Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was stopped for a license-plate violation, and deputies from the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (SBCSD) discovered that he had an expired driver’s license and a long criminal history. The deputies conducted an inventory search before towing Defendant’s truck, and, after finding a handgun under the driver’s seat of his truck, arrested Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a handgun found during an inventory search of his truck, vacated a condition of supervised release, and remanded.  The panel held that the district court did not err in concluding that the government established that a valid community caretaking purpose existed for impounding and inventorying Defendant’s truck before the search was conducted. The panel wrote that the deputies had an objectively reasonable belief that Anderson’s truck, which he had parked in a private driveway, was parked illegally. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s assertion that the deputies’ inventory search was invalid because they failed to comply with the SBCSD’s standardized inventory search procedures.   The panel wrote that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to a standard policy, and was performed in good faith, not solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime; therefore, the government’s interest in the protection of property and protection of the police outweighed Defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of his car, and the search was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. View "USA V. JONATHAN ANDERSON" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for attempted enticement of a child by means of interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2422(b). Defendant’s challenges to the conviction principally concern the use of an adult intermediary and the lack of any direct communication with a person believed to be a child.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempted enticement of a child by means of interstate commerce but remanded for the district court to narrow a special condition of supervised release on computer possession and use. Challenging the use of an adult intermediary for his communications, Defendant contended that Section 2422(b) required the government to prove direct communication with someone he believed to be a minor. Noting that no circuit has agreed with Defendant’s position, the panel took the opportunity to stress that so long as the government proves the defendant’s intent was to obtain sex with a minor, it does not matter that the phone or internet communications occurred only between the defendant and the adult intermediary.   The panel rejected Defendant’s contention that the government improperly relied on evidence that Defendant arrived at the anticipated rendezvous with children’s gift bags and sex toys. Regarding Defendant’s claim that the government presented an invalid legal theory to the jury by arguing that Defendant could be convicted of violating Section 2422(b) based only, or primarily, on his in-person activities at the house, the panel wrote that, considering the record as a whole, the government did not convey an improper theory nor claim that Defendant’s online activities were inessential or irrelevant. View "USA V. NOEL MACAPAGAL" on Justia Law

Defendant solicited others to deliver a bomb to the home of a witness who had testified against him at his criminal trial. He was charged with retaliating against a trial witness (Count 1); soliciting the transportation of an explosive device in commerce with the knowledge or intent that it would be used to kill, injure, or intimidate a person or damage property (Count 2); and soliciting the use of facilities of commerce with the intent that a murder be committed (Count 3).  The jury acquitted Defendant on Count 1, but convicted him on Counts 2 and 3. Before his sentencing, Defendant renewed his arguments for acquittal for a third time, but the district court again denied his motion. The district court sentenced Defendant to consecutive 60-month sentences on Counts 2 and 3, for a total term of 120 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed conviction for soliciting the transportation of an explosive device in commerce with the knowledge or intent that it would be used to kill, injure, or intimidate a person or damage property, reversed his conviction for soliciting the use of facilities of commerce with the intent that a murder be committed, and remanded for resentencing. The panel held that a violation of Section 844(d) is a categorical match to Section 373(a). The panel concluded that a violation of Section 844(d) requires the defendant to have undertaken a substantial step toward the use of violent force, which means that a violation of Section 844(d) categorically requires the attempted use of physical force within the meaning of Section 373(a). View "USA V. DAVID LINEHAN" on Justia Law

Defendants challenged their convictions for various sexual offenses against children, under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants first argued that the district court erred in denying their first motion to suppress because a detective’s affidavit supporting a 2016 warrant to search the residence contained material, intentionally false and/or reckless statements and omissions that misled the issuing judge; specifically, that the affidavit misstated the contents of a CyberTipline Report, drew conclusions unsupported by the Report, and ignored exculpatory factors.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders denying Defendants joint motions to suppress evidence. The panel held that Defendants failed to show that the affidavit contained any materially false statements or omissions (much less any such statements knowingly or recklessly made). The panel wrote that Defendants misstated the factual record by insisting that only one IP address was relevant, and that Defendants do not substantively address the results from a Tumblr search warrant referenced in the affidavit, which further supports the probable cause determination.   Defendants further argued that the district court erred in denying their second motion to suppress evidence derived from a 2018 search. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err by finding that Defendants abandoned the devices. The panel wrote that Defendants’ failure to ensure that their brother recovered the devices before the home was sold, and their subsequent failure to take any additional action, is sufficient to support a finding of abandonment, even if Defendants ceased their efforts only because they feared detection by law enforcement. View "USA V. JOSHUA FISHER" on Justia Law

Defendants recruited several “nannies” to live and work in their home. These nannies were subjected to a range of conditions, including: eighteen-hour workdays, limited food, isolation from their families, verbal and physical abuse, threats of violence, threats to call the authorities, and no pay. After an eleven-day jury trial, Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1594(b) and two substantive counts of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1589(a). Defendants challenge their convictions and sentences. Defendants proposed an instruction that would have told the jury that they must be unanimous as to which of the four prohibited means Defendants used to compel forced labor. The district court rejected the proposed instruction. The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict on the operative counts.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and concluded that he general unanimity instruction was sufficient. The court explained that all that was required for the jurors to convict Defendants under the forced labor statute was for the jurors to unanimously agree that Defendants knowingly obtained forced labor by one or more of the prohibited means listed in 18 U.S.C. Section 1589(a). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a specific unanimity instruction to the jury. View "USA V. SHARMISTHA BARAI" on Justia Law

Two Coast Guard employees were shot and killed at a Coast Guard station on Kodiak Island, Alaska. A jury found that their co-worker, Defendant, had committed the murders. Defendant contends contention that under the Fifth Amendment, statements he made to government investigators should have been suppressed because they were made under the threat of loss of employment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions, vacated the district court’s restitution order, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel’s independent review of the record confirmed that the investigators did not explicitly threaten Defendant’s job security if he refused to incriminate himself, and Defendant did not argue otherwise. Instead, Defendant advanced a theory of implicit coercion by virtue of an employment manual, and a letter of caution he received after allegedly using a fuel card for his personal vehicle, which, he argued, operated in the background of his interviews to create “an impermissible penalty situation.” The panel held that in the absence of a direct threat of loss of employment, the appropriate framework for the court is to consider both the public employee’s subjective belief and the objective reasonableness of that belief to determine whether the employee’s statements were improperly coerced; it is only when both elements are satisfied that the employee is, under Garrity, entitled to suppression of his statements absent a grant of immunity. The panel vacated the restitution order and remanded for the district court to determine whether each of Defendant’s benefit payment streams constituted “earnings” under Section 1673; if so, the MVRA limited garnishment of those funds to 25%. View "USA V. JAMES WELLS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native of El Salvador, was detained by immigration authorities. An immigration judge (IJ) denied bond, and an IJ later denied him relief under the Convention Against Torture and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, and this court denied his petition for review. In April 2021, Plaintiff moved the BIA to reopen, and the BIA denied a stay of removal. In May 2021, Plaintiff filed a habeas petition with the district court, which denied his motion to enjoin his removal until his motion to reopen and habeas petition were decided. On June 14, 2021, the district court denied Plaintiff subsequently-filed motion for a TRO, and the government voluntarily agreed to stay removal up to and including August 13, 2021.   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed August 13, 2021; and 2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the government from removing him. The panel concluded that the district court correctly determined that jurisdiction was barred by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(g), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” The panel rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause preserves judicial review here. View "WILLIAN RAUDA V. DAVID JENNINGS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant, along with an accomplice, surreptitiously approached a remote set of railroad tracks during the midnight hour. Defendant then secretly placed a “shunt” on the tracks to tamper with the rail signaling system and force trains to halt.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on Defendant, whom a jury convicted of Violence Against Railroad Carriers. The panel held that the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2A5.2(a)(2) for recklessly endangering the safety of a mass transportation vehicle. Disagreeing with Defendant’s argument that she was unaware of the risks posed by the shunt, the panel held that the district court correctly concluded that a reasonable person would understand that unexpectedly stopping a freight train, as it barrels down the tracks, poses an obvious risk of harm.   The panel also held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1(a). The panel wrote that the district court recognized that Defendant’s decision to go to trial did not necessarily bar her from receiving a sentencing reduction but determined that she had not shown genuine acceptance of responsibility. The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this determination. View "USA V. ELLEN REICHE" on Justia Law

Defendant crashed his plane when he attempted to fly over Atigun Pass in the Brooks Range in Alaska. During both the investigation and Defendant’s appeal of the revocation of his airman certificate, Defendant claimed that the plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700 feet with a target altitude of 6,000 feet as it approached the pass. GPS data showed that the plane was flying at an altitude more than 1,000 feet lower than what Defendant claimed. The proceeding in Count One was the NTSB investigation. The proceeding in Count Two was the appeal before the NTSB of the FAA’s revocation of his airman certificate. Challenging his conviction on Count One, Defendant argued that the NTSB’s accident investigation was not a pending “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1505.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction on two counts of obstructing a pending proceeding and affirmed the district court’s assessment of a $5,000 fine. The panel wrote that even if it were not reviewing for plain error, it would affirm, holding that the NTSB’s investigation of Defendant’s plane crash was a “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1505. The panel held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the materiality element. The panel held that the district court did not commit clear error in finding Defendant able to pay the $5,000 fine, as there was no evidence before the district court showing that Defendant was unable to pay the fine, or was likely become unable to pay it. View "USA V. FOREST KIRST" on Justia Law

Defendant contends that the district court impermissibly delegated to a nonjudicial officer the authority to “decide the nature or extent of” her punishment by giving her probation officer discretion to require inpatient treatment as part of her supervised release. Defendant argued on appeal that the treatment conditions are unlawful because they purport to delegate to the probation officer authority to determine her punishment, which is a function reserved exclusively for the court.   The Ninth Circuit vacated two special conditions of supervised release and remanded for resentencing so that the district court can clarify the scope of authority delegated to the probation officer. The court explained that Defendant did not contest that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her “right to assert any and all legally waivable claims,” and the panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court’s statements about her ability to appeal vitiated her appeal waiver. The panel noted that when a defendant with an otherwise valid appeal waiver challenges the legality of her sentence, the claim as to waiver rises and falls with the claim on the merits. The panel reviewed for plain error whether the treatment conditions, which Defendant did not challenge in the district court, are illegal.   Further, the panel found that the district court committed plain error affecting Defendant’s substantial rights because she must comply with the conditions or face revocation of her supervised release. The panel therefore vacated the substance-abuse and mental-health treatment conditions and remanded for resentencing so that the district court can clarify the scope of authority delegated to the probation officer. View "USA V. JERRE NISHIDA" on Justia Law