Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an Arizona capital prisoner convicted of murdering his ex-girlfriend, appealed from the denial of his first habeas petition and sought authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition. The court rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's requests for evidentiary hearings on his various ineffective assistance claims; the Arizona Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it denied petitioner's Eight Amendment claim regarding victim impact evidence; and because petitioner had not been able to demonstrate either due diligence or actual innocence as to his claims that where not presented in his first habeas petition, his application to file a second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition and denied his application to file a second or successive habeas petition. View "Gulbrandson v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the district court's denial of restitution and filed a petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. The court held that the district court did not err in imposing a proximate cause requirement when applying 18 U.S.C. 2259(b)(3) and, in this respect, the petition was denied. The court's review of the record demonstrated that petitioners provided sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between defendant's offense and petitioner's losses. Accordingly, the court granted the petition in part. View "Amy & Vicky v. USDC-SAC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his jury conviction and sentence for assault resulting in serious bodily injury on an Indian reservation. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the Certificate of Indian Blood was a self-authenticating document under Fed. R. Evid. 902(2). Because the error was not harmless, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion in limine, thus it did not deny defendant's right to present a defense. Finally, the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for serious bodily injury was not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Alvirez, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. Petitioner was convicted of murdering her child and sentenced to death. At trial, petitioner protested her innocence and denied confessing to the murder while the detective who interviewed her shortly after the murder testified that she had confessed to committing the murder. There were no other witnesses or direct evidence linking petitioner to the crime. The judge and jury believed the detective but they did not know that the detective had a long history of lying under oath and other misconduct. The court concluded that the state violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States because it knew about this misconduct but didn't disclose it. The court held that petitioner was entitled to habeas relief and therefore, reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus setting aside her convictions and sentences. View "Milke, et al v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The state filed a civil petition against petitioner under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6600 et seq., just before petitioner's confinement was expected to end. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the Superior Court, claiming that his exceedingly lengthy detention violated his constitutional rights. However, that court denied the petition and the California appellate courts agreed. Meanwhile, petitioner remained in custody and his SVPA petition made no progress. Petitioner then filed a federal pro se habeas petition. The district court concluded that the doctrine of Younger abstention applied and dismissed petitioner's case. The court held that the district court's abstention and denial of the writ were inappropriate where the state's counsel indicated that a trial on the commitment petition could be completed within 90 days and that the state would not oppose an order granting an alternative writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. View "Knight v. Ahlin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of providing material support to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A, and of making false statements to government officials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the jury's foreperson was biased against him; the district court imposed an unconstitutional limitation on his cross-examination of the government's key witness; and the district court erred in admitting expert testimony offered by the government and excluding expert testimony offered by the defense. Defendant also sought review of the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court affirmed the judgment; dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the appeal of the dismissal of the section 2255 motion; and denied the government's motion to strike portions of the opening brief that cited to materials outside the record as moot. View "United States v. Hayat" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that there was no "realistic probability" that California would apply California Penal Code 243.4(e) to conduct that was not normally turpitudinous and the BIA's decision denying his motion to reconsider. The court held that section 243.4(e)(1)'s requirement that defendant specifically intended to damage his victim psychologically evidenced the malicious intent that was the essence of moral turpitude. The BIA's decision that this kind of behavior was per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong was persuasive. Because the court agreed that there was no "realistic probability" that California courts would apply section 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude, the court denied the petitions. View "Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Respondent (the Warden) appealed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioner. The court held that the California Supreme Court necessarily decided that it was not reasonably probable that either petitioner's conviction or sentence would have turned out differently had counsel objected to the brace (knee restraint) petitioner wore beneath his clothing during the trial. Given what "prejudice" means in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the strength of the evidence, the nature of the brace, the atrociousness of petitioner's crimes, and the quality of the mitigation, the court could not say that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Walker v. Martel" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to an information charging misprision of a felony based on her concealment and failure to notify authorities of her husband's drug trafficking activities. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court should have allowed her to withdraw her plea because the misprision charge violated her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the information failed to allege an essential element of misprision, and the plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The court dismissed the appeal because defendant could not overcome the appeal waiver contained in her plea agreement. View "United States v. Brizan" on Justia Law

The CDCR, in an effort to meet the religious exercise needs of prison inmates, maintained paid full-time and part-time chaplain positions of five faiths: Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Native American, and Protestant (the Policy). Plaintiffs claimed, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that various entities and individuals violated their federal and state constitutional rights by refusing to hire a paid full-time Wiccan chaplain and by failing to apply neutral criteria in determining whether paid chaplaincy positions were necessary to meet the religious exercise needs of inmates adhering to religions outside the five faiths. Because plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded facts supporting a plausible claim under the Establishment Clause and the California State Constitution, the court reversed and remanded both claims to the district court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Hartmann, et al v. California Dept. of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law