Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves four affiliated companies, collectively known as the Pangang Companies, which were indicted for economic espionage related to their alleged efforts to steal trade secrets from E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (DuPont) concerning the production of titanium dioxide. The Pangang Companies argued that they were immune from criminal prosecution in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because they are owned and controlled by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the Pangang Companies' motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that the FSIA did not apply to criminal cases and that even if it did, the commercial activity and implied waiver exceptions to the FSIA would apply. The Pangang Companies appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially held that the companies failed to make a prima facie showing that they were covered entities under the FSIA.Upon remand, the district court again denied the motion to dismiss, reiterating that the Pangang Companies did not qualify for immunity under the FSIA and also rejecting their claims to common-law immunity. The court found that the companies did not exercise functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC and thus were not entitled to immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that under federal common law, the Pangang Companies did not make a prima facie showing that they exercised functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC. Therefore, they were not eligible for foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution. The court also noted that principles of deference to the political branches on matters touching on foreign relations reinforced this conclusion. View "USA V. PANGANG GROUP COMPANY, LTD." on Justia Law

Roberto Gonzalez-Loera pleaded guilty in March 2015 to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, violating 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court adopted the presentence report, which included a four-level enhancement for Gonzalez-Loera's role as an organizer or leader under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). This resulted in a total offense level of 39 and a guideline range of 262 to 327 months. Gonzalez-Loera was sentenced to 262 months' imprisonment.After his sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission created a new retroactive guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which allows for a two-level reduction for certain defendants with zero criminal history points. Gonzalez-Loera moved for a sentence reduction under this new guideline, arguing that he met the criteria. The government opposed, stating that Gonzalez-Loera was ineligible because he had received an aggravating role adjustment under § 3B1.1. The district court agreed with the government and denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(10) contains two distinct requirements: a defendant must not have received an adjustment under § 3B1.1 and must not have been engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. A defendant is ineligible for relief if either condition is not met. Since Gonzalez-Loera received an adjustment under § 3B1.1, he did not meet the criteria for a sentence reduction under § 4C1.1. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Gonzalez-Loera's motion to reduce his sentence. View "USA V. GONZALEZ-LOERA" on Justia Law

Robert Louis Carver pleaded guilty to charges related to two separate criminal schemes: a biotechnology investment fraud from 2004 to 2008 and a lighting company stock fraud from 2017 to 2018. The government filed indictments in 2011 and 2023, respectively. Carver's plea agreement acknowledged a total offense level of 20 under the Sentencing Guidelines but did not agree on his criminal history category.The United States Probation Office calculated Carver's criminal history score, including two points each for two 1994 California convictions, resulting in a total score of four and a criminal history category of III. Carver objected, arguing that these convictions were expunged under California Penal Code section 1203.4, which should exclude them from his criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). The district court disagreed, ruling that the relief provided by section 1203.4 did not amount to expungement under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under United States v. Hayden, convictions set aside under California Penal Code section 1203.4 are not considered expunged for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). The court rejected Carver's argument that Hayden was overruled by Kisor v. Wilkie, which modified the standard for deferring to agency interpretations of their regulations. The court found that Hayden's interpretation used traditional tools of construction and did not rely on the Guidelines' commentary, making it consistent with Kisor. The court also found that United States v. Castillo did not apply, as Hayden did not rely on commentary deference. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to include Carver's prior convictions in his criminal history score. View "USA V. CARVER" on Justia Law

John Holcomb was arrested after his ex-girlfriend, J.J., accused him of sexual assault. During the investigation, officers obtained a search warrant for Holcomb's computer, which led to the discovery of videos depicting child sexual abuse. Holcomb initially consented to the search but later withdrew his consent. A second warrant was issued, allowing a broader search of his computer, which included a provision to search for evidence of "dominion and control" without any temporal limitation. This search uncovered the incriminating videos.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially granted Holcomb's motion to suppress the videos, finding the "dominion and control" provision overbroad and insufficiently particular. However, upon reconsideration, the court applied the good-faith exception, citing the lack of clear precedent requiring temporal limitations for such provisions, and denied the motion to suppress. Holcomb then pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the "dominion and control" provision was invalid due to its overbreadth and lack of particularity. The court also determined that the good-faith exception did not apply because the warrant was facially deficient, and the plain view doctrine did not justify the seizure of the videos. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Holcomb's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. HOLCOMB" on Justia Law

Law enforcement had specific information connecting Robert Hamilton to an unlawful shooting. When officers located him two weeks after the incident, he fled. During the chase, officers observed Hamilton reaching for his waistband, leading them to believe he was armed. After tackling and arresting him, officers found a gun, marijuana, scales, and cash on Hamilton.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Hamilton’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his arrest, concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him and that his flight and actions during the chase provided probable cause for arrest. The jury convicted Hamilton of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition but acquitted him of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court also applied a sentencing enhancement for possessing a gun in connection with another felony offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that the officers’ initial attempt to stop Hamilton did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because he fled before they could do anything other than order him to stop. The court also found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Hamilton and that his flight and reaching for his waistband provided probable cause for arrest. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that the evidence was obtained legally and in applying the sentencing enhancement. The court affirmed Hamilton’s conviction and sentence. View "USA V. HAMILTON" on Justia Law

Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr., an Idaho death-row inmate, filed a lawsuit alleging that his execution by lethal injection would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Pizzuto sought discovery about the origin, manufacture, and acquisition dates of Idaho's execution protocol drugs. Idaho refused to respond, citing a state secrecy statute that protects the identity of execution drug suppliers. The district court found the information relevant and not protected by privilege, and ordered Idaho to respond to certain discovery requests, applying a "reasonable degree of certainty" standard to determine if the information would identify the drug supplier.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted Pizzuto's motion to compel discovery, finding that Idaho's secrecy statute did not create a federal evidentiary privilege and that the requested information was relevant. The court ordered Idaho to provide certain information, while allowing the state to withhold details that would, to a reasonable degree of certainty, identify the drug supplier. Idaho appealed the district court's discovery order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, as the discovery order fell into a narrow class of cases that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the disclosures, as Idaho failed to provide concrete examples of how the requested information would lead to the identification of the drug supplier. The court emphasized that Idaho's strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws, including the death penalty, must be considered, but found that the state did not show how its interests would be unduly burdened by the ordered discovery. View "PIZZUTO V. TEWALT" on Justia Law

Mahsa Parviz was convicted of making a false statement on a passport application and aggravated identity theft. Parviz lost her parental rights over her biological daughter, C.P., and was permanently enjoined from contacting her. Despite this, Parviz attempted to obtain a passport for C.P. by submitting false statements, including a fraudulent letter from a nurse practitioner, Bret Allen Parker, claiming C.P. was medically unable to appear in person due to a critical condition. This letter was crucial in bypassing the requirement for C.P. to appear in person for the passport application.The United States District Court for the Central District of California convicted Parviz on both counts. Parviz argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove she "used" Parker’s identity to commit passport fraud, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Dubin v. United States. The district court denied her motion for acquittal and sentenced her to 37 months for passport fraud and 24 months for aggravated identity theft, to be served consecutively. Parviz also argued for a sentence reduction for time served in Texas for attempted kidnapping, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show Parviz fraudulently used Parker’s identity, as the letter was central to obtaining the passport. The court also upheld the district court’s interpretation that "without lawful authority" does not require the means of identification to be used without the person’s consent. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to reduce Parviz’s sentence for time served in Texas and in imposing a special condition of supervised release prohibiting contact with C.P. View "USA V. PARVIZ" on Justia Law

Juan Carlos Enriquez, a pharmacy technician, was involved in a scheme to refer Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries to pharmacies owned by his alleged co-conspirator, Irina Sadovsky, in exchange for kickbacks. Enriquez was indicted for conspiracy to receive healthcare kickbacks in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and for receiving prohibited payments in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it failed to state an offense and lacked specificity because it did not negate the statutory safe harbor for a bona fide employment relationship under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B).The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Enriquez’s motion to dismiss. Enriquez then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motion. The district court sentenced him to one day of imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $121,115 in restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Enriquez argued that the principles from Ruan v. United States, which required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew they were acting in an unauthorized manner under the Controlled Substances Act, should apply to the AKS. He contended that the AKS bona fide employment safe harbor should be treated as a "quasi-element" for pleading purposes. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend Ruan’s reasoning to the AKS or to pleading requirements, affirming that indictments need not allege affirmative defenses. The court held that the indictment provided sufficient detail to inform Enriquez of the charges and enable him to prepare his defense. The district court’s denial of Enriquez’s motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "USA V. ENRIQUEZ" on Justia Law

Abelardo Rodriguez-Arvizu was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol agents on November 18, 2019, for a suspected immigration violation. During processing, an outstanding arrest warrant related to his involvement in a marijuana "rip crew" was discovered. He was subsequently arrested by FBI agents, who did not inform him of the specific charges. During the ride to the FBI office, Rodriguez-Arvizu made incriminating statements. At the FBI office, he was read his Miranda rights, and he made further statements after waiving his rights.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Rodriguez-Arvizu's motion to suppress his statements. The court found that although the FBI agents violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(3)(A) by not informing him of the charges, suppression was not warranted. The court also found no violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, as he did not unambiguously invoke this right. Additionally, the court determined that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel despite not knowing the specific charges. Finally, the court ruled that his confession was within the safe harbor period of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and did not violate the McNabb-Mallory rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that suppression was not warranted for the Rule 4(c)(3)(A) violation, as the agents' conduct was not sufficiently deliberate or culpable. The court also agreed that Rodriguez-Arvizu did not unambiguously invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right. The court further held that the safe harbor period began with his FBI arrest, making his confession admissible. View "USA V. RODRIGUEZ-ARVIZU" on Justia Law

Paige Thompson committed a significant data breach, hacking into Amazon Web Services (AWS) customers' accounts, stealing data from at least 30 entities, and causing tens of millions of dollars in damage. She also used the stolen credentials to mine cryptocurrency, further increasing the financial impact on the victims. Thompson was arrested after she revealed her activities to a cybersecurity professional, leading to an FBI investigation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington calculated Thompson's sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. However, the court granted a substantial downward variance, sentencing her to time served (approximately 100 days) and five years of probation. The court emphasized Thompson's personal history, including her transgender identity, autism, and past trauma, as significant factors in its decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court overemphasized Thompson's personal story and failed to properly weigh several of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court held that the district court's findings regarding Thompson's lack of malicious intent, her remorse, and the seriousness of her actions were clearly erroneous and not supported by the record. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the district court did not adequately consider the need for general and specific deterrence or the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities.The Ninth Circuit vacated Thompson's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to properly weigh all relevant factors and provide a more substantial justification for any variance from the Guidelines. View "USA V. THOMPSON" on Justia Law