Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kyle J. Rodney was convicted in Nevada state court of multiple charges, including burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon, and battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. The convictions stemmed from an incident where Rodney and an accomplice attacked and severely injured Ralph Monko after Monko won a significant amount of money at a casino. Monko's injuries were severe, including head trauma and long-term physical and cognitive impairments.Rodney's convictions were affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. He then filed a pro se post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court, which was denied without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. A second post-conviction petition was also denied on procedural grounds. Rodney subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims. The federal district court found these claims procedurally defaulted. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded for the district court to determine if the procedural default could be excused under Martinez v. Ryan, which allows for such an excuse if the IAC claims are substantial.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada, on remand, initially allowed new evidence and discovery but later ruled that it could not consider new evidence due to the Supreme Court's decision in Shinn v. Ramirez. The district court concluded that Rodney's IAC claims were not substantial based on the state-court record alone and denied relief.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Rodney did not fail to develop the state-court record within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) and that the district court erred in limiting its analysis to the state-court record. However, the Ninth Circuit found that even considering the new evidence, Rodney's IAC claims were not substantial. The court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Rodney's trial or sentencing would have been different but for counsel's alleged errors. Thus, the procedural default of Rodney's claims could not be excused, and the denial of his habeas petition was affirmed. View "RODNEY V. GARRETT" on Justia Law

Jesus Ramiro Gomez was sentenced to 188 months in prison for distributing methamphetamine. The district court applied a career offender enhancement, which significantly increased his sentence. This enhancement was based on Gomez's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the district court classified as a "crime of violence."The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially reviewed the case. The court found that Gomez's prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence, thus applying the career offender enhancement. This decision was based on previous rulings that had classified California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) as a crime of violence. Gomez did not object to this classification at the time of sentencing but raised the issue on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated Gomez's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The Ninth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) does not qualify as a crime of violence. The court reasoned that the statute includes reckless uses of force, which do not meet the elements clause of the career offender guideline requiring a mens rea more culpable than recklessness. The court also rejected the government's argument that the conviction could be classified as aggravated assault under the enumerated offenses clause, as this too requires a mens rea greater than extreme recklessness. Consequently, the district court's application of the career offender enhancement was deemed improper. View "USA V. GOMEZ" on Justia Law

Artak Ovsepian participated in a healthcare fraud scheme at Manor Medical Imaging, Inc., a sham clinic in Glendale, California. The clinic generated prescriptions for unnecessary medications, which were billed to Medicare and Medi-Cal. Manor employees used the identifying information of Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries, often without their knowledge, to fill these prescriptions. Ovsepian joined the conspiracy in 2010, managing drivers who transported beneficiaries to pharmacies to fill fraudulent prescriptions.The government charged Ovsepian with conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). At trial, the government narrowed the aggravated identity theft charge to the possession of one victim’s identifying information. The jury found Ovsepian guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 180 months, including a mandatory 24-month sentence for aggravated identity theft. Ovsepian’s direct appeals were unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.Ovsepian filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his aggravated identity theft conviction, arguing actual innocence. The district court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit initially denied a certificate of appealability. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Dubin v. United States, which clarified the interpretation of the aggravated identity theft statute.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Ovsepian’s § 2255 motion. The court held that a petitioner convicted under a divisible statute must demonstrate actual innocence only for the prong under which they were convicted. The court found that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not convey that possession of another’s identifying information must be central to the healthcare fraud to sustain a conviction. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Ovsepian’s conviction and sentence for aggravated identity theft. View "USA V. OVSEPIAN" on Justia Law

Derek Steven Trumbull pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was found with a Glock 17 loaded with a magazine containing seventeen rounds of nine-millimeter ammunition, and he also had two spare magazines. Trumbull had multiple prior felony convictions. He was indicted on federal charges and pled guilty without a plea agreement.The United States District Court for the District of Montana calculated Trumbull’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), which includes an increase for offenses involving a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. The court applied Application Note 2 of the commentary to § 2K2.1, which defines a large capacity magazine as one that can accept more than fifteen rounds. Trumbull objected, arguing that Application Note 2 was an invalid interpretation under Kisor v. Wilkie. The district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to twenty-four months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Application Note 2’s definition of “large capacity magazine” warrants deference under Kisor because the term is ambiguous, the interpretation is reasonable, and it meets the criteria for deference. The court found that the district court did not err in applying § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) as interpreted by Application Note 2 to Trumbull’s base offense level. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "United States v. Trumbull" on Justia Law

In early 2018, the DEA began investigating drug smuggling at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and received a tip implicating Lemack Bellot. Using a confidential source (CS), the DEA conducted a series of recorded meetings and phone calls with Bellot, who indicated he had previously smuggled drugs through the airport. Bellot and the CS agreed on plans to smuggle cocaine through SFO on two occasions, with the CS using fake cocaine provided by the DEA. Bellot advised the CS on how to package the drugs and introduced an associate to assist. The CS successfully smuggled the fake cocaine through airport security both times, paying Bellot fees for his assistance.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged Bellot with two counts of attempting to aid and abet possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Bellot was convicted by a jury on both counts. He then moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury instructions and the evidence presented at trial constructively amended the indictment, effectively convicting him of a different crime than the one for which he was indicted. The district court denied his motion, and Bellot appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Bellot’s conviction. The court held that the indictment was not constructively amended. It explained that whether Bellot was charged with aiding and abetting an attempt to possess cocaine or attempting to aid and abet possession of cocaine, the crime charged remained the same: knowingly attempting to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The court also found that the government’s statements during closing arguments did not alter its theory of the case or constructively amend the indictment. The court concluded that Bellot had sufficient notice of the charges against him and that the jury instructions were appropriate. The conviction was affirmed. View "USA V. BELLOT" on Justia Law

Gail Manney was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which criminalizes making false statements in connection with the acquisition of firearms. On April 21, 2021, Manney visited Hi-Cap Firearms in Reno, Nevada, and selected seven handguns to purchase. She filled out the required ATF Form 4473, certifying she was the actual purchaser. However, after her purchase, a Hi-Cap employee suspected her of being a straw purchaser and contacted the ATF. Upon investigation, ATF Special Agent Joshua Caron found incriminating messages on Manney’s phone indicating she was buying the firearms for her son, Razaaq, a convicted felon prohibited from possessing firearms.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada indicted Manney on May 27, 2021, for making false statements on ATF Form 4473. She was convicted after a jury trial. Manney appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) violated her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was not material under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Manney’s Second Amendment challenge, stating that the Second Amendment does not protect false statements. The court emphasized that § 922(a)(6) regulates false statements made during firearm acquisitions, not the possession of firearms. The court also dismissed Manney’s argument regarding the materiality of her false statement, citing Abramski v. United States, which held that a false statement about the actual purchaser of a firearm is material even if the actual purchaser could legally possess a firearm.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Manney’s conviction, concluding that § 922(a)(6) did not violate her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was material under the statute. View "USA V. MANNEY" on Justia Law

Patrick Neiss was convicted in Montana state court of deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, based on circumstantial evidence. He filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Neiss argued that his trial counsel failed to challenge the particularity of a search warrant, which led to the discovery of silencer-related internet searches on his computer, and that his appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed Neiss’s habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which allows for preliminary screening of habeas petitions. The district court adjudicated the petition on the merits, concluding that Neiss’s trial counsel was not deficient because they had made multiple attempts to suppress the evidence, albeit not on the particularity grounds. The court did not find the petition procedurally defective or frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Rule 4 standard, which is intended to screen out only those petitions that are procedurally defective or frivolous. The court emphasized that Rule 4 does not permit summary dismissal on the merits. The Ninth Circuit found that Neiss’s petition alleged a cognizable, non-frivolous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which should not have been dismissed summarily. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "NEISS V. BLUDWORTH" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. In 1999, she was convicted of possession for sale of methamphetamine in California. In 2015, upon returning from a trip to Mexico, she was detained and later charged with inadmissibility due to her drug conviction. She sought cancellation of removal and later moved to terminate the removal proceedings.The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charges of removability and denied her relief, ordering her removal to Mexico. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), requesting remand to the IJ to pursue derivative U visa status based on her husband's pending U visa application. She also moved for administrative closure of her removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed her appeal and denied both motions, finding it speculative whether she would receive U visa relief and noting the need for an inadmissibility waiver due to her conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motions for remand and administrative closure due to the criminal jurisdiction bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The court found that the petitioner’s motions merged with her final order of removal and that judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. The court also noted that the decision did not disturb the result in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, which requires an agency determination of removability based on a covered conviction for the criminal alien bar to apply. The petition for review was dismissed. View "CORIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes. View "RANA V. JENKINS" on Justia Law

In December 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted Victor Gaspar Chichande and his co-defendants on a small boat near the Galapagos Islands, carrying approximately 1,230 kilograms of cocaine. The defendants attempted to evade capture by throwing items overboard and fleeing, but the Coast Guard disabled their boat. The discarded packages were later found to contain cocaine. Chichande was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute cocaine on a vessel, possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California initially sentenced Chichande to 180 months in prison. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to an error in the district court's analysis of whether Chichande was entitled to a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court had incorrectly compared Chichande to a single average participant rather than the average of all participants in the crime.Upon remand, the district court again denied the minor role reduction, finding that Chichande was not substantially less culpable than the average participant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, clarifying that the district court correctly identified all participants, calculated a rough average level of culpability using the five factors from the Mitigating Role Guideline, and compared Chichande’s culpability to that average. The court also declined to remand for resentencing based on a retroactive amendment for zero criminal history points, noting that Chichande could seek relief through the established protocol in the Southern District of California. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the minor role reduction and affirmed the 180-month sentence. View "USA V. CHICHANDE" on Justia Law