Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A defendant was charged with 44 federal offenses, including bank fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, obstruction of official proceedings, and witness tampering, arising from an alleged scheme to defraud the Paycheck Protection Program. The defendant, a Black Muslim man, co-founded a nonprofit for transitional housing and allegedly used stolen identities and fraudulent loan applications for the nonprofit and two shell entities. He represented himself at trial, arguing law enforcement targeted him due to his race and religion.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial. During jury selection, an alternate juror expressed strong negative reactions to the defendant’s defense, stating he could not put aside his personal experiences and doubted his ability to be impartial. Despite the defendant’s request to excuse this juror, the district court deferred its inquiry and allowed the juror to serve as an alternate. When a regular juror was dismissed during trial, the alternate joined the deliberating jury after a brief, belated colloquy in which he claimed to have moved past his initial bias. The defendant objected, arguing the juror remained biased. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 204 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the proceedings and held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to promptly investigate the alternate juror’s bias and by conducting an inadequate inquiry after the juror had heard evidence. The appellate court found that these errors deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and constituted structural error. The Ninth Circuit vacated the convictions, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "USA V. COLAR" on Justia Law

Lamar Brown originally pleaded guilty in Nevada state court to a felony violation of lifetime supervision based on his failure to comply with conditions such as participating in counseling, reporting as directed, and not changing his address without permission. He was sentenced to five to twenty years in prison. After exhausting his appeals and state post-conviction proceedings, Brown filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer advised him to plead guilty to a felony and did not advise him to withdraw his plea before sentencing.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found merit in Brown’s ineffective assistance claims and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, ordering that his felony conviction be vacated. The court directed that, after appellate review was complete or the time for appeal expired, the state court should hold a status conference to determine next steps. The Nevada attorney general appealed this order. However, during the pendency of the federal appeal and without informing the state court judge of the pending appeal, the local prosecutor negotiated a new plea agreement with Brown. Under this agreement, Brown pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation for the same conduct and was sentenced to time served.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the state’s appeal. The court held that the appeal was moot because, after the district court’s order, the state had voluntarily entered into a new plea agreement resulting in a new conviction and sentence, which Brown has a due process right to enforce. The appellate court determined it could not provide the state any effective relief by reversing the district court’s order regarding the original felony conviction. The appeal was therefore dismissed as moot. View "BROWN V. OLIVER" on Justia Law

The defendant operated trucking and oil-drilling businesses and hired a hit man to murder two business associates, resulting in their deaths. He also solicited another hit man to kill three additional associates, but those killings did not occur. In 2016, a jury found the defendant guilty of multiple offenses, including four counts of solicitation to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 373(a) and 1958(a). Two of these solicitation convictions were based on acts that resulted in death, and two were based on acts that did not.Following the jury verdict, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment and other terms. In 2023, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his four solicitation convictions, arguing that a violation of § 1958(a) is not categorically a crime of violence and thus cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 373(a). The district court vacated the convictions on counts related to solicitations that did not result in death, citing United States v. Linehan, but declined to vacate the convictions related to solicitations that resulted in death, reasoning that those offenses were categorically crimes of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s partial denial and partial grant of the § 2255 motion. The Ninth Circuit held that solicitation of murder-for-hire resulting in death under § 1958(a) is not categorically a crime of violence because the death-results element lacks a mens rea requirement. Therefore, it cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 373(a). The court affirmed the district court’s vacatur of two convictions, reversed its denial regarding the other two, and remanded with instructions to vacate those remaining convictions. View "USA V. HENRIKSON" on Justia Law

A company operating as a mortgage lender applied for and received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company’s PPP loan was later forgiven. A private party, acting as a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleged that the company and its chief executive officer made several false statements in their loan application and forgiveness process. The key allegations were that the company was ineligible for PPP funds as a financial business primarily engaged in lending, that it misrepresented its use and need for the loan, and that it falsified the number of employees to increase the loan amount. The relator argued that these misrepresentations led the government to approve and forgive the loan improperly.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the relator’s amended complaint. The district court found that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied, reasoning that the necessary information supporting the ineligibility allegation was already publicly available on a government website, specifically concerning the company’s business classification. The district court also concluded that the relator’s allegations regarding the inflated employee count were speculative. The relator was denied leave to further amend the complaint, on the basis that amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the public disclosure bar did not apply because the information on the government website was not “substantially the same” as the relator’s allegations, and the company’s own website did not qualify as “news media” under the statute. The appellate court agreed that the relator’s claim regarding the number of employees was not sufficiently pleaded but found the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "RELATOR, LLC V. ERSKINE" on Justia Law

Three individuals participated over the course of a year in a complex money laundering operation involving Target gift cards. These cards were obtained through telephone scams, with victims deceived into purchasing the cards and providing the card numbers and access codes to overseas scammers. The defendants received these codes through encrypted messaging, then employed “runners” to quickly use the cards at Target stores—often buying high-value electronics or transferring balances to new gift cards. The merchandise was resold, and most of the proceeds were sent back to the scam’s organizers in China after taking a cut for themselves. One defendant continued to participate in the conspiracy even after being arrested and released on bond.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over their trial. A jury convicted all three of conspiracy to commit money laundering, with one also convicted for continuing the conspiracy while on pretrial release. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence reports, calculated the offense levels based on the scope and nature of their conduct, and applied several enhancements, including those for the amount laundered, sophisticated laundering, aggravated roles, and for being in the business of laundering funds. The court sentenced the defendants to terms below the calculated Guidelines range, but above the mandatory minimums.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s calculation of the loss amount and its application of aggravated and minor role adjustments. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for sophisticated laundering; under the Sentencing Guidelines, this enhancement can only be imposed if a different, specific enhancement was also applied, which did not occur here. The sentences were therefore vacated in part and remanded for limited resentencing to correct the guideline computation. View "USA v. SHI" on Justia Law

The case centers on an FBI investigation into Lionel Cannon for federal drug trafficking. During a lawful search, agents seized $585,000 in cash from Cannon’s bedroom safe. However, FBI Special Agent Scott Bowman stole $218,200 of that cash before it was officially inventoried. Bowman was later indicted and pleaded guilty to conversion of property and related crimes, with a money judgment of forfeiture reflecting the proceeds of his theft, much of which was attributable to Cannon’s safe.After Bowman’s conviction and forfeiture proceedings, Cannon pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking charges and agreed to forfeit $366,800, the amount remaining after Bowman’s theft. Despite awareness of the larger sum, the government never initiated forfeiture proceedings for the stolen $218,200. Cannon subsequently filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for the return of the un-forfeited cash.The United States District Court for the Central District of California treated Cannon’s motion as a civil complaint and granted summary judgment for the government. The district court concluded that Cannon had agreed to forfeit all property seized and found his evidence regarding lawful possession of some of the funds insufficient.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that sovereign immunity does not bar a Rule 41(g) claim for the return of cash when the government has recovered money traceable to funds it lost, even if it is not the exact physical currency seized. The court determined that Cannon had provided evidence of lawful sources for some of the cash and that the government had not rebutted this evidence sufficiently. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the proper disposition of the recovered funds. View "CANNON V. USA" on Justia Law

A man was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual abuse in connection with the 1989 killing of a woman. The prosecution relied heavily on testimony from a codefendant, who received a plea deal and testified that the defendant killed the victim after a dispute over drugs. Other witnesses, including the victim’s family and friends, corroborated aspects of the prosecution’s account. The defendant’s counsel presented a misidentification defense and a mere-presence defense, but the jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to death after the trial court determined the crime was especially cruel, heinous, or depraved.Following the initial conviction, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed some convictions and remanded for a retrial, after which the defendant was again convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding both aggravating factors met and that mitigating evidence, including the defendant’s abusive childhood and substance abuse, did not outweigh aggravation. The defendant filed state postconviction petitions, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases, and raising issues about mitigation evidence. Both the trial court and Arizona Supreme Court denied relief, often finding the claims procedurally barred or unsupported.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of federal habeas relief. The court held that most guilt-phase ineffective assistance claims were procedurally defaulted and not excused under Martinez v. Ryan, as the defendant failed to show cause and prejudice. The court found one claim—failure to retain a forensic expert to challenge testimony about the victim’s gurgling—was not defaulted, but concluded the state court reasonably found no prejudice given overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also found the Arizona Supreme Court reasonably rejected penalty-phase ineffective assistance claims and denied a certificate of appealability on the claim regarding mitigation evidence and the causal nexus test. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "DETRICH v. THORNELL" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in Arizona of first-degree murder, kidnapping, attempted transfer of a dangerous drug, and attempted arson. The crimes involved a failed drug transaction in which the petitioner, after threatening a victim, ultimately abducted and killed him with an accomplice. Following the crime, the petitioner, his girlfriend, and his accomplice attempted to destroy evidence by burning a vehicle, but were apprehended after a police chase. Substantial physical evidence and testimony, including from the girlfriend who accepted a plea bargain, linked the petitioner to the offenses. At sentencing, the petitioner, after consulting with counsel, declined to present mitigating evidence and was sentenced to death.The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence, although it reversed one aggravating factor and independently reweighed the remaining factors. The petitioner’s first state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition was denied on the merits, and later PCR petitions asserting additional ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims were dismissed as precluded. In federal habeas proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, the petitioner raised several IAC claims, some of which relied on evidence not presented in state court. The district court denied relief, finding some claims procedurally defaulted and others meritless, and declined to expand the record or hold an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) and Shinn v. Ramirez, the district court properly declined to consider evidence not presented in state court. The panel rejected the petitioner’s IAC claims, finding no unreasonable application of federal law or evidence of prejudice, and held that procedural defaults were not excused. It also denied certification for additional claims, finding no substantial showing of a constitutional violation. View "RIENHARDT V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

In 1985, Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr. was convicted by a jury in Idaho state court of murdering Berta and Del Herndon during a robbery, and he was sentenced to death. Over the following decades, Pizzuto challenged his conviction and death sentence through numerous state and federal post-conviction proceedings, but those efforts were unsuccessful. In 2021, Pizzuto sought clemency from the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole, which recommended that his death sentences be commuted to life without parole. However, the Governor of Idaho rejected this recommendation in accordance with an Idaho statute requiring gubernatorial approval for commutation in capital cases.Following the Governor’s denial, Pizzuto argued in Idaho state court that the Governor lacked authority under the Idaho Constitution to overrule the Commission’s recommendation. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the statute granting the Governor final authority in capital commutation cases, concluding that a 1986 amendment to the Idaho Constitution permitted the legislature to establish the procedures for granting clemency. Pizzuto filed a petition for rehearing, asserting that the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision was so arbitrary as to violate his federal due process rights, but the Idaho Supreme Court summarily denied rehearing.Pizzuto then brought a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, raising the due process claim. The district court denied relief, finding that the claim was not cognizable in federal habeas and would fail on the merits. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Pizzuto’s claim essentially challenged the Idaho Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law, which is not a cognizable federal habeas claim. Even if the claim were cognizable, the court determined that Pizzuto did not demonstrate a due process violation under clearly established federal law, and the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision was not so arbitrary as to support habeas relief. View "PIZZUTO V. VALLEY" on Justia Law

The defendant entered the United States in 1999 and remained without legal status after his tourist visa expired in 2000. He applied for and received a Washington concealed pistol license in 2019, falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen. He also submitted Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives forms indicating citizenship to register handguns. A series of domestic violence incidents led to multiple restraining orders against him, each including a prohibition on owning or possessing firearms. Law enforcement seized firearms, ammunition, and a silencer from his residence in 2022. The defendant admitted to being a Brazilian citizen and acknowledged that he was not permitted to possess firearms due to his immigration status and domestic violence convictions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss charges on Second Amendment, materiality, and vagueness grounds. The defendant was convicted in a bench trial based on stipulated facts for unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition as a noncitizen and as a person under a domestic violence restraining order, making false statements during firearm purchases, falsely claiming U.S. citizenship, and unlawful possession of a firearm silencer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed all convictions. The court held that precedent from United States v. Vazquez-Ramirez controlled challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), confirming the constitutionality of prohibiting firearm possession by noncitizens unlawfully present. Materiality challenges to false statement convictions failed because the Second Amendment does not protect firearm possession by such individuals. The court found that United States v. Rahimi and United States v. VanDyke foreclosed challenges to convictions based on domestic violence restraining orders. The court held that the National Firearms Act’s silencer regulations do not violate the Second Amendment or the Fifth Amendment’s vagueness doctrine. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. DEBORBA" on Justia Law