Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated identity theft. At issue on appeal was whether a counterfeit paper check that bears a victim's true name, bank account number, and routing number was a "means of identification of another person" for the purposes of the aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. 1028A, 1028(d)(7). The court concluded that, under the plain statutory language of the aggravated identity theft statute, the names and banking numbers on defendant's counterfeit check were a "means of identification." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was the opening statement of defense counsel regarding the presence of an alibi witness. Petitioner argued that counsel's statement constituted a broken promise that prejudiced the outcome of the trial and rendered counsel's assistance constitutionally ineffective. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the California Court of Appeal was not unreasonable in concluding that counsel had not made a promise to produce an alibi witness. Counsel's statement was merely an expression of hope that the witness would in fact appear. View "Saesee v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of twelve felonies stemming from her work as a tax preparer for various clients. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the superseding indictment where there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that defendant's fraud scheme affected the banks within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1343, regardless of whether the banks ultimately suffered any actual loss; the predicate offenses for Counts 16 and 17 happened after 18 U.S.C. 1028A was enacted and, therefore, the jury was not wrong in convicting defendant of aggravated identity theft while relying on the predicate wire fraud offenses; the district court did not err in allowing defendant's former attorney to testify at the sentencing hearing where no attorney-client privilege was implicated; and the district court did not clearly err in calculating the loss and restitution amounts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stargell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence stemming from a conviction for use or carrying and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (Count IV). The district court relied on Harris v. United States when it sentenced defendant. Harris has since been overruled in Alleyne v. United States, which held that facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the government conceded that Count IV did not comport with Alleyne because the increased mandatory minimum sentence was based on a fact found by the district court by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing where the district court must reexamine the entire sentence in light of the vacated sentence on Count IV. View "United States v. Lira" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence stemming from his conviction for drug-related charges. The court vacated and remanded for resentencing, concluding that any error in estimating the quantity of drugs attributable to the conspiracy was harmless, but that the district court erred in imposing the sentencing enhancement for use of a minor under U.S.S.G. 3B1.4 without an adequate factual basis. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's rejection of his guilty plea to illegal reentry into the country, asserting that the rejection violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The court court concluded that its prior opinions have rejected defendant's assertions that the indictment must set forth an enhancement under section 1326(b) and mention defendant's underlying conviction; the district court properly rejected defendant's guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and offered him the choice of again pleading guilty or proceeding to trial; because jeopardy attached when defendant pled guilty before the magistrate judge, this jeopardy never terminated and defendant had not been placed in double jeopardy; and defendant's claim was nonetheless colorable so the court had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Valenzuela-Arisqueta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the imposition and enforcement of two conditions of his parole: a residency restriction and a requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring using a GPS device. The district court dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that habeas corpus provided the exclusive federal remedy for plaintiff's claims. The court held, however, that such an action was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey if it was not a collateral attack on either the fact of a parolee's confinement as a parolee or the parolee's underlying conviction or sentence. Because petitioner's action was such an attack, the court reversed and remanded . View "Thornton v. Brown" on Justia Law

These interlocutory appeals stemmed from an encounter between a group of young men and several BART officers that ended with the shooting and death of one of the men. The court concluded that Defendant Mehserle was not entitled to immunity from Oscar Grant, Jr.'s Fourteenth Amendment claim where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mehserle's action's were required by a legitimate law enforcement purpose; the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal asserting a right to federal law qualified immunity from a California state law (Civil Code 52.1) violation; Mehserle was entitled to qualified immunity from a claim that he unlawfully arrested Plaintiff Anicete; the district court failed to consider whether there was any evidence that Mehserle participated in the extended detentions of Plaintiffs Anicete, Reyes, or Nigel Bryson; the district court properly denied Mehserle qualified immunity from Plaintiff Jack Bryson's unlawful arrest claim; Defendant Pirone was properly denied qualified immunity for his initial detention of Reyes, the Brysons, and Greer; Pirone was not entitled to qualified immunity for conducting a de facto arrest of Reyes and the Brysons; Pirone was not entitled to qualified immunity from Greer's unlawful arrest claim; and to the extent the district court relied on Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco to deny Defendant Domenici immunity, its judgment was vacated. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. View "Johnson v. BART" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that deputies used excessive force against her late husband and that a deputy unreasonably seized her when he kept her from the crime scene. At issue was whether a reasonable jury could determine that the deputies violated the Constitution when they fatally shot the husband - an armed homeowner on his patio. In this instance, the court concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the deputies' use of excessive force was constitutionally excessive where, among other things, the husband was not in the vicinity when the deputies arrived and plaintiff appeared unscathed and not in jeopardy. Accordingly, the court concluded that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court dismissed plaintiff's cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "George v. Morris, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of federal drug-trafficking felonies, appealed his sentence. The district court sentenced defendant as a "career offender" under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 because he had two prior convictions for "crimes of violence." The court concluded that defendant's prior conviction for criminal property damage in the first degree under section 708.820(1)(a) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes was categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2). Further, defendant's claim that section 4B1.2(a)(2)'s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law