Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted on terrorism-related charges for his central role in a conspiracy to travel to Afghanistan and engage in armed conflict against American soldiers. He was originally sentenced to 300 months in prison, but had to be resentenced after the Ninth Circuit reversed two of his convictions. The district court resentenced him, again imposing a 300-month sentence. Defendant challenged his resentence on multiple grounds, 1.) the district court erred in applying an enhancement to his sentence after finding that he was an “organizer” or “leader” of the criminal conspiracy pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 2.) the district court’s decision to impose an additional terrorism enhancement under the Guidelines was inadequately justified.The Ninth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges, affirming his sentence. The court explained that the district court reasonably concluded that Defendant had the necessary influence and ability to coordinate the behavior of others so as to achieve a desired criminal result, meaning that he was an “organizer” within the meaning of § 3B1.1(c). View "USA V. SOHIEL KABIR" on Justia Law

Defendants used fake driver’s licenses and a false tissue procurement company as cover to infiltrate conferences that Planned Parenthood hosted or attended. Using the same strategy, defendants also arranged and attended lunch meetings with Planned Parenthood and visited Planned Parenthood health clinics. During these conferences, meetings, and visits, defendants secretly recorded Planned Parenthood staff without their consent. After secretly recording for roughly a year-and-a-half, Defendants released on the internet edited videos of the secretly recorded conversations. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood and awarded it statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages as well as limited injunctive relief.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment, after a jury trial, in favor of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., and other plaintiffs on claims of trespass, fraud, conspiracy, breach of contracts, unlawful and fraudulent business practices, violating civil RICO, and violating various federal and state wiretapping laws. Affirming in part, the panel held that the compensatory damages were not precluded by the First Amendment. The panel held that under Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), and Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018), facially constitutional statutes apply to everyone, including journalists. The panel reversed the jury’s verdict on the claim under the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2511(2)(d), and vacated the related statutory damages for violating this statute. View "PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION, ET AL V. CENTER FOR MEDICAL PROGRESS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant kidnapped Jane Doe, then age 12 years old, and drove her from California to Nevada knowing that she would engage in prostitution. The defendant entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to which, in exchange for the government’s promise to drop five serious criminal charges, he would plead guilty to two lesser crimes (interstate travel in aid of unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1952(a)(3)(A)) and would pay Doe restitution.   The panel granted Jane Doe’s petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3771(d)(3), a provision of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, in a case in which the district court concluded that it lacked statutory authority to order Defendant to pay restitution to Jane Doe. The panel published the opinion to reiterate what this court held in two cases decided three decades ago: 18 U.S.C. Section 3663(a)(3) grants statutory authority to district courts to award restitution whenever a defendant agrees in a plea agreement to pay restitution. The panel instructed the district court to address, in the first instance, Defendant’s evidentiary challenges and other arguments concerning the appropriate amount of restitution View "JANE DOE V. USDC-NVL" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and a gun in 2007. He was sentenced to 107 months of incarceration. In a violation of parole hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to consecutive 24-month sentences after finding he violated the conditions of his supervised release by possessing two guns and ammunition.On appeal, Defendant argued that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g)’s requirement that a judge impose a term of imprisonment based on conduct that constitutes a federal crime violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and that his violations should therefore have been determined beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. He also challenged his sentences on Double Jeopardy grounds.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that Sec. 3583(g) is more like “ordinary revocation” than “punishment for a new offense,” and that Defendant’s argument is not supported by Justice Breyer’s controlling concurring opinion in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). Defendant's Double Jeopardy challenges similarly failed because 1.) He possessed more than one weapon and 2.) The violations related to separate counts in the indictment. View "USA V. JAMES RICHARDS" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition brought by Petitioner, who was sentenced to death in 1994 after a state jury convicted him of first-degree murder and other offenses. In the opinion, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner's certified claim that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).   Petitioner argued the California Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable application of Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1) because the state court “engaged in the prohibited exercise of reviewing the trial court record regarding the struck jurors and identifying colorable reasons why the prosecutor might have legitimately struck the three jurors.”   The panel held that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Johnson by doing exactly what this court has explained Johnson forbids: the court scanned the record, articulated its own race-neutral reasons why the prosecutor may have exercised his peremptory strikes, and denied Petitioner’s claim at Step One. The panel addressed Petitioner’s six other certified claims in a simultaneously filed memorandum disposition and affirmed the district court’s rulings on those claims. The panel declined to reach Petitioner’s uncertified claims. View "JAIME HOYOS V. RONALD DAVIS" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its Opinion filed April 27, 2022, affirming a conviction and sentence on one count of attempted sexual exploitation of a child, and one count of possession of sexually explicit images of children, in a case in which Defendant was arrested returning from the Philippines where he engaged in sex tourism involving minors.   Defendant argued that the evidence seized from his electrical devices upon his arrest should have been suppressed because Yahoo and Facebook were acting as government agents when they searched his online accounts. The panel rejected Defendant’s arguments (1) that two federal statutes—the Stored Communications Act and the Protect Our Children Act—transformed the ESPs’ searches into governmental action, and (2) that the government was sufficiently involved in the ESPs’ searches of Defendant’s accounts to trigger Fourth Amendment protection.   The panel declined to reach the question of whether the preservation requests implicate the Fourth Amendment because even assuming that they do, there is no basis for suppression given that the record establishes that the ESPs’ preservation of the defendant’s digital data had no effect on the government’s ability to obtain the evidence that convicted him.   The panel concluded that the affidavit—which described Yahoo’s internal investigation and the resulting findings, as well as the information Facebook provided to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children after searching the defendant’s accounts—established a fair probability that child pornography would be found on the defendant’s electronic devices. The panel wrote that there was no impermissible double counting here, as the enhancements were premised on separate exploitative acts. View "USA V. CARSTEN ROSENOW" on Justia Law

In a case in which the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision filed April 7, 2020, and reported at 954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020), the panel filed an amended order granting the government’s motion to reinstate portions of April 7, 2020, opinion, to the following extent:   The panel reversed the district court’s judgment on Counts Four (money laundering) and Ten (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence). The panel affirmed—for the reasons explained in April 7, 2020, opinion—on all remaining Counts: One, Eight (conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery); Two (Hobbs Act robbery); Three (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence); and Nine (attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery). The panel remanded to the district court for resentencing consistent with United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. —, 2022 WL 2203334 (June 21, 2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. View "USA V. MONICO DOMINGUEZ" on Justia Law

The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation have a cross-deputization agreement with the State of Montana under which the Tribes have agreed to commission state police to act as tribal police where there is a gap between their respective criminal jurisdictions. Defendant challenges the validity of the cross-deputization agreement, arguing that the Tribes lack the inherent sovereign authority to enter into a cross-deputization agreement with the State of Montana.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The panel emphasized that the cross-deputization agreement deputizes state officers to enforce tribal law, not state law, and emphasized that Congress has expressly provided for the Tribes’ authority to enter into such compacts.   Defendant also argued that the Tribes explicitly conditioned the cross-deputization agreement on federal approval, which they did not receive. The panel did not read the agreement’s use of the word “approve” as giving the Bureau of Indian Affairs veto power over the agreement.   The panel wrote that even if the lack of a signature from the BIA representative on the 2003 amendment to the agreement impaired the validity of the amendment, it would not invalidate the trooper’s commissioned status. The panel wrote that the trooper’s failure to carry an identification card was plainly a violation of the agreement.  The panel noted, however, that none of the sovereign parties to the agreement appears to consider the violation sufficiently serious to seek any remedy for it. View "USA V. ERIC FOWLER" on Justia Law

Defendant argued that she should be able to withdraw her guilty plea at the sentencing hearing because the district court “rejected” the non-binding sentencing recommendation under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). She asserted that the district court erred by not allowing her to withdraw her guilty plea because it supposedly treated her plea agreement as a binding plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the criminal judgment. Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that Defendant had no right to withdraw her plea. Explaining that the district court’s use of “reject” in the context of Rule 11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement has no legal effect, the panel wrote that the “rejection” of a recommended sentence under a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) agreement could logically mean only that the court rejected the recommendation itself, and the district court thus did not plainly err in not providing Defendant an opportunity to withdraw her plea. The panel wrote that Defendant was permitted to withdraw her guilty plea before sentencing only if she could show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal and that she has not done so. The panel held that Defendant’s remaining arguments fail. The magistrate judge’s failure to specifically mention a “jury” trial during the plea colloquy, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(C), did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The district court properly considered and explained its reasons for rejecting Defendant’s variance requests. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 100-month sentence. View "USA V. CYNTHIA MONTOYA" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for habeas relief after being in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. During her initial removal proceedings, she was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c) (“Subsection C”) due to a conviction. Thus, she was not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing. However, in Casas Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, the Ninth Circuit held that once a noncitizen’s immigration case reaches judicial review, the authority for holding a Subsection C detainee shifts to 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) (“Subsection A”), which does entitle a noncitizen to a bond hearing. Accordingly, Petitioner argued she was entitled to a bond hearing.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and held that a noncitizen of the United States—who initially was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c)—is not entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) while awaiting a decision from this court on a petition for review.   Here, the panel observed that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings does not directly address the question in Casas Castrillon—when, if ever, mandatory detention under Subsection C ends. However, the panel explained that Jennings’s reasoning makes clear that Subsection A and Subsection C apply to discrete categories of noncitizens, and not to different stages of a noncitizen’s legal proceedings. The district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question. View "LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law