Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants seeking damages for his detention and treatment at Guantanamo Bay. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, given the jurisdiction-stripping provisions in 28 U.S.C. 2241(e). Looking to the plain language of section 2241(e)(2), it was clear that this provision applied to plaintiff's claims, and that, as a result, no court, justice, or judge had authority to hear his action. The court concluded that Boumediene v. Bush did not address section 2241(e)(2), let alone strike it down; because section 2241(e)(2) was capable of functioning independently, and was consistent with Congress's basic objectives in enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, the court concluded that it was severable from section 2241(e)(1), and remained in effect, provided that it was constitutional; and section 2241(e)(2) was not unconstitutional as applied to him. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims and remanded. View "Hamad v. Gates, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, appealed the district court's dismissal of his Rule 60(b) motion seeking to reopen the district court's 2006 denial of his original federal habeas petition. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the Rule 60(b) motion as a second or successive petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Schad v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's dismissal of an indictment charging defendant of possession of a firearm as a misdemeanant under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) because defendant was not provided with appointed counsel. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)'s "right to counsel" provision referred to the right to counsel that existed in the predicate misdemeanor proceeding - not to a uniform federal right to counsel. Because defendant was not denied his right to counsel as it existed in the tribal court misdemeanor proceeding, the court held that his resulting conviction could properly serve as a predicate to a section 922(g)(9) prosecution. The court also held that this result did not violate the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. First" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and convictions for criminal copyright infringement and trafficking in counterfeit labels. The court held that the term "willfully" required the government to prove that a defendant knew he was acting illegally rather than simply that he knew he was making copies. Similarly, to "knowingly" traffic in counterfeit labels required knowledge that the labels were counterfeit. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's conviction and remanded because the district court improperly instructed the jury on these issues. The court also concluded that the district court should dismiss the second count against defendant on remand because his counsel failed to raise an obvious statute-of-limitations defense. View "United States v. Liu" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for possessing child pornography. The court held that the 2005 search of his computer at a CompUSA store was lawful because the police officers who conducted it did not exceed the scope of the permissible search already conducted by a private party; the 2009 search of his home office was lawful because defendant's wife had apparent authority, if not actual authority, to consent; and the district court properly considered defendant's age, 76 years old, and physical characteristics when it exercised its sentencing discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Tosti" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over 0.08 percent; and failure to maintain control of a vehicle. The court concluded that section 3161(d)(2) of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(d)(2) did not apply to Class B misdemeanors such as defendant's, and the charges against defendant were properly allowed to proceed despite the failure to adhere to the time limit set forth in that section. The court also concluded that defendant's claim of outrageous government conduct was waived because she failed to present it to the district court. Further, the evidence in the record and the findings of the trial court supported the conclusion that the government was not attempting to collect evidence through videotaping defendant and did not do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Nickerson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and two counts of securities fraud by use of manipulative and deceptive devices. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence of 36 years' supervised release. The court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he knew of Rule 10b-5; the district court did not err in imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement for abuse of trust under U.S.S.G. 3B1.3; the district court did not fail to be attentive to defendant's contentions as to mitigation; the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court committed plain error when it did not read the last two pages of his sentencing memorandum or view a DVD he had submitted; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Laurienti" on Justia Law

Stake Center petitioned for a writ of mandamus reversing the district court's denial of its motion for forfeiture under The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. Stake Center moved the district court to compel the government to institute criminal forfeiture proceedings against Stake Center's former employee, who was charged with crimes stemming from her embezzlement of funds from Stake Center and others, and to obtain property traceable to the employee's crimes. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error in denying Stake Center's motion for forfeiture where the CVRA and Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(1), gave victims a right to restitution, not a right to criminal forfeiture. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in declining to order the U.S. Attorneys' Office to commence criminal forfeiture proceedings against the IRS and other non-parties alleged to possess assets implicated in the employee's criminal activities. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus. View "In re: Stake Center Locating, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his sentence for committing lewd and lascivious acts with force against a child. The court concluded that petitioner's challenge to his parole term was moot because he was no longer on parole. The court also concluded that petitioner's claim that imposition of the sex-offender registration requirement violated Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler was without merit where the state court's decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Maciel v. Cates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Arizona state prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12134, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794, by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. Plaintiff picked tomatoes for Eurofresh as a part of a convict labor force. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Eurofresh were properly dismissed because plaintiff and Eurofresh were not in an employment relationship, and Eurofresh did not receive federal financial assistance. The court concluded, however, that judgment was improperly granted to the State Defendants where they were liable for disability discrimination committed by a contractor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether such discrimination occurred. View "Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc." on Justia Law