Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, sentenced to death on each of two counts of first-degree murder, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. On appeal, petitioner raised claims regarding the trial court's use of dual juries at trial; the trial court's use of a leg brace as a security measure during trial; and whether the sentencing judge properly considered all mitigating evidence under Lockett v. Ohio and Eddings v. Oklahoma. The court concluded that the district court properly denied relief on petitioner's "courtroom layout" and Lockett/Eddings claims, because the Arizona Supreme Court's decision denying relief was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court agreed with the State that the Lockett/Eddings line of cases held only that a sentencer must fully consider proffered mitigation evidence and did not affect a sentencer's determination of its weight. In this instance, the record made clear that the trial court adequately considered and weighed the mitigation evidence. The court also concluded that the district court properly denied relief on petitioner's remaining dual juries and "shackling" claims, because the claims were procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McKinney v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Barry Bonds's conviction of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1503, arose from Bonds's testimony before a grand jury investigation regarding whether the proceeds of the sales of performance enhancing drugs were being laundered. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 1503 applied to factually true statements that were evasive or misleading. Bonds could not escape criminal liability under section 1503 by contending that his response that he was a "celebrity child" was true. The court also concluded that Bonds's contention that his conviction should be reversed on the ground that section 1503 did not apply to a witness's statements before the grand jury was foreclosed by established precedent; the court rejected Bonds's argument that the use of the word "corruptly" in section 1503 was unconstitutionally vague and failed to put him on notice that his conduct was criminal; the indictment was sufficient; and the indictment and the jury instructions made clear that Bonds could be convicted on the basis of individual statements that were evasive or misleading. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress and the order denying the government's motion for reconsideration. Defendant had given a border patrol agent permission to "look in" or "search" the two cell phones he had with him but the agent did not ask him whether he would also consent to the agent's answering any incoming calls. Nonetheless, when one of the phones range while the agent was conducting his search, the agent answered it, passing himself off as defendant. By answering the call, the agent obtained information leading to defendant's arrest and felony charges of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens. The court rejected the government's claims that defendant did not have standing; in this instance, the agent's answering of the phone exceeded the scope of the consent that he obtained and, thus, violated defendant's Fourth Amendment right; the agent's impersonation of the intended recipient constituted a meaningful difference in the method and scope of the search in contrast to merely pushing a button in order to view a text message; consent to search a cell phone was insufficient to allow an agent to answer that phone, rather, specific consent to answer was necessary; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to both orders. View "United States v. Lopez-Cruz" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that most of the new evidence was cumulative and minimally significant; that non-cumulative evidence including allegations of sexual abuse, cerebral dysfunction and fetal alcohol syndrome were unsubstantiated by petitioner; most of the remaining evidence was speculative and came nowhere close to showing deficient performance; and the remaining evidence was minimally relevant at best. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Schurz v. Schriro" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of second degree burglary, challenged the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it was untimely. The court held, however, that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling on the ground that he relied on the assigned magistrate judge's order extending the filing deadline beyond the statutory limit. The court also held that petitioner sufficiently alleged that he was precluded from filing his habeas petition within the time period provided in the magistrate judge's order to warrant further development of the record. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court, remanding for further proceedings. View "Sossa v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendants Bonilla and Calixtro appealed their convictions and sentences stemming from charges related to their involvement in a plan to hold an illegal alien hostage until he paid defendants certain sums of money. The court concluded that the district court did not err in admitting an ICE agent's expert testimony where the fact that the agent's potential bias happened to result from his employment by the Government was not also grounds for categorically barring his testimony; from the record, the court did not know whether the district court found Bonilla managed another participant in the crime under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c); and the district court plainly erred in calculating the range of Calixtro's sentence by apply the U.S.S.G. 2A41.(b)(3) enhancement to his sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions but vacated defendants' sentences, remanding for resentencing. View "United States v. Bonilla-Guizar" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of robbery, and one count of grand theft. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on Atkins v. Virginia. In response to Atkins, Idaho enacted a law prohibiting execution of mentally retarded criminals. The court concluded that the Idaho Supreme Court's application of Atkins was not objectively unreasonable where the Supreme Court left the definition of mentally retarded persons broadly open for consistent state-court decisions. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court's factual findings were not unreasonable in light of the record. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. View "Pizzuto v. Blades" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a crack cocaine offense. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court affirmed the judgment, holding that it had jurisdiction to review section 3582(c)(2) discretionary decisions pursuant to United States v. Colson, which was not "clearly irreconcilable" with Dillon v. United States. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a reduced sentence where it properly considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and relied on facts supported by the record. View "United States v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Donald and Kristi Gravelet-Blondin filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and Sgt. Shelton for excessive force and unlawful arrest, as well as malicious prosecution for the tasing and arrest of Donald. Kristi also filed suit under state law for the harm she suffered watching her husband's tasing and being threatened with tasing herself. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. The court concluded, inter alia, that Sgt. Shelton was not entitled to qualified immunity where it was clearly established as of 2008 that the use of a taser in dart mode against a passive bystander such as Donald amounted to unconstitutionally excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to Sgt. Shelton and the grant of summary judgment to the City on plaintiffs' excessive force claim; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on the determination that probable cause existed for Donald's arrest; remanded for further proceedings on the unlawful arrest claim; and reversed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' common law claims. View "Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to four drug offenses. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's finding that he violated a condition of his supervised release by associating with known felons. Under United States v. Miller, the court held that a defendant's term of supervise release did not begin when the Bureau of Prisons places him in home confinement as part of his federal sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, the court affirmed the trial court's order revoking defendant's term of supervised release and imposing additional terms where the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's term of supervised release. View "United States v. Earl" on Justia Law