Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In Petitioner’s first Section 2255 motion, which the district court denied, Petitioner, argued that his Section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and sentence were invalid under United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). In the second or successive Section 2255 motion he later sought to file, he again raised a claim that his Section 924(c)(1) conviction and sentence are unlawful under Davis; and he added a claim that under Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), his conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 113(a)(6) and 1153, cannot serve as a predicate crime of violence for his Section 924(c) conviction, because a violation of Section 113(a)(6) can be committed recklessly.   The court held that Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to applications for leave to file second or successive motions under Section 2255. Instead, when faced with an application such as that presented by Jones, the court must ask whether it makes a prima facie showing that the second or successive motion relies on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2255(h)(2). The court explained here, that Petitioner does not make a prima facie showing that either his Davis claim or his Borden claim satisfies this test. Davis was not “previously unavailable,” and Borden did not state a constitutional rule, but rather a statutory one. View "WILLIE JONES, SR. V. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant, who placed Wi-Fi cameras in the eye of a stuffed animal and surreptitiously filmed a teenage girl masturbating, argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he taped the minor surreptitiously and did not cause her “to engage in” sexually explicit conduct. The appeal centered on whether the defendant “used” his minor victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct by taping her in her bedroom, without her knowledge or participation.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a), which criminalizes the conduct of any person who “employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces” a minor “to engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.”   Applying the broad interpretation of Section 2251(a) adopted in United States v. Laursen, 847 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2017), the court wrote that the active conduct that is required is that of the perpetrator, not the target of the visual depiction; that the defendant’s placement of hidden cameras in a teenage girl’s bedroom is active conduct in the heartland of a statute criminalizing the production of child pornography; and that the “use” element is satisfied whenever a minor is the subject of the photography. The court concluded that the evidence was, therefore, sufficient under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and (e) to support the conviction for attempting to “use” a minor “to engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct” for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct. View "USA V. LORENZO MENDEZ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued various Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry (“ADCRR”) officials and the Arizona Attorney General (collectively “Defendants”) challenging Defendants’ proposed protocol for his execution. Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting his execution until such time as Defendants can assure the district court that his execution would comply with various federal statutes and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and Plaintiff appealed and filed two motions to stay his execution.   The Ninth Circuit denied the motions because: (1) it deferred to the district court’s finding that Defendants’ accommodations for Plaintiff’s degenerative spinal disease preclude a finding that their lethal injection protocol creates a substantial risk of severe pain; (2) even assuming without deciding that Defendants’ Execution Protocol may give rise to a liberty interest, there is insufficient evidence that Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated; and (3) given that Defendants shall execute Plaintiff by lethal injection, he lacks standing to challenge Defendants’ protocol for execution by lethal gas. View "FRANK ATWOOD V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of forgery under Section 472 for possession of a counterfeit government seal. The Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that this conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude that made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner argued that intent to defraud is not a required element under Section 472, and therefore, his forgery conviction was not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude.   The Ninth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the court held that a forgery under California Penal Code Section 472 is a crime involving moral turpitude.   The court considered the elements of Section 472 and concluded that California law does not support Petitioner’s reading of the statute. The court explained that it is reasonable to read the statutory text as requiring that all the prohibited acts be done “with the intent to defraud another,” and that no California court has held that Section 472 has separate clauses or that the intent-to-defraud element is limited to specific clauses or actions. The court also explained that California caselaw establishes that forgery requires intent to defraud and that California’s pattern jury instructions confirm that conclusion.   Finally, Petitioner contended that his argument to the BIA that his conviction did not render him inadmissible was sufficient to alert the BIA to the relevance of the petty offense exception. The court concluded that the record belied that assertion, noting that the BIA did not read Petitioner’s brief as raising that assertion. View "PEDRO VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant sought to vacate the conviction because he pled guilty without being informed of the mens rea element announced in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Defendant did not challenge the omission of this element in the district court or on direct appeal, his claim is procedurally defaulted, such that the district court may not consider the merits of the claim unless Defendant can overcome the default by showing (1) cause for not raising the error sooner; and (2) prejudice, which means a reasonable probability that Defendant would not have pled guilty had he been properly informed of the elements of the offense   The district court summarily denied the motion without supplementing the record, holding an evidentiary hearing, or making factual findings.  The court held that the district court’s summary denial was erroneous. The court wrote that the district court erred by applying plain-error analysis. Rejecting the Government’s specific arguments, the court held (1) neither the fact that Defendant was sentenced to more than one year in prison nor his acknowledgment at his sentencing hearing that he had been “convicted of felonies,” is conclusive evidence that he would have pled guilty even if he were informed of all of the elements of the offense; and (2) the potential loss of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction is not so great that it alone conclusively establishes that Defendant would have pled guilty to the felon-in-possession count even if he were properly informed of the elements of the offense. View "USA V. JUSTIN WERLE" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a class action filed under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 by individuals who were incarcerated in private immigration detention facilities owned and operated by a for-profit corporation, CoreCivic, Inc. These individuals were detained solely due to their immigration status alleged that the overseers of their private detention facilities forced them to perform labor against their will and without compensation. The inquiry on appeal concerns only whether the district court properly certified three classes of detainees.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying three classes in an action. The court held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in certifying a California Labor Law Class, a California Forced Labor Class, and a National Forced Labor Class. The court held that, as to the California Forced Labor Class, Plaintiffs submitted sufficient proof of a class-wide policy of forced labor to establish commonality. Plaintiff established predominance because the claims of the class members all depended on common questions of law and fact. The court agreed with the district court that narrowing the California Forced Labor Class based on the California TVPA’s statute of limitations was not required at the class certification stage.   The court held that, as to the National Forced Labor Class, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs presented significant proof of a class-wide policy of forced labor. As to the California Labor Law Class, the court held that Plaintiffs established that damages were capable of measurement on a class-wide basis. View "SYLVESTER OWINO V. CORECIVIC, INC." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s original life sentence in 1998. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (holding that Miller’s rule applied retroactively on collateral review), Defendant was resentenced to LWOP in 2016. Defendant argued relying on the now-vacated en banc decision, Briones I, that the resentencing record does not reflect that the district court meaningfully engaged in Miller’s central inquiry, namely, identifying those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. The Ninth Circuit wrote that Jones made altogether clear that—irrespective of any seemingly contrary language in Miller or Montgomery— permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion for juvenile LWOP. The court held that Defendant waived his argument that a requirement of meaningful engagement with Miller’s central inquiry comes from this court’s cases interpreting the federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 3553, as to which Jones is irrelevant. The court rejected Defendant’s argument that Briones II vacated his LWOP sentence for a second, independent reason—namely, that the district court may not have understood it was allowed to meaningfully consider evidence of his post-conviction rehabilitation. The court held that Defendant waived his as-applied challenge to the substantive proportionality of his sentence, and wrote that all relevant factors militate against exercising discretion to consider the merits of Defendant’s otherwise waived substantive disproportionality arguments. View "USA V. RILEY BRIONES, JR." on Justia Law

Petitioner was found guilty of kidnapping and first-degree felony murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that his 1975 California conviction could not be used as an aggravating circumstance under section 13–703(F)(1) of the later-revised Arizona Revised Statutes. He also argued that the use of section 13–703(F)(1) violated his Eighth Amendment rights (this is referred to as the “Eighth Amendment claim”). The Arizona Supreme Court rejected these claims and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s March 2012 opinion in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the district court allowed Petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of its prior dismissal of his ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel claim as procedurally barred. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion to seek leave to file a second or successive habeas motion. The court held that Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed petition meets the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)(B). The court reasoned that because Sawyer provides no equitable exception to Section 2244(b)(2)(B)’s requirements, and because Petitioner does not assert that his first claim otherwise meets those requirements, Petitioner’s first claim does not make a prima facie showing that it meets the requirements for an exception to the bar on second or successive petitions. Finally, Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing in support of his freestanding actual innocence claim. View "FRANK ATWOOD V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged excessive force after being shot by a correctional officer during an incident that occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at California’s San Quentin State Prison. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint against Defendant Clawson for failure to state a claim and because Plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) before he filed his original complaint. The district court agreed that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim against Defendant at the time he filed his original complaint and dismissed the third amended complaint for lack of exhaustion under the PLRA.   The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred and reversed the district court’s dismissal.  The court clarified the underlying principle in Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2017). Jackson made clear that the PLRA does not supplant or modify Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Rule 15 allows plaintiffs, regardless of their incarceration status, to supplement pleadings with leave of court “even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense.” A prisoner who has fully complied with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement need not file an entirely new federal case simply because he had not exhausted when he filed his original federal complaint. The parties agreed that Plaintiff had fully exhausted by the time he filed his third amended complaint, which the district court deemed the “operative complaint.” Plaintiff’s operative third amended complaint was the only relevant pleading for purposes of the PLRA exhaustion analysis. View "SHIKEB SADDOZAI V. RON DAVIS" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of distributing and receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A. He challenged the sentences imposed. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not err in applying the enhancement and did not err in assessing a fine of $5,000 for each of Defendants two counts of conviction.   The court reasoned that to be eligible for a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), which applies to offenders who distribute child pornography “in exchange for any valuable consideration,” Defendant need not actually receive the valuable consideration.   Further, the court held that the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3014(a), mandates a $5,000 assessment for each of a defendant’s counts of conviction—not a single assessment per defendant in the case. The court explained that Section 3014(a) works in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. Section 3013, to which Section 3014 is closely related in terms of text, purpose, and statutory structure; and observed that every circuit court has interpreted Section 3013’s assessment on a person “convicted of an offense” to apply separately to each count of conviction rather than to each offender. The panel wrote that the ordinary meaning of Section 3014’s “convicted of an offense” also supports a separate assessment per conviction. View "USA V. DUSTIN RANDALL" on Justia Law