Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants challenged their convictions for various sexual offenses against children, under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants first argued that the district court erred in denying their first motion to suppress because a detective’s affidavit supporting a 2016 warrant to search the residence contained material, intentionally false and/or reckless statements and omissions that misled the issuing judge; specifically, that the affidavit misstated the contents of a CyberTipline Report, drew conclusions unsupported by the Report, and ignored exculpatory factors.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders denying Defendants joint motions to suppress evidence. The panel held that Defendants failed to show that the affidavit contained any materially false statements or omissions (much less any such statements knowingly or recklessly made). The panel wrote that Defendants misstated the factual record by insisting that only one IP address was relevant, and that Defendants do not substantively address the results from a Tumblr search warrant referenced in the affidavit, which further supports the probable cause determination.   Defendants further argued that the district court erred in denying their second motion to suppress evidence derived from a 2018 search. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err by finding that Defendants abandoned the devices. The panel wrote that Defendants’ failure to ensure that their brother recovered the devices before the home was sold, and their subsequent failure to take any additional action, is sufficient to support a finding of abandonment, even if Defendants ceased their efforts only because they feared detection by law enforcement. View "USA V. JOSHUA FISHER" on Justia Law

Defendants recruited several “nannies” to live and work in their home. These nannies were subjected to a range of conditions, including: eighteen-hour workdays, limited food, isolation from their families, verbal and physical abuse, threats of violence, threats to call the authorities, and no pay. After an eleven-day jury trial, Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1594(b) and two substantive counts of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1589(a). Defendants challenge their convictions and sentences. Defendants proposed an instruction that would have told the jury that they must be unanimous as to which of the four prohibited means Defendants used to compel forced labor. The district court rejected the proposed instruction. The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict on the operative counts.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and concluded that he general unanimity instruction was sufficient. The court explained that all that was required for the jurors to convict Defendants under the forced labor statute was for the jurors to unanimously agree that Defendants knowingly obtained forced labor by one or more of the prohibited means listed in 18 U.S.C. Section 1589(a). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a specific unanimity instruction to the jury. View "USA V. SHARMISTHA BARAI" on Justia Law

Two Coast Guard employees were shot and killed at a Coast Guard station on Kodiak Island, Alaska. A jury found that their co-worker, Defendant, had committed the murders. Defendant contends contention that under the Fifth Amendment, statements he made to government investigators should have been suppressed because they were made under the threat of loss of employment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions, vacated the district court’s restitution order, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel’s independent review of the record confirmed that the investigators did not explicitly threaten Defendant’s job security if he refused to incriminate himself, and Defendant did not argue otherwise. Instead, Defendant advanced a theory of implicit coercion by virtue of an employment manual, and a letter of caution he received after allegedly using a fuel card for his personal vehicle, which, he argued, operated in the background of his interviews to create “an impermissible penalty situation.” The panel held that in the absence of a direct threat of loss of employment, the appropriate framework for the court is to consider both the public employee’s subjective belief and the objective reasonableness of that belief to determine whether the employee’s statements were improperly coerced; it is only when both elements are satisfied that the employee is, under Garrity, entitled to suppression of his statements absent a grant of immunity. The panel vacated the restitution order and remanded for the district court to determine whether each of Defendant’s benefit payment streams constituted “earnings” under Section 1673; if so, the MVRA limited garnishment of those funds to 25%. View "USA V. JAMES WELLS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native of El Salvador, was detained by immigration authorities. An immigration judge (IJ) denied bond, and an IJ later denied him relief under the Convention Against Torture and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, and this court denied his petition for review. In April 2021, Plaintiff moved the BIA to reopen, and the BIA denied a stay of removal. In May 2021, Plaintiff filed a habeas petition with the district court, which denied his motion to enjoin his removal until his motion to reopen and habeas petition were decided. On June 14, 2021, the district court denied Plaintiff subsequently-filed motion for a TRO, and the government voluntarily agreed to stay removal up to and including August 13, 2021.   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed August 13, 2021; and 2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the government from removing him. The panel concluded that the district court correctly determined that jurisdiction was barred by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(g), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” The panel rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause preserves judicial review here. View "WILLIAN RAUDA V. DAVID JENNINGS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant, along with an accomplice, surreptitiously approached a remote set of railroad tracks during the midnight hour. Defendant then secretly placed a “shunt” on the tracks to tamper with the rail signaling system and force trains to halt.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on Defendant, whom a jury convicted of Violence Against Railroad Carriers. The panel held that the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2A5.2(a)(2) for recklessly endangering the safety of a mass transportation vehicle. Disagreeing with Defendant’s argument that she was unaware of the risks posed by the shunt, the panel held that the district court correctly concluded that a reasonable person would understand that unexpectedly stopping a freight train, as it barrels down the tracks, poses an obvious risk of harm.   The panel also held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1(a). The panel wrote that the district court recognized that Defendant’s decision to go to trial did not necessarily bar her from receiving a sentencing reduction but determined that she had not shown genuine acceptance of responsibility. The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this determination. View "USA V. ELLEN REICHE" on Justia Law

Defendant crashed his plane when he attempted to fly over Atigun Pass in the Brooks Range in Alaska. During both the investigation and Defendant’s appeal of the revocation of his airman certificate, Defendant claimed that the plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700 feet with a target altitude of 6,000 feet as it approached the pass. GPS data showed that the plane was flying at an altitude more than 1,000 feet lower than what Defendant claimed. The proceeding in Count One was the NTSB investigation. The proceeding in Count Two was the appeal before the NTSB of the FAA’s revocation of his airman certificate. Challenging his conviction on Count One, Defendant argued that the NTSB’s accident investigation was not a pending “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1505.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction on two counts of obstructing a pending proceeding and affirmed the district court’s assessment of a $5,000 fine. The panel wrote that even if it were not reviewing for plain error, it would affirm, holding that the NTSB’s investigation of Defendant’s plane crash was a “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 1505. The panel held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the materiality element. The panel held that the district court did not commit clear error in finding Defendant able to pay the $5,000 fine, as there was no evidence before the district court showing that Defendant was unable to pay the fine, or was likely become unable to pay it. View "USA V. FOREST KIRST" on Justia Law

Defendant contends that the district court impermissibly delegated to a nonjudicial officer the authority to “decide the nature or extent of” her punishment by giving her probation officer discretion to require inpatient treatment as part of her supervised release. Defendant argued on appeal that the treatment conditions are unlawful because they purport to delegate to the probation officer authority to determine her punishment, which is a function reserved exclusively for the court.   The Ninth Circuit vacated two special conditions of supervised release and remanded for resentencing so that the district court can clarify the scope of authority delegated to the probation officer. The court explained that Defendant did not contest that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her “right to assert any and all legally waivable claims,” and the panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court’s statements about her ability to appeal vitiated her appeal waiver. The panel noted that when a defendant with an otherwise valid appeal waiver challenges the legality of her sentence, the claim as to waiver rises and falls with the claim on the merits. The panel reviewed for plain error whether the treatment conditions, which Defendant did not challenge in the district court, are illegal.   Further, the panel found that the district court committed plain error affecting Defendant’s substantial rights because she must comply with the conditions or face revocation of her supervised release. The panel therefore vacated the substance-abuse and mental-health treatment conditions and remanded for resentencing so that the district court can clarify the scope of authority delegated to the probation officer. View "USA V. JERRE NISHIDA" on Justia Law

Petitioner is scheduled to be executed in Arizona on Wednesday, November 16, 2022. Petitioner filed a second-in-time habeas petition in the district court under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, alleging a freestanding innocence claim, violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and a due process violation based on the surviving victim’s unreliable pretrial identification. The district court dismissed the Brady and Napue claims, finding that they were unauthorized second or successive claims. It also dismissed the due process claim, finding that it had been presented in Petitioner’s first federal petition.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the due process and actual innocence claims. The court agreed with the district court that the Brady and Napue claims are second or successive claims subject to Section 2244(b)(2). The court wrote it construed Petitioner’s notice of appeal as an application for authorization to file a second or successive petition as to those claims. So construed, the court denied Petitioner’s request to file a second or successive petition because he has failed to satisfy the stringent standards under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). View "MURRAY HOOPER V. DAVID SHINN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff moved under state law for an order permitting him to conduct DNA testing and fingerprint analysis on evidence found at the crime scene more than forty years ago. The superior court denied relief in an October 21, 2022 order. Plaintiff sought a review of this order via a special action petition in the Arizona Supreme Court. The state supreme court accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the superior court's ruling. Plaintiff then commenced this federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He sought a declaratory judgment that the Arizona statutes providing for forensic testing of DNA and other evidence are unconstitutional as applied to him as well as an injunction ordering defendants to permit him to conduct the forensic testing. He moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting his execution until he obtains this relief. The district court denied the injunction, and he appealed.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because this action amounted to an improper appeal of the state court's judgment. View "MURRAY HOOPER V. MARK BRNOVICH, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder in 2012. Following his conviction, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court arguing that two letters allegedly written by his codefendant, exonerated Petitioner. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas petition, and the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Petitioner, who conceded that 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1) does not apply, argued that the state court made an unreasonable determination of facts under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(2) by rejecting his claim of actual innocence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition challenging his California murder conviction. The panel applied the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d). The panel held that Petitioner did not waive his actual innocence argument in his briefing to the district court. Turning to the merits, the panel wrote that Petitioner cannot challenge the substance of the state court's factual findings because the state courts made no factual findings. In the absence of substantive factual findings by the state courts, Petitioner contended that the state courts’ factfinding process was unreasonable because no court could have reasonably found that Petitioner’s allegations failed to establish a prima facie case of actual innocence. The panel held that it was not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to reject Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning the authenticity of the letters. View "EARNEST PRESCOTT V. KELLY SANTORO" on Justia Law