Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an individual convicted of two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, stemming from a 2018 indictment related to the sale of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court classified him as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior convictions: one federal conviction for distribution of cocaine and one Nevada state conviction for the sale of controlled substances under Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321(1)(a). This classification resulted in a higher sentencing range, and he ultimately received a sentence of 235 months, substantially longer than a similarly situated co-defendant.After his direct appeal was unsuccessful, he filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, arguing that his prior Nevada conviction was not a qualifying “controlled substance offense” for the purposes of the career offender enhancement. The district court held that this claim was procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal, and alternatively found that the prior conviction did qualify as a predicate offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that there was cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default, finding that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the career offender enhancement, and that this failure prejudiced the outcome. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit determined that the relevant Nevada statute is indivisible and overbroad, and therefore, his conviction under that statute cannot serve as a predicate offense for career offender status under the Guidelines. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 2255 motion and remanded for resentencing. View "USA V. CASILDO" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2024 to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the government sought an increased base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which applies if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The defendant conceded that a previous conviction for third-degree assault in Oregon counted as one predicate crime of violence, but contested whether his 2021 Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualified as a second predicate.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon concluded that attempted first-degree assault under Oregon law does qualify as a crime of violence and increased the defendant’s base offense level accordingly. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months and sentenced the defendant to 80 months’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the attempt statute in Oregon is broader than the federal definition of attempt and should not qualify under the “force clause” of the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying its precedent, the court held that the “attempted use” of physical force, as required by the force clause in the Sentencing Guidelines, means taking a substantial step toward the use of physical force. Because Oregon law requires a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury for a conviction of attempted first-degree assault, the Ninth Circuit concluded that such a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected the argument that a narrower “probable desistance” test should apply and affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. CHAVEZ-ECHEVERRIA" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempting to kidnap a federal officer and assaulting a family member of a federal official. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the court heard arguments from counsel for both the defense and the government, but did not ask the defendant if he wished to speak personally before sentencing—a procedural requirement known as allocution, mandated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.Shortly after imposing concurrent maximum sentences for both counts, the government realized the allocution right had been overlooked and promptly moved to reopen sentencing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which allows correction of “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days of sentencing. The district court granted the government’s motion over the defendant’s objection, vacated the original sentence, and set a new sentencing hearing. At the subsequent hearing, the defendant was allowed to address the court and allocute. The district court then reimposed the same sentences as before.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court had the authority to correct its failure to afford allocution by reopening sentencing under Rule 35(a). The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to allow a defendant the right to allocute under Rule 32 constitutes “other clear error” correctable under Rule 35(a). The court concluded that resentencing after a belated allocution is permissible under Rule 35(a), even if it requires the exercise of judicial discretion. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. DEPAPE" on Justia Law

In this case, law enforcement learned from a confidential informant that Christian Ferrari was manufacturing and selling privately made firearms, commonly called “ghost guns,” without the required federal license or serial numbers, making the weapons untraceable. Between March and May 2023, Ferrari sold 22 unregistered AR-15 style rifles, including 20 short-barreled rifles, to undercover ATF agents in four separate cash transactions. During these sales, Ferrari failed to ask for or provide paperwork, complete background checks, or exchange identification. The agents told Ferrari that the guns were intended for use in protecting marijuana grows in Northern California and for transport to Mexico.Ferrari was charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California and pled guilty to four counts of willfully dealing firearms without a license. The Presentence Investigation Report recommended a sentencing enhancement for firearms trafficking under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), based on Ferrari having “reason to believe” the guns would be used unlawfully. Ferrari objected, arguing there was no evidence he believed the agents were unlawful possessors or would use the guns unlawfully. The district court overruled his objection, finding the totality of circumstances gave Ferrari reason to believe in unlawful use, and applied the enhancement, resulting in a 37-month sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Ferrari changed his argument, claiming the Sentencing Guidelines required that the transferee in fact be an unlawful possessor or intend unlawful use. The Ninth Circuit, reviewing de novo, held that Application Note 13 to § 2K2.1(b)(5) does not require that what the defendant had reason to believe was actually true. Because Ferrari did not dispute he had reason to believe the agents were unlawful possessors, the district court correctly applied the enhancement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "USA V. FERRARI" on Justia Law

Three individuals were convicted under a federal law that prohibits those with prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Each had a history of violent conduct against intimate partners, and after their misdemeanor convictions under state law, they were later found in possession of firearms, leading to federal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).Prior to this appeal, each defendant was convicted in a United States District Court—one in the Northern District of California and two in the District of Alaska—of violating § 922(g)(9). The convictions were based on evidence that after their state-level domestic violence misdemeanor convictions, they knowingly possessed firearms. Following their convictions, the defendants appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court applied the framework established by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and concluded that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the appellants’ conduct but that the government demonstrated § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court rejected both the facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, holding that Congress may categorically disarm those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence without individualized findings of future dangerousness. The court further held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to these appellants and affirmed the judgments of conviction. View "USA V. MARTINEZ" on Justia Law

A healthcare provider operating as a covered entity under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program purchased pharmaceuticals from several drug manufacturers. The provider alleged that these manufacturers engaged in a fraudulent scheme by knowingly charging prices for drugs that exceeded the statutory ceiling, resulting in inflated reimbursement claims submitted to Medicaid, Medicare, and other government-funded programs. The provider did not seek compensation for its own overcharges, but instead brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), seeking to recover losses on behalf of the federal and state governments.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It reasoned that, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, Section 340B does not confer a private right of action for covered entities to sue drug manufacturers over pricing disputes; such claims must instead be pursued through the Section 340B Administrative Dispute Resolution process. The district court concluded that the provider’s FCA claims were essentially attempts to enforce Section 340B and should therefore be barred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the provider’s FCA claims were not barred by the absence of a private right of action under Section 340B or by the Astra decision, because the action was brought to remediate fraud against the government and not to recover personal losses or enforce Section 340B directly. The court further found that the provider had plausibly pleaded falsity under the FCA. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM OF WEST V. ABBVIE INC." on Justia Law

Cruz Torres-Gonzalez was convicted in 2014 for illegal reentry into the United States and for making false statements to federal officers. He received concurrent 35-month sentences for these offenses. In 2024, he was again convicted of illegal reentry. During sentencing for the 2024 conviction, the district court considered his prior convictions and applied sentencing enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, including an eight-level enhancement based on the 35-month sentence for his prior false-statement conviction.After his 2024 conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Torres-Gonzalez objected to the eight-level enhancement. He argued that the sentence for his false-statement offense was not truly independent, as it had been grouped with his illegal reentry conviction in 2014, which carried the highest offense level. He asserted that this grouping made it impossible to determine the appropriate enhancement, and asked the court to apply a lesser, four-level enhancement instead. The district court acknowledged that the grouped sentence likely affected the length of the false-statement sentence but concluded that the guidelines, as written, required the eight-level enhancement. The court imposed a sentence of 51 months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. The appellate court held that the district court correctly applied the guidelines. It found no ambiguity in the relevant guideline provisions and determined that the length of the prior sentence, even if grouped, was the proper basis for the enhancement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. TORRES-GONZALEZ" on Justia Law

The case concerns a habeas corpus petition filed by an individual convicted and sentenced to death for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Janine Lee in California in 1993. The petitioner had worked with the victim and, after planning the crime, killed her for financial gain and subsequently attempted to cash her checks. Forensic evidence and the petitioner’s confession corroborated his involvement, including details about the killing, use of martial arts training, and subsequent events. Expert testimony at trial highlighted the petitioner’s mental health issues, drug use, and troubled social history, but the jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death.Following his conviction and sentencing, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal and summarily denied habeas relief. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but granted a certificate of appealability for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The petitioner sought to expand the certificate to include additional claims related to competency and juror bias.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Applying AEDPA deference, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably determined that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for relief on all penalty-phase ineffective assistance subclaims, including alleged failures to investigate, prepare witnesses, and rebut aggravating evidence. The court also rejected cumulative error and competency claims, and denied a certificate of appealability for juror bias. The panel granted a certificate for one penalty-phase competency subclaim but affirmed its denial. The district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief was affirmed. View "COMBS V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Federal agents investigated a fatal fentanyl overdose in Goleta, California, and traced the source to Isaac Tekola. They discovered that Tekola had been selling drugs for years, primarily from his apartment. A search of his apartment revealed significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and Alprazolam, along with nearly $13,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia, and evidence that drug sales occurred at his residence. Tekola admitted that the cash came from drug dealing, and that a safe in his closet was used to store drugs and proceeds. His cell phone contained numerous messages confirming that his apartment was the hub of his trafficking operation.A grand jury indicted Tekola on several counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 841. He pled guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Central District of California applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing controlled substances. Tekola argued that, because his apartment was his primary residence, drug trafficking was not a primary or principal use of the premises. The district court found overwhelming evidence that the apartment was used as the central location for his drug business and imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 105 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The Ninth Circuit clarified that maintaining a primary residence as a central hub for substantial drug trafficking activity qualifies for the enhancement, even if the premises also serve as a residence, affirming Tekola’s sentence. View "USA V. TEKOLA" on Justia Law

A former ship captain was prosecuted after a fire broke out on his vessel, resulting in the deaths of thirty-four passengers and crew members. The ship, used for recreational diving, had multiple fire safety features and regulatory requirements, including the need for a roving night patrol and crew training in fire response. The captain had extensive maritime experience, but his crew was relatively inexperienced and had not been adequately trained in emergency procedures. On the night of the incident, no one was assigned to patrol for fires, and when the fire was discovered, the crew was unprepared to respond effectively. The captain contacted the Coast Guard but did not use the ship’s public address system to warn those below deck or attempt a rescue, ultimately abandoning ship along with other crew members. All individuals below deck died from smoke inhalation and asphyxiation.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the initial criminal case. The first indictment tracked the language of the seaman’s manslaughter statute but was dismissed by the district court for not alleging gross negligence, which the court believed was required based on prior interpretations of a different manslaughter statute. The government reindicted, alleging gross negligence, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury was instructed that conviction could follow if the captain engaged in “misconduct and/or acted with gross negligence.” The jury found the captain guilty.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the seaman’s manslaughter statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1115, requires only ordinary negligence, not gross negligence. The court further concluded that, even if the jury instruction’s use of “misconduct” was erroneous, any such error was harmless because the instructions repeatedly referenced the higher gross negligence standard, the prosecution did not argue for a lower standard, and overwhelming evidence supported the conviction. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. BOYLAN" on Justia Law