, in Arizona for a 1978 murder. The Ninth Circuit previously affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Schad also unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a clemency hearing and to stay his execution, claiming that the Clemency Board was biased and subject to undue pressure by the Governor in violation of due process. The Arizona Clemency Board is appointed by the Governor and issues recommendations to the Governor, who may grant clemency only when the Board recommends it. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 31-402(A). The Ninth Circuit upheld denial of the injunction, stating that the record and the district court’s “well-reasoned decision” did not support challenges to the Board’s fairness. View "Schad v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, disabled state prisoners and parolees, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., seeking disability accommodations. In these consolidated appeals, defendant challenged the scope of the district court's injunction in light of the amendments to California Penal Code 3056. The court concluded that the August 28 orders, which required California state officials to disseminate and implement a previously negotiated County Jail Plan for disabled persons and parolees, neither conflicted with section 3056 nor required more of defendants than was appropriate to assist in remedying the ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations for which they bear responsibility. Therefore, the court affirmed the remedial August 28 orders issued by the district court. Case No. 12-6018 was dismissed as moot and the court affirmed the district court's order in Case No. 12-17198. View "Armstrong v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with illegal reentry. The court held that the stipulated removal proceeding violated defendant's right to due process because he was denied his right to appeal the removal order. Further, the IJ violated 8 C.F.R. 1003.25(b) by finding defendant's waiver of rights "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" on the basis of an insufficient record. The court affirmed the conviction, nonetheless, because the violations were harmless given that defendant was ineligible for voluntary departure at the time of the 2006 proceeding. The court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing because Arizona Revised Statute section 12-1405 did not constitute a "crime of violence" as defined by U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). In light of Descamps v. United States, the court no longer analyzed a statute missing an element of a generic offense, as here, under the modified categorical approach. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law