Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is an Idaho prisoner facing execution by lethal injection. He challenged Idaho’s execution practices. He alleged that these practices: 1) interfere with his ability to challenge the State’s method of execution as cruel and unusual punishment; 2) inhibit his ability to seek clemency; 3) inflict mental anguish; 4) increase the risk of an unconstitutionally painful execution; 5) treat similarly situated prisoners unequally; 6) violate the separation of powers under the Idaho Constitution; and 7) contravene Idaho Code Section 19-2716’s requirement that the director of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) establish procedures governing executions. On remand, and in light of then-co-plaintiff’s scheduled execution, the district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the district court violated the rule of mandate by denying leave to amend in connection with the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint. The court explained that although its decision in Pizzuto I noted parenthetically that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend the complaint, the court did not foreclose the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or address whether, in connection with such a dismissal, further amendment would be futile. The court agreed with the district court that amendment of several of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the First Amendment claims based on access to execution-related information. View "THOMAS CREECH, ET AL V. JOSH TEWALT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—five individuals and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.—filed this action in the Southern District of California challenging the constitutionality of Section 32310 under the Second Amendment. On September 22, 2023, the district court issued an order declaring Section 32310 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and enjoining California officials from enforcing the law. Defendant Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California, filed an emergency motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The Attorney General seeks to stay “all portions of the order except those regarding Sections 32310(c) and (d), which relate to large-capacity magazines that were acquired and possessed lawfully prior to the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction.”   The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. First, the court concluded that the Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits. The court explained that the Attorney General makes strong arguments that Section 32310 comports with the Second Amendment under Bruen. Second, the Attorney General has shown that California will be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal by presenting evidence that large-capacity magazines pose significant threats to public safety. Third, it does not appear that staying portions of the district court’s order while the merits of this appeal are pending will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings. Finally, the court concluded that the public interest tips in favor of a stay. View "VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murders. He was also convicted of one count of mutilation of human remains and one count of attempted murder and mayhem. The jury found a multiple murder special circumstance allegation and sentenced Petitioner to death. The California Supreme Court reversed Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder and mayhem and affirmed Petitioner’s murder convictions and death sentence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition challenging his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of first-degree murder. The panel held that Petitioner’s pre-AEDPA October 1992 pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an “actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by appointed counsel in April 1997. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the district court properly concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Petitioner’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court View "DOUGLAS CLARK V. RON BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an open guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2246(2) & 1152. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated the sentence using the 2004 version of the Guidelines, applied a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and added a four-level enhancement because “the victim was abducted.” Defendant objected based on his claim that there was no significant change in locations during or prior to the offense.The evidence presented showed that Defendant grabbed the victim, put his hands over her mouth, and dragged her 35-40 feet into a cornfield, where he sexually assaulted her. Overruling Defendant's objection, the district court concluded that the forced movement of the victim from the roadside into the cornfield was sufficient to support the abduction enhancement. Defendant appealed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Under the plain language of the text of Sec. 2A3.1(b)(5), the court found that Defendant “abducted” the victim when he forced her from the roadside where he encountered her into a nearby cornfield. View "USA V. JOSHUA SCHEU" on Justia Law

Defendant filed two appeals with the Ninth Circuit, which were consolidated in a single opinion. Regarding Defendant's felony child abuse case, the court held that the Major Crimes Act granted federal jurisdiction. Although there is no "felony child abuse" statute under federal law, the Major Crimes Act permits prosecutors to charge a defendant in "accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed. Here, Montana Code 45-5-212 provided a sufficient basis for the charge.Regarding Defendant's aggravated sexual abuse case, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, finding that USSG 1B1.1 provides different definitions of “serious bodily injury”—a Harm Definition and a Conduct Definition. Because Defendant made no argument that the district court failed to apply the Harm Definition or that the victim’s injuries resulting from the sexual abuse or from Defendant's other conduct surrounding the offense failed to meet the Harm Definition, Defendant failed to prove the district court erred. View "USA V. LUKE SCOTT, SR." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He was sentenced to 77 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant raised three challenges to the district court’s sentencing calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court’s application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States. The panel wrote that the determination of a sentencing enhancement based on a new offense can be made by a judge without a jury and by a standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no mandatory minimum sentence at play, and the enhancement still placed Defendant’s Guidelines range within the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty; and that Defendant received all the notice that is required for the enhancement.   The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that he used or possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense under Montana law for purposes of applying the enhancement. The panel concluded that the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. View "USA V. JOHN BARLOW" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of attempted illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1325 and attempted illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. On appeal, he argued that the district court violated his rights to a fair trial and sentence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a statement he made to a Border Patrol agent about coming to the United States to find work. Defendant argued that the statement, which he made while between border fences, should have been suppressed because he was “in custody” and was not given a Miranda warning prior to his admission. The panel held that the stop here met the requirements of Terry, and the agent’s question about Defendant’s purpose for being in the United States did not exceed the scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403, the testimony of Defendant’s only proposed witness, a Tijuana immigration attorney, whom Defendant intended to call as a lay witness to testify about the “factual situation in Tijuana in November 2019”. The panel wrote that neither the record nor the witness’s testimony could establish that Defendant knew of the long lines, and the district court’s concern about distracting the jury was reasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions on the requisite intent for a Section 1326 conviction. View "USA V. JUAN CABRERA" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) for shipping misbranded drugs in interstate commerce. Along with other challenges, Defendant contended that the district court erred in concluding that the charged offense did not require proof that Defendant knew that the drugs he shipped were misbranded. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, and the district court denied that motion.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The panel first held that the text of the various provisions of the FDCA at issue does not contain any language that imposes a scienter requirement of the sort that Defendant advocates. The panel then addressed whether there are convincing reasons to depart from the presumption that Congress intended to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, even when Congress does not specify any scienter in the statutory text. The panel concluded that such convincing reasons are present here. The panel wrote that this is the unusual case in which a public welfare offense lacks a scienter element even though it is a felony with moderately severe potential penalties, given the confluence of circumstances: (1) Congress augmented, into a felony, a predicate misdemeanor offense that concededly lacks a scienter requirement; (2) it did so by adding, not a scienter requirement, but a prior conviction requirement; (3) this action contrasts with Congress’s explicit addition of a scienter requirement in the other clause of Section 333(a)(2); and (4) the prior conviction requirement largely serves the same purposes as an express scienter requirement. View "USA V. RICHARD MARSCHALL" on Justia Law

Petitioner has been a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States since 2003. Since that time, he has been convicted of various crimes, including theft, criminal trespass, a DUI, and, as relevant here, possession of heroin in violation of Oregon law. After he received a notice to appear (NTA) initiating removal proceedings, Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) denied the petition and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court held that the agency did not err in concluding that the stop-time rule set forth in 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(d)(1)(B), which terminates accrual of the requisite seven years of continuous physical presence, is calculated from the date a petitioner committed the criminal offense that rendered him removable, rather than the date he was convicted. A lawful permanent resident becomes removable once he is convicted of a qualifying offense, and if the offense is committed within seven years of being admitted into the United States, the Attorney General lacks discretion to cancel removal. Here, Petitioner committed the offense a few months shy of satisfying the seven-year continuous residence requirement, but the conviction became final outside the statutory seven-year period. The panel held that the agency did not err in deciding that the stop-time rule is calculated from the date Petitioner committed the criminal offense that rendered him removable, rather than the date he was convicted. View "RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her sentence on the ground that her due process rights were violated when the district court failed to pronounce certain discretionary conditions of supervised release in her presence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The en banc court held that a district court must orally pronounce all discretionary conditions of supervised release, including those referred to as “standard” in U.S.S.G. Section 5D1.3(c), in order to protect a defendant’s due process right to be present at sentencing. In so holding, the en banc court overruled in part the opinion in United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006). The en banc court further held that the pronouncement requirement is satisfied if the defendant is informed of the proposed discretionary conditions before the sentencing hearing, and the district court orally incorporates by reference some or all of those conditions, which gives the defendant an opportunity to object. The en banc court vacated only the conditions of Defendant’s supervised release that were referred to as the “standard conditions” in the written sentence but were not orally pronounced. The en banc court remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to cure its error by orally pronouncing any of the standard conditions of supervised release that it chooses to impose and by giving Defendant a chance to object to them. View "USA V. CYNTHIA MONTOYA" on Justia Law