Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man was arrested after he used Instagram to offer his services as a pimp to someone he believed was a 16-year-old girl, who was actually an undercover officer. The officer, part of a human trafficking task force, had created a fake Instagram account with photos and hashtags suggesting prostitution. The man initiated contact, and their conversations led to a plan to meet in person, at which point he was arrested. He later admitted to attempting to lure a minor into prostitution. He was charged and convicted of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and attempted sexual enticement of a minor.Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the defendant, who is Black, sought discovery to support a claim of selective enforcement based on race discrimination. He argued that similar cases in the district involved only Black men, but his evidence was limited to six cases over ten years. The district court denied his motion for discovery, finding the sample size too small and not reflective of the broader work of the task force. The court also sentenced him to 144 months in prison, rejecting his argument that this sentence created an unwarranted disparity compared to other similar cases.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in denying discovery and in sentencing. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the discovery request, as the evidence presented was insufficient under the flexible standard for selective enforcement claims established in United States v. Sellers. The appellate court also found no procedural or substantive error in the sentence imposed, concluding that the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. GREEN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested in Montana in 2019 in connection with a burglary, during which officers found methamphetamine and syringes in his possession. He admitted to being addicted to methamphetamine. He was charged in state court with felony drug possession, and his pretrial release conditions prohibited firearm possession. In 2022, while those charges were still pending, he was found in possession of a stolen firearm and again admitted to daily methamphetamine use. He was subsequently indicted in federal court for being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and for illegally receiving a firearm while under felony indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant argued that both statutes were facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The district court relied on prior Ninth Circuit precedent and Supreme Court language in District of Columbia v. Heller, concluding that the statutes were consistent with longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by certain groups, such as felons and the mentally ill, and that the defendant had sufficient notice that his conduct was prohibited.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit held that both § 922(g)(3) and § 922(n) are facially constitutional under the Second Amendment, as there are circumstances in which their application is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. The court also held that § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, given his admitted daily methamphetamine use. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. STENNERSON" on Justia Law

A group of former executives from an investment management company were prosecuted after the company collapsed and was placed in receivership. The company, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors, primarily through promissory notes and other investment vehicles, experienced severe financial distress following the default of a major asset. Despite this, the executives continued to solicit investments, representing to investors that their funds would be used to purchase secure receivables and that the company was financially healthy. In reality, most new investor funds were used to pay prior investors and cover operating expenses. The executives were accused of making material misrepresentations and misleading half-truths about the use of investor funds, the security of investments, and the company’s financial health.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and multiple counts of wire fraud; one defendant was also convicted of making a false statement on a loan application. The defendants argued that they were improperly convicted on an omissions theory of fraud and that they were prevented from presenting a complete defense based on disclosures in offering documents and financial statements. They also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the materiality of their statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government’s theory at trial was based on affirmative misrepresentations and misleading half-truths, not mere omissions, and that the jury instructions fairly stated the law. The court found that evidence of what was not disclosed was relevant to materiality, and that disclaimers in offering documents did not render other representations immaterial in a criminal fraud prosecution. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. JESENIK" on Justia Law

Douglas Eligha Taylor was originally convicted in 1995 for robbing four banks in Los Angeles, pleading guilty to multiple counts including armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to 147 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. After his release in 2007, Taylor committed another bank robbery in 2008 and was prosecuted in state court, receiving a 17-year sentence. While in state custody, he was involved in a stabbing incident and accumulated multiple rules violations. Upon completing his state sentence in 2023, Taylor was transferred to federal custody, where the United States Probation Office petitioned to revoke his supervised release based on his 2008 conduct. Taylor admitted the allegations, and the district court accepted his admissions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California revoked Taylor’s supervised release and imposed a 60-month prison sentence, which was above the recommended Guidelines range of 18–24 months, followed by 24 months of supervised release. The court explained its decision by referencing Taylor’s repeated violations, the danger posed to the public, his lack of deterrence from prior sanctions, and the risk of recidivism. Taylor appealed, arguing that the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence, improperly considering his prior criminal conduct, and imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not commit plain procedural error, adequately explained its reasons for the above-Guidelines sentence, and properly considered Taylor’s history and risk to the public. The court also found the sentence to be substantively reasonable and rejected Taylor’s arguments for a lower sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. TAYLOR" on Justia Law

Gladys Perez was convicted in Nevada state court of first-degree murder, child neglect, and child abuse, and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. After her conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Nevada and became final in May 2012, Perez filed a state post-conviction habeas petition, which tolled the federal one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Her state petition was denied in December 2013, and Perez repeatedly instructed her court-appointed attorney, Bret Whipple, to file an appeal. Whipple failed to communicate with Perez or file the appeal, and did not provide her with the necessary case documents. After months of unsuccessful attempts to contact Whipple, Perez began preparing a federal habeas petition on her own, facing additional obstacles such as limited access to the prison law library, incomplete case files, and delays in obtaining a required financial certificate from prison officials.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed Perez’s federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that she had not demonstrated the extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence required for equitable tolling under AEDPA. The district court concluded that Perez’s efforts to contact her attorney and prepare her petition were insufficient to excuse her late filing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Perez’s abandonment by her post-conviction counsel constituted an extraordinary circumstance that prevented her timely filing, and that she acted with reasonable diligence both before and after the abandonment. The court also found that delays by prison officials in processing her financial certificate further contributed to her late filing. The panel concluded that Perez qualified for equitable tolling and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of her habeas petition. View "PEREZ V. REUBART" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was shot five times in his apartment parking lot and, in the chaos, dropped his black iPhone and a satchel. His girlfriend took the satchel but left the phone, which was later recovered by police near some shrubs. The police also seized a different (white) iPhone from the defendant at the hospital. The black iPhone remained in police evidence for over two years, until it became relevant in a separate federal drug investigation. The government ultimately used data from the black iPhone, along with other evidence, to charge the defendant with drug trafficking, firearm offenses, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the black iPhone, arguing that he retained a privacy interest in the device and its data, and also sought recusal of the district judge due to her prior service as U.S. Attorney when he was prosecuted for unrelated charges over fifteen years earlier. The district court denied both motions, finding that the defendant had abandoned the black iPhone and thus lacked standing to challenge its search, and that recusal was not warranted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that the defendant had abandoned his privacy interest in the black iPhone, holding that the circumstances—dropping the phone while fleeing after being shot—did not show intent to abandon the device or its data. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the suppression motion because federal agents obtained a warrant and searched the phone within a reasonable period. The court also affirmed the denial of the recusal motion, concluding that a reasonable person would not question the judge’s impartiality under these facts. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. HUNT" on Justia Law

Two individuals, both members of a San Francisco gang known as Mac Block, were involved in a shootout at a funeral reception that resulted in the death of a man named Simmons and injuries to several bystanders. The government alleged that the defendants, after a confrontation with Simmons, retrieved firearms and returned to the scene, where a gunfight ensued. One defendant was accused of aiding and abetting the murder, while the other was alleged to have directly participated in the shooting. Both were charged with murder in aid of racketeering under the VICAR statute and with being felons in possession of firearms.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial. Before trial, the court considered, but ultimately denied, a motion to bifurcate the trial so that the jury would first decide whether the defendants committed murder, and only if so, then consider the racketeering elements. The court concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent, specifically United States v. Barker, precluded such bifurcation. The court also addressed a Batson challenge to the government’s peremptory strike of a Black juror, finding the government’s race-neutral explanation sufficient and not pretextual. The jury convicted both defendants on all counts, and the court denied post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that Barker forecloses bifurcation of the elements of a single VICAR murder charge, reasoning that such bifurcation would impermissibly alter the structure of the offense as defined by Congress. The court also upheld the district court’s rejection of the Batson challenge, finding no clear error in the determination that the government’s strike was not racially motivated. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. MANNING" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in Montana suspected Danielle Williams of drug trafficking and observed her and Brandon Gordon engaging in suspicious activity, including Gordon climbing a fence with a black bag and entering Williams’s vehicle. After a traffic stop, officers found drug paraphernalia and two stolen handguns in the vehicle. Gordon later admitted to daily methamphetamine use and intent to use the stolen items to pay a drug debt. He was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for possessing a stolen firearm. At trial, the jury acquitted him of the stolen firearm charge but convicted him of being a felon in possession. He was sentenced to 87 months in prison.Gordon appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the conviction. He then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, raising several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that his attorney misinformed him about sentencing exposure, failed to challenge the indictment, and did not move to suppress evidence. The district court denied his claims, declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, and dismissed a second-in-time § 2255 motion as an unauthorized successive petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that counsel’s alleged sentencing predictions did not constitute ineffective assistance, so no evidentiary hearing was required. The court also held that, although the district court should have considered all ineffective assistance claims related to plea negotiations as a whole, Gordon’s claims failed on the merits. Finally, the court determined that Gordon’s second-in-time § 2255 motion should have been treated as a motion to amend, but denied relief because the only argument raised was foreclosed by binding precedent. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. GORDON" on Justia Law

After being convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, the petitioner was sentenced to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. While incarcerated, he participated in recidivism reduction programs and earned time credits under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). He continued to accrue these credits while on home confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Upon nearing the end of his custodial sentence, he sought to have his earned time credits applied to reduce both his remaining time in custody and the length of his supervised release. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) applied some credits to end his custody early but refused to apply the remaining credits to reduce his supervised release, arguing that the FSA did not permit such use.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed his habeas corpus petition, agreeing with the government that the FSA time credits could not be used to shorten the term of supervised release. The court found that the credits could only be applied to reduce time in custody, not supervised release, and thus denied the petitioner’s request for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the FSA, as well as relevant canons of statutory construction, demonstrate that Congress intended for earned time credits to be applied toward reducing the length of supervised release, not just custodial time. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded with instructions to grant the petition in part, direct the government to recalculate the petitioner’s earned time credits, and provide the recalculation to his probation officer. The main holding is that, under the FSA, earned time credits may be used to reduce the term of supervised release. View "GONZALEZ V. HERRERA" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law