Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, a former U.S. Coast Guard employee, was convicted by a jury of murdering two co-workers in Alaska. At the time of the government’s collection action, he held approximately $450,000 in a Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account, a federal retirement savings plan. His wife had a statutory right to a joint and survivor annuity from the account, and federal law generally requires spousal consent for lump-sum withdrawals. Following his conviction, the government sought to collect the entire balance of his TSP account as restitution for the victims’ families.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska initially ordered restitution from the defendant’s retirement and disability income, including his TSP funds, but limited lump-sum withdrawals from the TSP without spousal consent, instead permitting monthly payments. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the restitution order, holding that the district court could not use the All Writs Act to bypass statutory garnishment limits and remanded for a determination of whether the defendant’s benefit streams constituted “earnings” subject to a 25% garnishment cap under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.On remand, the district court issued amended restitution orders authorizing the government to collect the entire TSP account balance as a lump sum. The defendant appealed, arguing that statutory spousal protections limited the government to periodic garnishments. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the government may only cash out a defendant’s TSP account to satisfy a restitution order under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act if the plan’s terms would allow the defendant to do so at the time of the order. Because spousal consent was required and not obtained, the court vacated the restitution orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

A resident of Billings, Montana, who lived across the street from a public elementary school, began carrying a shotgun outside his home, including on the sidewalk, during the summer of 2023. He did so to protect himself and his mother from a former neighbor who had repeatedly violated a protection order. Local police received several complaints about his conduct but did not charge him with any crime and told him he was complying with state law. After the resident contacted the FBI to complain about police harassment, federal authorities indicted him for possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant argued that he was exempt from the federal prohibition because, under Montana law, he was considered licensed to possess a firearm in a school zone. The district court found that Montana’s licensing scheme did not meet the federal requirements for the statutory exception, and also rejected the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge. The defendant then pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s order, directing that the indictment be dismissed. The Ninth Circuit held that the statutory exception for state-licensed individuals in the Gun-Free School Zones Act was ambiguous as applied to Montana’s licensing scheme. Given this ambiguity, and considering the rule of lenity, constitutional avoidance, and the presumption in favor of scienter as articulated in Rehaif v. United States, the court concluded that the defendant lacked fair notice that his conduct was criminal. The court did not address the Second Amendment argument. View "USA V. METCALF" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after he attempted to meet someone he believed to be a 12-year-old girl for sex, following extensive online and text communications. The “girl” was actually a fictional persona created by law enforcement as part of an undercover operation. After his arrest, officers obtained a warrant to search his residence, where they discovered a large quantity of child pornography on a hard drive. The defendant was charged with attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, as well as possession of child pornography.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to suppress the evidence seized from his residence, to sever the two charges in the indictment, and to exclude evidence of his uncharged interactions with a 17-year-old girl. The court found that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, that the charges were properly joined as offenses of similar character, and that the evidence regarding the 17-year-old was admissible to show intent. After a jury convicted the defendant on both counts, the district court sentenced him to 154 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause to search for both enticement and child pornography, and that any omission in the warrant affidavit was immaterial. The court also held that the charges were properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), and that the evidence of the defendant’s relationship with the 17-year-old was properly admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. Finally, the court found that the sentence was substantively reasonable and did not result in unwarranted sentencing disparity. View "USA V. BOUDREAU" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and pled guilty to the charge. At sentencing, he received a prison term of 151 months, three years of supervised release, and was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment. The district court specified that these monetary penalties were “due immediately,” but, recognizing the defendant’s indigency, also established a payment schedule: while incarcerated, he was to make nominal payments through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, and during supervised release, he was to pay a percentage of his income, subject to a minimum monthly amount.After sentencing, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered judgment reflecting both the immediate due date and the payment schedule. The government sent a letter demanding immediate payment of the full amount and warning of a possible judgment lien. The defendant appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) does not permit a court to make monetary penalties due immediately while also setting a payment schedule, contending that the statute requires the court to choose only one of these options.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo. The court held that the district court did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) by making the fine and special assessment due immediately while also providing a payment schedule. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the statute allows for the total amount to be due immediately, with a payment schedule reflecting the defendant’s ability to pay, and that this approach is consistent with its own precedent and that of other circuits. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. PATRICK" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the time of sentencing, he had a prior Oregon felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, specifically under the “possession” subsection of the Oregon statute, with an added firearm enhancement. The key issue at sentencing was whether this prior conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which would increase the recommended sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon determined that the prior Oregon conviction did qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). This finding increased the defendant’s base offense level and resulted in a higher recommended sentencing range. The district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 46 months, which was below the enhanced guideline range but above what it would have been without the crime-of-violence enhancement. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court’s analysis was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Oregon statutes at issue do not require, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. The court found that neither the underlying offense nor the firearm enhancement statute required such an element, and that the government’s arguments to the contrary were not supported by the statutory text or Oregon case law. As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prior conviction was not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the crime-of-violence enhancement. View "USA V. KEAST" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after he used Instagram to offer his services as a pimp to someone he believed was a 16-year-old girl, who was actually an undercover officer. The officer, part of a human trafficking task force, had created a fake Instagram account with photos and hashtags suggesting prostitution. The man initiated contact, and their conversations led to a plan to meet in person, at which point he was arrested. He later admitted to attempting to lure a minor into prostitution. He was charged and convicted of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and attempted sexual enticement of a minor.Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the defendant, who is Black, sought discovery to support a claim of selective enforcement based on race discrimination. He argued that similar cases in the district involved only Black men, but his evidence was limited to six cases over ten years. The district court denied his motion for discovery, finding the sample size too small and not reflective of the broader work of the task force. The court also sentenced him to 144 months in prison, rejecting his argument that this sentence created an unwarranted disparity compared to other similar cases.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in denying discovery and in sentencing. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the discovery request, as the evidence presented was insufficient under the flexible standard for selective enforcement claims established in United States v. Sellers. The appellate court also found no procedural or substantive error in the sentence imposed, concluding that the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. GREEN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested in Montana in 2019 in connection with a burglary, during which officers found methamphetamine and syringes in his possession. He admitted to being addicted to methamphetamine. He was charged in state court with felony drug possession, and his pretrial release conditions prohibited firearm possession. In 2022, while those charges were still pending, he was found in possession of a stolen firearm and again admitted to daily methamphetamine use. He was subsequently indicted in federal court for being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and for illegally receiving a firearm while under felony indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant argued that both statutes were facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The district court relied on prior Ninth Circuit precedent and Supreme Court language in District of Columbia v. Heller, concluding that the statutes were consistent with longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by certain groups, such as felons and the mentally ill, and that the defendant had sufficient notice that his conduct was prohibited.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit held that both § 922(g)(3) and § 922(n) are facially constitutional under the Second Amendment, as there are circumstances in which their application is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. The court also held that § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, given his admitted daily methamphetamine use. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. STENNERSON" on Justia Law

A group of former executives from an investment management company were prosecuted after the company collapsed and was placed in receivership. The company, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors, primarily through promissory notes and other investment vehicles, experienced severe financial distress following the default of a major asset. Despite this, the executives continued to solicit investments, representing to investors that their funds would be used to purchase secure receivables and that the company was financially healthy. In reality, most new investor funds were used to pay prior investors and cover operating expenses. The executives were accused of making material misrepresentations and misleading half-truths about the use of investor funds, the security of investments, and the company’s financial health.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and multiple counts of wire fraud; one defendant was also convicted of making a false statement on a loan application. The defendants argued that they were improperly convicted on an omissions theory of fraud and that they were prevented from presenting a complete defense based on disclosures in offering documents and financial statements. They also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the materiality of their statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government’s theory at trial was based on affirmative misrepresentations and misleading half-truths, not mere omissions, and that the jury instructions fairly stated the law. The court found that evidence of what was not disclosed was relevant to materiality, and that disclaimers in offering documents did not render other representations immaterial in a criminal fraud prosecution. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. JESENIK" on Justia Law

Douglas Eligha Taylor was originally convicted in 1995 for robbing four banks in Los Angeles, pleading guilty to multiple counts including armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to 147 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. After his release in 2007, Taylor committed another bank robbery in 2008 and was prosecuted in state court, receiving a 17-year sentence. While in state custody, he was involved in a stabbing incident and accumulated multiple rules violations. Upon completing his state sentence in 2023, Taylor was transferred to federal custody, where the United States Probation Office petitioned to revoke his supervised release based on his 2008 conduct. Taylor admitted the allegations, and the district court accepted his admissions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California revoked Taylor’s supervised release and imposed a 60-month prison sentence, which was above the recommended Guidelines range of 18–24 months, followed by 24 months of supervised release. The court explained its decision by referencing Taylor’s repeated violations, the danger posed to the public, his lack of deterrence from prior sanctions, and the risk of recidivism. Taylor appealed, arguing that the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence, improperly considering his prior criminal conduct, and imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not commit plain procedural error, adequately explained its reasons for the above-Guidelines sentence, and properly considered Taylor’s history and risk to the public. The court also found the sentence to be substantively reasonable and rejected Taylor’s arguments for a lower sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. TAYLOR" on Justia Law

Gladys Perez was convicted in Nevada state court of first-degree murder, child neglect, and child abuse, and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. After her conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Nevada and became final in May 2012, Perez filed a state post-conviction habeas petition, which tolled the federal one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Her state petition was denied in December 2013, and Perez repeatedly instructed her court-appointed attorney, Bret Whipple, to file an appeal. Whipple failed to communicate with Perez or file the appeal, and did not provide her with the necessary case documents. After months of unsuccessful attempts to contact Whipple, Perez began preparing a federal habeas petition on her own, facing additional obstacles such as limited access to the prison law library, incomplete case files, and delays in obtaining a required financial certificate from prison officials.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed Perez’s federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that she had not demonstrated the extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence required for equitable tolling under AEDPA. The district court concluded that Perez’s efforts to contact her attorney and prepare her petition were insufficient to excuse her late filing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Perez’s abandonment by her post-conviction counsel constituted an extraordinary circumstance that prevented her timely filing, and that she acted with reasonable diligence both before and after the abandonment. The court also found that delays by prison officials in processing her financial certificate further contributed to her late filing. The panel concluded that Perez qualified for equitable tolling and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of her habeas petition. View "PEREZ V. REUBART" on Justia Law