Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eugene Allen Doerr was convicted in 1996 by a jury for the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of Karen Bohl, and was sentenced to death by an Arizona state court judge. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court, Doerr filed a federal habeas petition, which was partially denied by the district court. Doerr then moved for a stay and abeyance to present new claims in state court, including ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia.The district court initially denied Doerr’s federal habeas petition, finding his claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing procedurally defaulted. The court held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel did not constitute cause to excuse the procedural default. Doerr appealed, and while his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel could excuse procedural default. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to reconsider Doerr’s ineffective assistance claim in light of Martinez. On remand, the district court again denied relief on the ineffective assistance claim but granted relief on another claim. Doerr appealed the partial denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Doerr’s motion to remand to the district court with instructions to stay and abey the federal habeas petition. The court held that the criteria for a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber were met, allowing Doerr to present his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins to the state court. The court found that Doerr had good cause for not previously bringing these claims, that the claims were potentially meritorious, and that there was no indication of intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "DOERR V. SHINN" on Justia Law

An individual, referred to as "Client," became the target of a criminal investigation into alleged tax evasion. The grand jury issued a subpoena to Client, who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to produce documents. Subsequently, the grand jury subpoenaed the law firm that had represented Client in tax matters, requesting documents related to that representation and instructing the firm to provide a privilege log if any documents were withheld. The law firm declined to produce certain documents or provide a privilege log, citing attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and Client’s Fifth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Central District of California ordered the law firm to provide the Government with a privilege log, rejecting the firm's assertion of Client’s Fifth Amendment rights. The district court temporarily stayed enforcement of its order, and Client filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an attorney cannot be compelled to provide the Government with a privilege log of documents protected under Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The court explained that providing a privilege log would reveal the existence, authenticity, and Client’s custody of the documents, thus undermining Client’s Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege. The court determined that to assess whether the documents are indeed protected under Fisher, the district court should conduct an in camera review.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct an in camera review to determine the applicability of the Fisher privilege. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated July 21, 2023" on Justia Law

Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to an Arizona law that requires criminal defense attorneys and their agents to initiate any contact with crime victims through the prosecutor’s office. The plaintiffs, a group of criminal defense attorneys and their association, argue that this law violates the First Amendment's Speech Clause by restricting their ability to communicate directly with victims.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court held a bench trial and concluded that the law was unconstitutional on its face, issuing a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The district court found that the law's requirement for defense attorneys to communicate through the prosecutor's office was a content- and viewpoint-based regulation of speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' facial challenge failed because they did not challenge the law's primary application to victim-interview requests, which remain regulated under a similar Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure. The court noted that the unchallenged applications of the law, which include requests for victim interviews, are substantial and legitimate. Therefore, the challenged applications related to non-interview contacts are not substantial enough to render the entire statute unconstitutional.The Ninth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the facial challenge to the Victim Contact Limit, as framed by the plaintiffs, must fail. View "ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Alfred Velazquez, a U.S. citizen residing in Tijuana, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Sean Hanlon while entering the United States from Mexico. Hanlon noticed Velazquez's nervous behavior and inconsistencies in his story about his destination. A cursory search of Velazquez's vehicle, a red Pontiac Firebird, revealed signs of tampering around the engine. A canine inspection led to the discovery of 4.53 pounds of fentanyl and heroin hidden in the vehicle. Velazquez was arrested, and the drugs were seized.The Government charged Velazquez with importing a mixture containing fentanyl under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. At his first trial, Velazquez was convicted, but the conviction was reversed due to a prosecutorial error. A second trial ended in a mistrial with a hung jury. In the third trial, the district court admitted testimony from a Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent about the retail value of the seized fentanyl, which ranged from $405,888 to $608,832. Velazquez was found guilty, and the court sentenced him to 139 months in custody and 5 years of supervised release. Velazquez appealed the admission of the retail value testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that district courts do not abuse their discretion when admitting evidence of the retail value of narcotics in importation cases if the evidence is relevant, probative, and not unfairly prejudicial under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court found that the retail value of the fentanyl was relevant to Velazquez's knowledge of the drugs and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to admit the testimony and upheld Velazquez's conviction. View "USA V. VELAZQUEZ" on Justia Law

Julian Omidi and his business, Surgery Center Management, LLC (SCM), were involved in a fraudulent scheme called "Get Thin," which promised weight loss through Lap-Band surgery and other medical procedures. Omidi and SCM defrauded insurance companies by submitting false claims for reimbursement, including fabricated patient data and misrepresented physician involvement. The scheme recruited patients through a call center, pushing them towards expensive medical tests and procedures regardless of medical necessity.A grand jury indicted Omidi and SCM for mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and related charges. After extensive pretrial litigation and a lengthy jury trial, both were convicted on all charges. The district court sentenced Omidi to 84 months in prison and fined SCM over $22 million. The government sought forfeiture of nearly $100 million, arguing that all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were derived from fraud. The district court agreed, finding that even proceeds from legitimate procedures were indirectly the result of the fraudulent scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's forfeiture judgment, holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), all proceeds directly or indirectly derived from a health care fraud scheme must be forfeited. The court rejected the argument that only proceeds from fraudulent transactions should be forfeited, noting that the entire business was permeated with fraud. The court concluded that there is no "100% Fraud Rule" in forfeiture cases seeking proceeds of a fraud scheme, and all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were subject to forfeiture. View "United States V. Surgery Center Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Larry Seng In was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after a gun was found in his car during a traffic stop. In moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the officers' actions, particularly handcuffing him, escalated a valid Terry stop into an unlawful de facto arrest because they handcuffed him before having probable cause to believe he was prohibited from possessing the gun.The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who held an evidentiary hearing and recommended denying the motion, concluding that the handcuffing was justified. However, the district court rejected this recommendation and granted In's motion to suppress, holding that the gun was obtained as a result of an unlawful de facto arrest without probable cause. The Government's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the traffic stop did not turn into a de facto arrest. The officers had a sufficient and reasonable basis to fear for their safety, justifying their decision to handcuff In during their investigation. The court noted that the presence of an unsecured gun in the car, In's initial dishonesty about the gun, and the location of the stop near a densely populated area contributed to the reasonableness of the officers' actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order granting the suppression motion and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. IN" on Justia Law

Michael Blake DeFrance was convicted of assaulting his girlfriend in 2013 under Montana Code Annotated section 45-5-206(1)(a), a misdemeanor. In 2018, he was found in possession of three firearms, leading to a federal indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied DeFrance's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the Montana statute could be violated without the use of physical force. DeFrance was subsequently convicted and appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction under Montana's PFMA statute qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The court concluded that because the Montana statute can be violated by inflicting emotional distress rather than physical injury, it does not have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force as required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Consequently, the court held that DeFrance's conviction under the Montana statute does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.The Ninth Circuit reversed DeFrance's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing or other proceedings consistent with their opinion. View "USA V. DEFRANCE" on Justia Law