Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree sex abuse and two counts of first degree sodomy. At issue was whether a credible showing of "actual innocence" under Schlup v. Delon excused the statute of limitations period established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2241 et seq. The court held that it did, but that the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence of actual innocence to permit review of his constitutional claims on the merits. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) to one count of possession of child pornography. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the offending material located during a search of his computer, a search conducted by federal agents pursuant to the alleged consent of his one-time friend and now fiancee. The court held that the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the federal agent at issue at the time of the search satisfied the test in Illinois v. Rodriquez and therefore, the federal agents were justified in relying on the fiancee's consent.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for murdering a mother and her daughter. Petitioner appealed his denial of federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, raising a number of different claims. The court agreed with the district court that there was no showing of any impropriety or appearance of impropriety from the trial judge. The court affirmed the denial of the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing because the court concluded that they lacked merit. The court agreed with the district court that the state courts adequately considered all mitigating evidence in sentencing defendant to death and therefore, affirmed the denial of that claim. The court further held that since defendant was still pursuing his first post-conviction petition when, in accordance with the suggestion of the state supreme court, he sought to amend his first petition, there was no "previous collateral proceeding." Hence, there was no adequate and independent state ground supporting the trial court's refusal to hear the claims of ineffective assistance at trial and on direct appeal. Therefore, the court remanded only those claims for consideration by the district court.

Plaintiff, the mother of Jerry Amaro, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against defendants for the use of excessive force, which resulted in injuries that caused Amaro's death. At issue was whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply where a plaintiff believed she had a section 1983 claim but was dissuaded from bringing the claim by affirmative misrepresentations and stonewalling by the police. The court held that equitable estoppel did apply to the circumstances and affirmed the district court's judgment on that issue.

Defendants appealed from their convictions for conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and aiding and abetting. Defendants argued that the district court erred in refusing to provide an entrapment instruction to the jury. The court held that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support a finding by the jury that defendants were induced by the government to commit the crimes, one of the two necessary elements of entrapment defense. Consequently, the court affirmed and held that the district court did not err by refusing to give the entrapment instruction.

Plaintiff, an inmate, sought enforcement of his Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or Act), 5 U.S.C. 552, request to the DEA for records pertaining to a certain confidential informant. In response, the DEA submitted a Glomar response, refusing to confirm or deny the existence of any responsive records pertaining to the informant, citing exemptions 6 and 7(C), (D), and (F) of the Act. The court held that because the government officially confirmed the informant's status as an informant in open court in the course of official proceedings, the government could not continue to "neither admit nor deny" his informant status in response to a FOIA request. Therefore, the court held that the government must provide an index of the documents it has and make whatever additional objections to disclosure it deemed appropriate. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to prove that they were subjected to excessive force while in custody at the Sacramento County Main Jail. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to use certain jury instructions plaintiffs had requested. The court held that the district court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, for purposes of proving a Monell claim, a custom or practice could be supported by evidence of repeated constitutional violations which went uninvestigated and for which the errant municipal officers went unpunished. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for damages resulting from a violent attack he allegedly suffered while he was an inmate in the Los Angeles County Jail. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's supervisory liability claim for deliberate indifference against Sheriff Leroy Baca in his individual capacity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal did not alter the substantive requirements for supervisory liability claims in an unconstitutional conditions of confinement case under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments where deliberate indifference was alleged. The court further held that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) a supervisory liability claim of deliberate indifference against Sheriff Baca. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim and remanded for further proceedings.

Each of the defendants in these consolidated appeals sought safety-valve relief where they were serving a state probationary sentence when they committed and pleaded guilty to the charge of smuggling methamphetamine into the United States. At issue was whether, given the California state courts' wide latitude to modify ongoing probationary terms under California state law, the federal district courts in calculating criminal history points for purposes of safety valve eligibility must credit state orders terminating probationary sentences. The court held that, in applying the sentencing safety valve, federal courts must credit the California state orders under the California Penal Code 1203.3 modifying or terminating ongoing probationary terms. Accordingly, the court affirmed Audenago Acosta-Montes's sentence and vacated David Yepez's sentence and remanded Yepez's case for resentencing.

Defendant was charged with crimes stemming from conduct involving her live-in nanny and housekeeper where defendant arranged for her to travel from her native Peru to the United States in 2006 by entering under a fraudulently-obtained visa to serve as a nanny and housekeeper. Defendant appealed her convictions for forced labor, related offenses of document servitude, and harboring an alien for financial gain. Defendant also appealed three sentencing enhancements and the restitution order. The court affirmed the convictions on all counts as supported by sufficient evidence. With respect to sentencing, the court declined to reach the merits of the first enhancement for visa fraud because it did not affect the guidelines offense level; affirmed the second enhancement holding defendant in forced labor for over one year; and affirmed the third enhancement for committing a felony "in connection with" forced labor. As for the restitution order which presented a question of first impression regarding whether child support arrearages belonged to a criminal defendant such that they could be assigned to a victim by restitution order while defendant's children were still minors, the court held that the minor child was the real party in interest to the accrued support. Therefore, any money that defendant received for child support did not belong to her but rather her children and it could not be assigned to the nanny/housekeeper. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.