Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a frequent filer of lawsuits and indigent, sought money damages and other relief against defendant resulting from an alleged mistreatment of plaintiff when he was a prisoner. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of plaintiff's in forma pauperis status. As a preliminary matter, the court held that because the underlying substantive claims were not moot and because a ruling in favor of plaintiff would permit those claims to proceed, the court could provide effective relief and the appeal was not moot now that plaintiff was released from jail and was on parole. The court held that because only two of the four dismissals identified by the district court qualified as "strikes" under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from an indictment charging defendant with two counts of transporting an illegal alien for profit. At issue was whether a district court could, in the absence of a motion for a new trial by the defendant, order a new trial for a defendant who was tried before the judge but never properly waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that, insofar as the district court's order for a new trial was premised on the post-verdict declaration of a mistrial, it was error. The court also held that the district court erred in converting defendant's motion, over his objection, into a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's December 11, 2009 order that set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial under Rule 33, as well as its January 26, 2010 order that also justified the new trial by declaring the first proceeding a mistrial under Rule 26.3. The court remanded with instructions to deny defendant's "Motion to Set Aside Verdict by Trial Court," which cited no rule or authority and was procedurally improper.

This case arose when federal law enforcement officers seized funds from passengers who were temporarily in the Atlanta airport changing planes. The travelers truthfully explained that the funds were legal gambling proceeds, not evidence of drug transactions. The travelers subsequently claimed that the seizure and later efforts to institute forfeiture proceedings were unconstitutional and sued in Las Vegas, where they were heading, lived at least part time, and suffered the inconvenience of arriving with absolutely no money, as well as other financial injuries. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Bivens action against the federal officers for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that an officer's intentional acts with regard to the false probable cause affidavit and the consequent delay in returning the travelers' money were expressly aimed at Nevada and so satisfied the requirement for personal jurisdiction. As to the search and seizure claim, the court remanded to the district court for the exercise of discretion with regard to pendant personal jurisdiction. The court also held that venue was proper in the District of Nevada.

Defendant appealed his conviction for one count of importation of marijuana and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The court held that it was an abuse of discretion to allow the government to introduce evidence of defendant's prior "law enforcement contacts." Therefore, the court held that because this error was not harmless, defendant's conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. The court declined to address defendant's remaining arguments.

A jury convicted defendant of felony murder and/or aiding and abetting felony murder, but acquitted him of premeditated murder. The trial judge then imposed the death penalty. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that, although it rejected defendant's contentions on appeal, absent the State's knowing presentation of perjured inmate testimony, the result of defendant's penalty-phase hearing could have been different. Accordingly, the court held that the State violated defendant's due process rights under Napue v. Illinois and reversed the district court's denial of the writ with respect to defendant's death sentence.

Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and oxycodone with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm and an armed career criminal, and with possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the initial stop, the extended duration of the seizure, and the search of his vehicle all violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that all the physical evidence seized and defendant's subsequent statements to police must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule because there was no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime where there was no specific particularized fact indicating that the passenger of the vehicle had identification and that such identification was located in defendant's car.

Defendant, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged his conviction for illegal reentry after removal on the ground that the removal order on which the conviction was based was invalid. The court held that in light of the "unique circumstances" of defendant's case, it was not plausible that the IJ would have granted him permission to withdraw his application for admission. Therefore, defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by the IJ's alleged error and could not show that the entry of the February 27, 2006 removal order was "fundamentally unfair" as required by 8 U.S.C. 1326(d)(3). Accordingly, defendant's collateral attack on the removal order failed and the court upheld the district court's ruling.

Over thirty years ago, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1979 kidnapping, rape, and murder of a sixteen-year-old female. Petitioner subsequently appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the district court erred by dismissing as unexhausted petitioner's claim for denial of an impartial jury, but after receiving supplemental briefing from the parties, the court denied the claim on the merits. The court affirmed the district court on the other three claims. As to the uncertified claims, the court granted a COA on the prosecutorial misconduct claim because the district court erred by finding this claim unexhausted, but also denied that claim on the merits. The court denied a COA on the remaining uncertified claims. Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and rape and the attempted murder of two individuals. Defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant appealed two procedural issues: whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty phase for failure to investigate and present evidence of social history and whether the prosecution's failure to disclose a confidential informant's status as a government agent was a Brady violation. Defendant also appealed two uncertified issues: whether defendant was deprived of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate or present evidence of PTSD at the penalty phase and whether his sentence must be overturned because of cumulative errors. The court dismissed the challenge to California's lethal injection protocol as premature, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted by a jury in an Arizona state court of first degree murder. Defendant subsequently petitioned for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, raising, inter alia, the same ineffective assistance of counsel claims that he had brought in state court. The district court found that the felony murder instruction was not erroneous; that it did not deprive defendant of due process; and that, therefore, counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to it. The court held that, since the district court rejected defendant's claim that the trial court's felony murder instruction was erroneous, the district court never reached certain questions under Strickland v. Washington and Harrington v. Richter. The court further held that, since defendant framed the issue in his certificate of appealability as an instruction issue, not an ineffective assistance of counsel claim more broadly, neither party addressed these issues. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.