Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant plead guilty to possession of child pornography. At issue on appeal was whether 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1)(A) required an individual to personally produce the sexually explicit visual depictions of minors that he advertised for distribution. The court held that the plain language of the statute did not contain a personal production requirement, and nothing in the tense of the wording evidenced a congressional intent to insert such an element. Accordingly, the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

This case arose from a deadly use of force lawsuit filed by decedent's family against defendants. The district court issued an in limine order precluding defendants from arguing that decedent was armed when he was shot. In his summation, defense counsel argued that the police sergeant who shot decedent thought decedent failed to surrender because he had shot a man just moments earlier. Plaintiffs' counsel objected, apparently based on the in limine order and the court sustained the objection, instructing the jury to ignore defense counsel's statement. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for sanctions against defense counsel for his statements. The district court granted the motion and sanctioned defendants. Defendants appealed. The court reversed the district court's order imposing sanctions. On remand, the district court could, if it chose, hold further proceedings, consistent with the court's opinion, to determine whether any sanction was warranted for defense counsel's conceded violation.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. At issue was whether the California trial court's use of California Jury Instruction, Criminal (CALJIC) No. 2.50.01 violated petitioner's constitutional right to due process by allowing the jury to find him guilty of charged offenses based only on facts found by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held that because the decision of the California Court of Appeals to reject petitioner's constitutional challenge to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 was not contrary to clearly established federal law, the court affirmed.

Over the course of more than 30 years, petitioner was convicted of crimes involving deviant sexual acts with children. After a series of unsuccessful appeals and postconviction procedures, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition on February 7, 2008. The district court denied his habeas petition and petitioner appealed. During the course of the proceedings, California adopted Proposition 83, which changed the commitment term for sexually violent predators from renewable two-year periods to an indeterminate period. On appeal, petitioner contended that his federal due process rights were violated because he was held under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, Cal. Welf. & Ins. Code 6600-6609.3. The court held that because the only relief petitioner sought was release from custody, and because petitioner was not in civil commitment for an indeterminate term based on a proceeding that was legitimately commenced and the result of which was not challenged in this appeal, the appeal was moot.

Respondent appealed the district court's order granting petitioner a conditional writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the petition was timely; even assuming the petition was deemed timely, whether there was error in the state court's jury instructions; and whether the district court erred by not granting habeas relief on the alternative ground that retroactive application of California Evidence Code 1109 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court agreed with the district court that petitioner did not relent in his efforts and that he was entitled to equitable tolling for his diligence in the face of his counsel's deceit and therefore addressed the merits of the petition. The court held that the instructions directed the jury to consider evidence of petitioner's prior unadjudicated acts of domestic violence, most of which were wholly unrelated to the crimes with which he was charged, to convict him, among other things, of first-degree murder. This was error under Sullivan v. Louisiana and Gibson v. Ortiz and the court affirmed the district court's issuance of a conditional writ. The court also held that the use of certain evidence of domestic violence at Doe's trial did not contravene the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner was statutorily ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because petitioner's armed robbery conviction was "particularly serious." Petitioner had complained to the BIA that the IJ's decision failed to take into consideration several facts. However, all of the purported omissions related to petitioner's claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. The court concluded that the only way to give the BIA the opportunity to correct its own errors was to raise the "particularly serious" issue before the BIA, which defendant simply failed to do. Therefore, the court held that because petitioner did not exhaust the issue before the BIA, the court had no jurisdiction to consider whether or not his crime was "particularly serious." Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.

This case arose when defendant was accused of drunk driving on the Kitsap Naval Base in Bremerton, Washington. At issue was whether the Government violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by prosecuting and convicting defendant for a crime after the Navy punished him for the same offense. The Government argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated because the non-judicial punishment administered by the Navy under 10 U.S.C. 815 was not criminal in nature. The court agreed and held that the Government's prosecution of defendant was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, defendant's conviction was affirmed.

This case centered around the political corruption of former California Congressman Randall "Duke" Cunningham, who provided lucrative government defense contracts to defendant and others in exchange for expensive meals, lavish trips, a houseboat in Washington D.C., and mortgage payments for his multi-million dollar home. Defendant appealed his convictions on multiple counts of conspiracy, honest services wire fraud, bribery, and money laundering. The court held that, under its holding in United States v. Straub, the district court's determination that it was not authorized to compel use immunity for a defense witness absent a finding of prosecutorial misconduct was erroneous. Because the district court concluded that the proffered testimony would "counter" the testimony presented by the prosecution through immunized government witnesses, and the government did not challenge that finding as clearly erroneous, the court remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether compelled use immunity regarding the proposed testimony was constitutionally required. The court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction in all other respects.

Defendant appealed her jury conviction for one count of conspiracy, one count of bank fraud, and thirteen counts of loan fraud. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court committed prejudicial error by admitting two summary charts under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006; there was insufficient evidence to support each of her convictions; and the district court erred in ordering her to pay restitution in the full amount of the victim lenders' loss, despite a prior civil settlement with the victim lenders that included a release from liability. The court held that the charts were properly admitted under Rule 1006, 404(b), and 403. The court also held that the evidence at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to convict defendant of the crimes for which she was charged. The court held, however, that under the current restitution order, the victim lenders would receive more than their actual losses and therefore, the imposition of the order was plain error. Accordingly, defendant's convictions were affirmed and the restitution order vacated and remanded with instructions.

Plaintiffs, both women who were tased during an encounter with officers, filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages for the alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. At issue was whether the use of a taser to subdue a suspect resulted in the excessive use of force and whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that, although plaintiffs in both cases have alleged constitutional violations because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the officers' use of a taser was unconstitutionally excessive, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' section 1983 claims because the law was not clearly established at the time of the incidents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on these claims. In Brooks, however, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on her state law assault and battery claims against the officers.