Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The CDCR, in an effort to meet the religious exercise needs of prison inmates, maintained paid full-time and part-time chaplain positions of five faiths: Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Native American, and Protestant (the Policy). Plaintiffs claimed, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that various entities and individuals violated their federal and state constitutional rights by refusing to hire a paid full-time Wiccan chaplain and by failing to apply neutral criteria in determining whether paid chaplaincy positions were necessary to meet the religious exercise needs of inmates adhering to religions outside the five faiths. Because plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded facts supporting a plausible claim under the Establishment Clause and the California State Constitution, the court reversed and remanded both claims to the district court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Hartmann, et al v. California Dept. of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Defendants pled guilty to one count of receipt of stolen mail and one count of mail theft. During the 2010 holiday season, defendants drove through neighborhoods on "Christmas shopping" trips in search of packages on porches, doorways, or in community mailboxes to steal. On appeal, defendants argued that the district court erred by including certain expenses the USPS incurred to avert future mail thefts as loss, for purposes of both sentencing and restitution. The court held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that the expense the USPS incurred was a reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm resulting from defendants' actions. The USPS theft prevention measures were directed at defendants' ongoing crime spree that concluded after the USPS changed its delivery procedures. The court held, however, that the district court plainly erred in ordering restitution for the USPS's expenses where mail theft - not unlawful possession - caused the USPS to change its procedure. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendants' sentences but vacated that portion of the restitution order awarding restitution for the USPS's expenses. View "United States v. May" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to aggravated identity theft and two other counts in connection with an ATM skimming scheme. On appeal, defendant argued that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 extended the district court's fact-finding responsibility to all matters controverted, no matter how they were presented, throughout the entire sentencing phase. The court held that Rule 32(i)(3)(B) required a district court to address only unresolved factual objections to the presentence report, and defendant failed to dispute any fact in the report. Similarly, when explaining a sentence, the district court need not address every assertion made within every argument advanced before the court during sentencing. The district court properly considered the presentence report and the parties' arguments and then adequately explained its reasonable and generous resolution imposing a below Guidelines sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Petri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and two of its police officers, in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the police officers retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of speech after he was cited for a noise violation. The court held that plaintiff had put forth facts sufficient to allege a violation of his clearly established First Amendment right to be free from police action motivated by retaliatory animus, even if probable cause existed for that action. Therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and plaintiff's claims should proceed to trial. View "Ford v. City of Yakima, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United States effectively overruled United States v. Miller, where the court held that the Government did not need to prove that a defendant knew the firearm or ammunition had traveled in interstate commerce to obtain a conviction under section 922(g)(1). The court did not read Flores-Figueroa, which did not announce an "inflexible rule of construction," as affecting the court's interpretation of section 922(g)(1) and affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Stone" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon his stepdaughter, and of attempting to dissuade her from reporting those acts to the police. Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and the district court granted the petition. The court concluded that petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to interview a potentially important witness or to introduce significant exculpatory evidence that she could have provided. Further, counsel's deficient performance prejudiced petitioner where there was a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Cannedy, Jr. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of her 28 U.S.C 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contended that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it affirmed the trial court's decision to admit as evidence statements made by her during a station-house interview. Because the court concluded that fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether petitioner was "in custody" when she made the statements in dispute, the court affirmed the district court's denial of her application for habeas relief. View "Dyer v. Hornbeck" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1153 and 244, and contested the portion of his sentence imposing a lifetime term of supervised release and several conditions of his supervised release. The court concluded that defendant's confession was properly admitted; defendant validly waived his rights to a jury trial and an indictment, and the district court did not plainly err by accepting defendant's counsel's waiver of his right to confrontation; the court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony about the DNA evidence used to implicate him; the court held that the district court properly admitted the testimony of the grandmother and uncle under the excited utterance exception to the general hearsay exclusion; the testimony of the officer was not properly admitted at trial but its admission was harmless error; and the court rejected defendant's argument that prosecutorial misconduct materially affected the fairness of the trial and that the trial court relied on insufficient evidence. The court remanded for the district court to reconsider the plethysmograph testing requirement, to clarify the condition that defendant "shall not possess, view, or otherwise, use any other material that is sexually stimulating, sexually oriented, or deemed to be inappropriate by the probation officer and/or treatment provider," to adjust his probation requirements so that they were definite and certain, and to provide adequate explanation for defendant's conditions of supervised release. The court affirmed in part and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Preston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of charges stemming from the brutal beating of his wife, petitioned for review of the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner claimed that his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was a lesser-included offense of his conviction for infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, thus, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Apprendi v. New Jersey, Texas v. Cobb, and Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania - whether considered individually or together - did not create "clearly established Federal law" requiring a state court to consider sentencing enhancements as an element of an offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. A state court could not be expected - much less required - to refer to federal law which was not clearly established. Thus, the court held that the state court's decision was not "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed this issue and fairminded jurists could disagree as to the constitutional principle. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Smith v. Hedgpeth, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and thirty counts of money laundering. On appeal, defendant challenged the portion of his sentence that imposed forfeiture and restitution. Defendant argued that, because the FBI was essentially a part of the DOJ, the two entities were functionally the same. Thus, he argued, requiring him to pay forfeiture to the DOJ and restitution to the FBI would result in an impermissible double recovery for the government. The court concluded that the two payments represented different types of funds: punitive and compensatory. They were different in nature, kind, and purpose. Therefore, it was irrelevant as to what extent the FBI and DOJ were distinct entities and the district court did not clearly err when it did not offset defendant's forfeiture amount. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law