Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder in the first degree, one count of attempted murder in the first degree, and one count of attempting to elude a police vehicle. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief on his claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself where the Washington Supreme Court's determination was not unreasonable in light of the circumstances. The court also held that the admission of one of the victim's out-of-court statements at trial as an excited utterance was an unreasonable application of clearly established law, but that defendant could not establish prejudice as a result of the Confrontation Clause violation. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to habeas relief on this issue. The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief on defendant's two sub-claims regarding the state's withholding of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The court finally held that, although defendant's trial counsel might not have provided a model defense, counsel's actions did not render defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of relief on defendant's claim of cumulative deficiency. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose when defendant was charged with one count of embezzlement and theft of labor union assets. At issue was whether the district court's employment of supplemental arguments impermissibly coerced a guilty verdict and whether the district court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury regarding defendant's defense that her actions were authorized by the union's president. The court held that the district court neither coerced a guilty verdict nor abused its discretion by ordering supplemental closing arguments under the circumstances presented in this case. The district court also did not commit reversible plain error by failing to instruct the jury on an authorization defense, as the evidence presented and relied on by defendant at trial did not support a finding that her actions were authorized by the union. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of reentry of removed alien and the district court applied a sixteen-level enhancement for a previous "alien smuggling offense." Defendant filed a motion on March 5, 2010, arguing that the enhancement should not have applied and the district court, twenty-eight days after sentencing, held a hearing on the motion. At a hearing on April 12, 2010, the district court entered an amended judgment and the government subsequently appealed the district court's resentencing of defendant, arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction to resentence more than fourteen days after sentencing, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a). The court held that the fourteen day provision in Rule 35(a) was jurisdictional and the district court was thus without jurisdiction to resentence defendant. Accordingly, defendant's original sentence must be reinstated. The court further held that, even if the district court had jurisdiction to correct its error, it was still error nonetheless. Accordingly, the amended judgment was vacated and the original judgment was reinstated.

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to manufacture one kilogram or more of a substance containing phencylcidine (PCP); possession of approximately eleven kilograms of piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile (PCC) with intent to manufacture PCP; and attempted manufacture of more than one kilogram of a substance containing PCP. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear defendant's self-styled Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, or whether that court should have dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction because it was actually a disguised third request for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 that did not meet the standard in section 2255(h) for second or successive motions brought under that section. The court held that because all of the issues on appeal were of the merits variety, the court vacated the district court's denial of defendant's Rule 60(b)(4) motion and remanded with instructions to dismiss it as an unauthorized successive section 2255 motion.

Defendants, John Stinson and Robert Griffin, appealed their convictions for crimes related to their membership in the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) prison gang. This appeal centered on numerous procedural decisions by the district court before and during trial. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss for improper venue; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Griffin's motion to sever; the district court did not err in proceeding with a death qualified jury; the district court did not clearly err in rejecting the two Batson challenges; the district court did not err in supervising discovery because the government did not redact Brady material and the district court was not required to review unredacted documents in camera; the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the order granting Griffin's habeas petition; even if the government elicited vouching testimony, it was harmless in light of the strength of its case; the prosecutorial misconduct in posing hypotheticals concerning debriefs not in evidence was harmless in light of jury instructions and an otherwise strong government case; the district court did not err in its jury instructions; the district court did not err in declining to instruct the jurors that Ricky Rose had been a potential government witness; the partial read backs of testimony without precautions, such as an admonition, did not affect defendants' substantial rights in light of other evidence presented and therefore did not warrant reversal; and the district court operated well within its discretion when it chose the wording of the special verdict form on withdrawal. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendants' convictions.

Defendants were convicted for several crimes related to their membership in the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) prison gang and were both sentenced to life in prison. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support both defendants' convictions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962; for violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR); 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(1), and for murder pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1111. The court rejected defendants' remaining claims of error. Accordingly, the court affirmed both defendants' convictions.

Defendant was convicted on two counts of violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which prohibited a deported alien from reentering the United States without the consent of the U.S. Attorney General. Defendant appealed from his conviction and from his subsequent sentence of 96 months imprisonment. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion when it excluded defendant's minimally relevant evidence at issue, which presented the potential for jury confusion and which could have resulted in a verdict premised on mere speculation. The court also held that because the trial record contained nothing more than a mere scintilla of evidence of derivative citizenship, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found the requisite evidentiary foundation lacking and refused to instruct the jury pursuant to that theory. The court further held that the district court did not err by upwardly adjusting defendant's sentence pursuant to a multiple count enhancement and that defendant's sentence was both substantively and procedurally reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants were jointly tried and convicted of a substantive RICO violation, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c); RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); and two counts of violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity (VICAR), 18 U.S.C. 1959, arising out of their membership in the Aryan Brotherhood (AB). Defendants appealed, raising Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois issues and claiming instructional error. The court held that, under the circumstances, it saw no plain Brady Error. The court also held that defendants failed to show that a jail house informant's testimony was "actually false" or that the government knowingly presented false testimony in light of Napue. The court further held that, assuming a duress defense was available, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a duress instruction under California, Pennsylvania, or federal law because the evidence did not support such an instruction. The court also rejected defendants' remaining claims of instructional errors. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner, and nine other similarly situated prisoners, appealed the district court's judgment denying their 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas corpus petitions. At issue was whether these consolidated habeas corpus petitions required the court to consider the manner in which the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prioritized a prisoner's eligibility for entering into a Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP). The court found no error in the BOP's interpretation of the governing statute, 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(1), and therefore, affirmed the district court's judgment. The court noted, however, that the BOP's administration of RDAP, combined with the program's insufficient capacity, had created a troubling situation that called for a legislative or regulatory remedy.

This is an interlocutory government appeal from the district court's suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of an airport search of defendant's checked luggage at Hilo International Airport. The government argued that the evidence from defendant's bag, which included, among other things, almost five dozen photographs of nude and partially nude minors. Defendant contended, and the district court agreed, that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents turned a routine administrative search for explosives into an unauthorized investigatory search for contraband. The court, however, vacated the order suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the airport screening and the follow-on consent- and warrant-based searches of defendant's computer and other materials where the viewing of the photographs from the envelope at issue was justified by and part of the lawful administrative search and where the development of a secondary desire to confirm that the photographs evidenced contraband did not invalidate that search. The court also held that the district court's probable cause approach was erroneous and remanded with instructions for the district court to decide what materials could be considered in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest defendant and to determine whether that evidence was "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense."