Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant who was not a SNAP beneficiary, was the owner and operator of Laguna Best Restaurant and Catering in Harmon, Guam. From 2015 to 2020, Defendantbought SNAP benefits from various individuals at a substantial discount, and then used those benefits to buy bulk food items for her restaurant. A grand jury indicted Defendant on two counts of the unauthorized use of SNAP benefits and one count of conspiracy to use, transfer, acquire, alter or possess SNAP benefits without authorization. Defendant pled guilty to the conspiracy count. Defendant stipulated to a two-level authentication feature enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii), which was based on her use of EBT cards and PINs to purchase food. The district court sentenced Defendant to ten months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The court also ordered Defendant to pay $18,752.30 in restitution. Defendant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Considering principally whether the district court properly imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) for Defendant’s misuse of an “authentication feature,” the panel held that a personal identification number associated with a debit-type card is an “authentication feature” under the Sentencing Guidelines and the statutory provisions they reference. The panel held that Defendant did not demonstrate error in the district court’s order requiring her to pay $18,752.30 in restitution, and rejected Defendant’s argument that the government’s breach of the plea agreement constituted plain error. View "USA V. MARITES BARROGO" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his jury convictions for attempted coercion and enticement of a child. Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the government failed to show that he attempted to persuade or entice a minor to engage in sexual activity. According to Defendant, the messages reveal that the only issues discussed were the costs of the shows and the specific acts requested.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel wrote that Defendant’s argument conflicts with the trial record, which would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he attempted to persuade certain minors to perform his abhorrent desires, despite some apparent hesitancy on their part, and that the children’s participation in the live stream was contingent on how much Defendant was willing to pay. The panel noted that, more importantly, Defendant’s argument ignores Section 2422(b)’s focus. The panel wrote that the statute applies whether the minors are real or fictional, and an attempt through an intermediary or an undercover officer still leads to criminal liability. Whether Defendant’s intended victims were “willing” to engage in these acts is ultimately irrelevant— the focus always remains on the defendant’s subjective intent because the statute is designed to protect children from the act of solicitation itself. The panel concluded that, with that focus, the evidence of Defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. View "USA V. FRANKLIN ELLER, JR." on Justia Law

The question presented in this case is whether Appellants, a cannabis entrepreneur and two cannabis businesses, have standing to bring claims arising pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), based on alleged harms to their cannabis business and related property. The district court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss with prejudice, holding that Appellants lacked standing to bring their RICO claims. The court also dismissed Appellants’ Lanham Act claims on standing grounds as well as their state law claims, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Appellants appealed the district court’s order only as to their RICO claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that while Appellants had Article III standing, they lacked statutory standing under RICO. As to Article III standing, the panel held that Appellants satisfied the injury requirement, which requires a showing of an invasion of a legally protected interest because cannabis-related property interests are recognized under California law. Appellees argued that Appellants’ alleged injuries were not redressable because they related to a cannabis business, which was illegal under the Controlled Substances Act. The panel held that the fact that Appellants sought damages for economic harms related to cannabis was not relevant to whether a court could, theoretically, fashion a remedy to redress their injuries. Further, the panel held that Appellants lacked statutory standing to bring their claims under RICO Section 1964(c).  The panel concluded that the statutory purpose of RICO and the congressional intent animating its passage conflicted with the California laws recognizing a business and property interest in cannabis. View "FRANCINE SHULMAN, ET AL V. TODD KAPLAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant kidnapped Doe, then age twelve, and drove her from California to Nevada knowing that she would engage in prostitution. The defendant entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to which, in exchange for the government’s promise to drop five serious criminal charges, he would plead guilty to two lesser crimes (interstate travel in aid of unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1952(a)(3)(A)) and would pay Doe restitution. The district court nonetheless concluded that it lacked statutory authority to order Defendant to pay restitution to Doe.   The panel filed (1) an order amending its opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion granting Jane Doe’s petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3771(d)(3), a provision of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act. The panel published the opinion to reiterate what this court held in two cases decided three decades ago: 18 U.S.C. Section 3663(a)(3) grants statutory authority to district courts to award restitution whenever a defendant agrees in a plea agreement to pay restitution.   The panel held that the district court’s holding that it lacked statutory authority to order restitution was legal error. The panel granted the mandamus petition and instructed the district court to address, in the first instance, Defendant’s evidentiary challenges and other arguments concerning the appropriate amount of restitution. View "JANE DOE V. USDC-NVL" on Justia Law

Defendant was serving a sentence of supervised release for a prior federal conviction from Nevada when he was arrested and indicted on one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud. Soon after Defendant’s arrest, the government obtained an order permitting it to seize the funds in his inmate trust account and apply them to a restitution obligation for a prior federal conviction from Washington. Defendant pleaded guilty in the conspiracy case, admitted a violation of his supervised release in his Nevada case, and was sentenced in both cases. Defendant urges that the seizure of his inmate funds violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and his Fifth Amendment due process right. He also contends that the district court’s imposition of an undisputedly illegal sentence for his supervised release violation is reversible error.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in part, vacated the sentence imposed for the violation of supervised release, and remanded for re-sentencing on the supervised release violation. The panel concluded that the government’s seizure of Defendant’s inmate funds did not violate his right to either counsel of choice or due process. The court also concluded that the district court’s imposition of an illegally excessive sentence for Defendant’s supervised release violation was plain error that requires vacatur of that sentence and remand for re-sentencing. View "USA V. LONNIE LILLARD" on Justia Law

Defendant, an Iraqi citizen, was convicted of attempting to procure naturalization unlawfully and of presenting a naturalization application with false statements. Both convictions were predicated on Defendant’s answers to two questions on his naturalization application, in which he asserted that he had never given false information to a U.S. Government official and that he had never lied to such an official to gain an immigration benefit.   On appeal, Defendant argued that the Government presented insufficient evidence to establish that any false statements he made during the asylum process were material to his subsequent naturalization application and that his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts should have been granted.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempting to procure naturalization unlawfully and presenting a naturalization application with false statements. The panel concluded that ample evidence supports the Government’s reliance on the “investigation-based theory” of materiality. The panel concluded that a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a reasonable immigration judge apprised of the facts about Defendant’s presence in Germany would have found Defendant not to be credible, and would have denied asylum, on the ground that the claimed persecution in 2008 was fabricated and that Defendant thus had not established that he had suffered past persecution. Further, the panel concluded that the Government presented sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude on this basis that Defendant would have been ineligible for asylum and that his false statements on his later naturalization application were, therefore material to the naturalization decision under an “investigation-based theory.” View "USA V. SEVAN AMINTOBIA" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he argued that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). One of the firearms that formed the basis of the enhancement was a Polymer80, which is typically sold online as a kit of component parts and need not be serialized. Defendant argued that the Polymer80 could not be counted because it did not qualify as a “firearm” as that term is defined within the meaning of Section 2K2.1(b)(1).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on the ground that the offense involved three firearms. The court explained that the requirement that the owner of an unserialized firearm apply for a serial number or other identifying mark does not render the owner’s possession of the gun unlawful. Second, the government presented no evidence that Defendant was in fact the owner of the Polymer80, much less that he owned the gun "as of July 1, 2018," as the statute then required.   The panel nevertheless agreed that the enhancement was proper under Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because Defendant unlawfully possessed the Polymer80 in violation of a different California statute, Penal Code Section 29800. That statute, which is California’s analogue to Section 922(g)(1), prohibits any “person who has been convicted of a felony” from having “any firearm” in his possession or under his custody or control. The panel held that the district court did not err in finding that the Polymer80 qualified as a firearm under California law. View "USA V. ELIGIO MUNOZ" on Justia Law

Mongol Nation is an unincorporated association whose members include the official, or “full-patch,” members of the Mongols Gang. A jury convicted the association of substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy violations; it also found various forms of Mongol Nation property forfeitable. That property included the collective membership marks—a type of intellectual property used to designate membership in an association or other organization. The district court denied forfeiture of those marks, holding that the forfeiture would violate the First and Eighth Amendments.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that in Mongol Nation’s appeal, it argued for the first time that it is not an indictable “person” under RICO because the indictment alleges that the association was organized for unlawful purposes only. The panel concluded that this unpreserved argument is non-jurisdictional. The panel did not resolve the Government’s contention that Mongol waived it. The panel wrote that regardless of the merits of Mongol Nation’s argument, it mischaracterizes the allegations in the indictment.    On the Government’s cross-appeal of the order denying its second preliminary order of forfeiture, the panel did not need to decide whether forfeiture of the membership marks would violate the First and Eighth Amendments. Nor did the panel reach the question of whether the marks may be forfeitable without the transfer of any goodwill associated with the marks. The panel held that the forfeiture was improper for a different reason—the Government effectively sought an order seizing and extinguishing the Mongols’ right to exclusive use of its marks without the Government itself ever seizing title to the marks. View "USA V. MONGOL NATION" on Justia Law

Defendant asserted that permitting a juror to participate remotely via Zoom violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, that the error was structural and could not be waived, and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial without having to show prejudice. Defendant asserted that the alleged error is akin to depriving him of his right to a jury trial, depriving him of his right to a fair and impartial jury, depriving him of a representative jury, and/or depriving him of his right to confront witnesses   The Ninth Circuit affirmed his robbery convictions. The court assumed without deciding that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the in-person participation of jurors during their trial. The panel wrote that none of these comparisons is apt, as there is no indication in the record—and no reason to suppose—that the remote participation of a duly empaneled juror interfered with the functioning of the jury, somehow made that juror partial or unrepresentative, or impacted the procedures used for the presentation of witnesses. The panel wrote that allowing remote juror participation does not impact the entire framework of the trial in ways that cannot be accurately measured on review. The court explained that none of those errors Defendant alleged will necessarily arise simply because a juror is participating remotely. The panel wrote that there is no case law or record evidence to support a presumption that the remote participation of a juror will always render a trial unfair and the judgment unreliable. View "USA V. EDWARD KNIGHT" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc. Judge VanDyke, joined by Judges Callahan, Ikuta, Bennett, R. Nelson, and Bumatay, dissented from the denial rehearing en banc. Judge VanDyke wrote that the term “clearly established Federal law” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act only refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Supreme Court’s decisions; and that the Supreme Court has emphasized that if this court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand, then by definition the rationale was not “clearly established.” View "FREDDIE CRESPIN V. CHARLES RYAN, ET AL" on Justia Law