Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas petition, contending that the California state trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it imposed an upper term sentence based in part on its conclusion that he was on parole for a violent offense at the time of the crime. The court affirmed the district court's holding that petitioner suffered an error pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey but that any such error was harmless.

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. The court held that because the delay in presenting defendant to a magistrate was unreasonable, his statements made more than six hours after his arrest must be suppressed under the rule announced in both McNabb v. United States and Mallory v. United States. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's suppression motion, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not address defendant's remaining challenges to his conviction.

Defendant appealed from his conviction for maintaining his residence for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using methamphetamine. Defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements he made to DEA officials. Because the government did not bear its burden of showing that these statements were not the product of government officials' concededly illegal searches of defendant's home and garage, the court reversed his conviction. The court also concluded that, although the evidence was sparse, it was sufficient to allow a jury to infer that one of the primary or principal uses to which defendant devoted his property was the manufacture, distribution, or use of methamphetamine. Therefore, the court held that defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence. The court also rejected defendant's void for vagueness argument.

Petitioner was convicted of murder and other aggravated enhancements. This case reached the court on a certificate of appealability granted by the district court on the issue of whether the state court of appeal acted contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States when it held that the supplemental jury charge given at petitioner's trial was not coercive. The court affirmed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus because the state court of appeal's decision met the federal review standards set forth under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).

Defendant and a group of allegedly similarly situated state prisoners brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging that they were overdetained in violation of federal and state law. At issue was whether state prison officials had a clearly established duty to seek out original court records in response to a prisoner's unsupported assertion that he was being overdetained in violation of the United States Constitution. The court held that there was no clearly established duty on a prison official to review a prisoner's original court records beyond those in his institutional file on the facts of this case. Thus, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Petitioner was convicted in California state court of first degree murder and subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition. Petitioner challenged the admission at trial of the non-testifying autopsy pathologist's opinion, claiming violations of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. Because the chain of causation began as tenuous, continued to be disputed and was described inconsistently by the experts, the erroneous admission of the autopsy pathologist's non-cumulative opinion testimony likely had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. Furthermore, it was impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt of the autopsy pathologist's opinion did not contribute to petitioner's conviction. Accordingly, because the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisdiction to the facts and the error was prejudicial, the judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded with direction to vacate the murder conviction and issue the writ.

Plaintiffs appealed the adverse summary judgment grant in their 42 U.S.C. 1983 action arising out of the nighttime SWAT team search of their home for weapons suspected of being used in a drive-by shooting and stored in their home by their son. Plaintiffs alleged that their Fourth Amendments rights were violated by the issuance and execution of a search warrant whose application failed to disclose that their son was at that time, and for over six months had been, incarcerated and was therefore not present in plaintiffs' home, but moreover could not have been involved in the shooting or the storage of weapons used in it. Because plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence establishing a genuine issue as to whether Santa Maria Police Department Detective Louis Tanore's omission of this material fact was intentional or reckless, as opposed to merely negligent, the court reversed the summary judgment grant in his favor and remanded.

Petitioners challenged the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes to exclude black jurors in their trial. A magistrate judge, after holding an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecutor testified, found that he had purposefully discriminated on the basis of race in exercising a peremptory strike against one of the black jurors. The district judge, without holding a new evidentiary hearing, rejected the magistrate judge's finding as to the prosecutor's lack of credibility in asserting race-neutral reasons for having stricken the juror. In doing so, the district judge denied petitioners the process that they were constitutionally due. The court held that the rule of United States v. Ridgeway extended to determinations by a magistrate judge as to the credibility of a prosecutor's testimony at the second and third steps of the inquiry required by Batson v. Kentucky. Therefore, the district court erred in declining the opportunity to observe the trial prosecutor's demeanor before rejecting the magistrate judge's adverse credibility finding. The court vacated the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus and remanded for the district judge either to accept the magistrate judge's credibility finding or to conduct a new evidentiary hearing.

In sentencing defendant following her conviction on immigration and bail-jumping charges, the district court made a number of comments suggesting that the length of the sentence imposed was determined at least in part by a desire to ensure that defendant received drug treatment while in prison. The court affirmed defendant's sentence but the Supreme Court reversed, remanding to the court to determine whether defendant was entitled to relief despite her failure to object to her sentence when it was imposed. The court held that the district court's consideration of defendant's rehabilitative needs in determining her sentence constituted plain error. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Petitioner was convicted in a California state court of first degree murder, with a finding of the special circumstance of killing a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful pursuit of his duties, and was sentenced to death. Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner's appeal required the court to consider and apply the United States Supreme Court decision in Cullen v. Pinholster. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that Pinholster was applicable and prevented the court from considering the new evidence in reviewing petitioner's Brady claim under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). In light of Pinholster's emphasis on the primary responsibility of the state court, the court concluded that the new evidence needed to be presented to the state court before it could be considered by the court on habeas review of the state court's decision. The court concluded that petitioner had a colorable or potentially meritorious Brady claim such that a reasonable state court could find a Brady violation. The court affirmed all of the district court's rulings on all of the non-Brady claims.