Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of drug trafficking offenses and sentenced to 380 months imprisonment, brought a habeas petition requesting reconsideration of the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) rejection of his application to the Second Chance Act's, Pub. L. No. 110-199, elderly offenders pilot program. The district court, considering the merits of the case, denied the petition. The court concluded that the appeal was moot because the relief requested was no longer available due to the termination of the pilot program. On the merits, even if petitioner were eligible for the pilot program, his admission to the program would be at the BOP's discretion. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. View "McCullough v. Graber" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of attempted entry after deportation. The court concluded that defendant's prior conviction for unlawful sexual penetration in violation of California Penal Code 289(a)(1), for which he was sentenced to more than one year in custody, constituted an aggravated felony under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) and 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Accordingly, defendant was ineligible for discretionary relief as an aggravated felon and the district court appropriately denied his motion to dismiss. Therefore, defendant's 57-month sentence was reasonable and the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Sandoval-Orellana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent 24 years in prison after being convicted for murder based largely upon the perjured testimony of an unreliable jailhouse informant, Edward Fink. Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the District Attorney's Office failed to create any system for the Deputy District Attorneys handling criminal cases to access information pertaining to the benefits provided to jailhouse informants and other impeachment information, and failed to train Deputy District Attorneys to disseminate this information. At issue on appeal was whether a district attorney acted as a local or a state official when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. The court concluded that the policies challenged by plaintiff were distinct from the acts the district attorney undertook on behalf of the state. Even taking into account the control and supervisory powers of the Attorney General, the District Attorney represented the county when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. Therefore, a cause of action could lie against the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the pleadings. View "Goldstein v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his drug-related convictions, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the government's destruction of evidence and that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss. In the alternative, defendant argued that the trial judge erred in requiring a showing of bad faith in order to give a remedial jury instruction. The court held that while Supreme Court precedent demanded that a showing of bad faith was required for dismissal, it was not required for a remedial jury instruction. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the dismissal and reversed the denial of the remedial jury instruction. Accordingly, the court remanded for a new trial with a remedial instruction. View "United States v. Sivilla" on Justia Law

Amy and Vicky, child pornography victims, petitioned for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. The court concluded that the district court did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion in declining to impose joint and several liability in this case. Petitioners' request that this court overrule United States v. Kennedy, which required a court to identify a causal connection between the defendant's offense conduct and the victim's specific losses before awarding restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2259, was previously considered and denied. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "In re: Amy & Vicky, et al v. USDC, Sacramento" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against correctional officials at the Saguaro Correctional Center (SCC), asserting that the decision to house him in the same cell with a member of a rival gang after he had fought with another member of that same gang violated his Eight Amendment rights. The district court rejected defendant's claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk he faced from the cell assignment. The court concluded that, despite the late Rand v. Rowland notice, plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of substantial rights when the district court decided the summary judgment motion on the merits. Plaintiff's response demonstrated that he understood the nature of summary judgment and complied with the requirements of Rule 56. Thus, reversal and remand of the district court was not required. Further, the undisputed evidence in the record showed that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of an attack if the rival gang member and plaintiff were placed in a cell together. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Labatad v. CCA, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was a dentist who was charged with crimes relating to cocaine possession and distribution. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentence imposed for one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, one count of distribution of cocaine, and two counts of maintaining a drug-involved premises. The government cross-appealed the district court's denial of forfeiture of the seized equity from the sale of defendant's home. The court affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; affirmed the district court's determination of the drug amount and refusal to grant a minor role adjustment; vacated the distribution count because it was duplicitous; vacated the convictions for maintaining drug-involved premises because the district court committed plain error by utilizing a "significant purpose" instruction rather than a "primary or principal use" instruction; and reversed the district court's denial of the government's forfeiture motion. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Mancuso" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault under a statute that provided for a maximum prison sentence of six months. On appeal, defendant argued that the possibility of being ordered to pay a substantial amount of money in restitution gave him the right to a trial by jury under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. The court concluded that the prosecution of defendant, even though it resulted in an order requiring him to make monetary payment in restitution, was still a prosecution for a petty offense, and was not a civil action. Therefore, defendant had no right to a jury under either the Sixth or Seventh Amendment and the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stanfill El" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for distribution, possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to deliver a "missing witness" instruction; the district court erred by sua sponte instructing the jury not to "speculate" as to why the witness was absent; the sua sponte instruction was harmless with regards to the charges of distribution and possession with intent to distribute; the court did not need to decide whether the district court's sua sponte instruction had a prejudicial effect on the conspiracy charge because the court reversed the conspiracy conviction on other grounds; even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was no such agreement between defendant and someone else to distribute meth; therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of this offense; and the court rejected defendant's contention that the judge should not have imposed a sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. 841(b). Accordingly, the court vacated the conspiracy conviction, remanded to the district court to grant a judgment of acquittal on that count alone and to conform the sentence accordingly, and affirmed the remainder of defendant's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of receiving stolen property. On appeal, the state challenged the district court's grant of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition based on Batson v. Kentucky. At issue was whether the California courts' determination that a prosecutor had genuine, race-neutral reasons for striking four black jurors during voir dire was an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law. As a threshold matter, the court held that Cullen v. Pinholster allowed the court to consider photographs that showed the racial composition of a jury venire to the extent that those photographs merely constructed facts visible to the state trial court that ruled on petitioner's Batson challenge. Overall, the evidence presented, including comparative analysis, did not persuade the court that habeas relief was warranted under the court's doubly deferential standard of review. Although some of the prosecutor's justifications appeared thin at first glance, a more searching review revealed nothing in the record suggesting that the state court unreasonably found these reasons to be genuine and not pretextual. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner. View "Jamerson v. Runnels" on Justia Law