Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Ceja’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine in the amount of at least 50 grams, distribution of methamphetamine in the amount of at least five grams, and distribution of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school.Ceja’s oral jury trial waiver was valid, although the district court did not inform him that he could take part in jury selection or that the jurors would be members of his community. The colloquy was adequate to ensure that Ceja knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his trial. Because the jury trial waiver was conducted orally through a court interpreter, Ceja’s language skills were not a barrier; there is no evidence that Ceja suffers from emotional or cognitive disabilities.Upholding the denial of Ceja’s motion for substitute counsel, the court held that, given the colloquy's subject matter (dissatisfaction with Ceja's counsel’s suggested outcomes), the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarizing its ruling using the language of “inadequacy” rather than “conflict.” The court’s inquiry, though brief, was adequate to discern Ceja’s complaints. A rational trier of fact viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government could find that Ceja distributed 50 grams of methamphetamine in one distribution beyond a reasonable doubt. Upholding the application of the career offender sentencing enhancement, the court reasoned that California’s definition of methamphetamine is a categorical match to the definition under federal law. View "United States v. Ceja" on Justia Law

The government accused Orrock of tax evasion for concealing income he received from the sale of a vacant lot that he controlled. Rather than report the sale proceeds on his personal tax return, Orrock belatedly disclosed the sale in the tax return for a partnership that he also controlled. In that return, he significantly underreported the sale proceeds.The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction for evading the assessment of taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7201, rejecting Orrock’s argument that the statute of limitations barred his conviction because it ran from the date he filed his false personal tax return, not from the later act of filing the partnership return. Acknowledging that some language in precedent may seemingly support that argument, the court clarified that the statute of limitations for evasion of assessment cases under section 7201 runs from the last act necessary to complete the offense, either a tax deficiency or the last affirmative act of evasion, whichever is later. The court aligned evasion of assessment cases with evasion of payment cases and joined all the other circuit courts that have addressed the issue. The indictment was filed within six years of Orrock’s last affirmative act of evasion, the filing of the partnership tax return, and was timely. View "United States v. Orrock" on Justia Law

In an action brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the district court entered an injunction, requiring Nevada prison officials to allow the plaintiff to possess no more than a half-ounce of scented oil in his cell for personal use with his prayers.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Noting RLUIPA's expansive protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that Nevada’s regulation banning personal possession of scented oil substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise and that Nevada failed to show that the regulation was the least restrictive means of serving compelling interests in general prison security and minimizing contraband. The plain language of RLUIPA prohibits courts from evaluating the centrality of a religious practice or belief, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5(7)(A); a court can only scrutinize the sincerity of the prisoner’s beliefs. The court, therefore, rejected assertions that scented oil was not “really that important” to the plaintiff’s worship practice or that plaintiff needed to point to textual support or oral history proving that the Prophet Mohammad used scented oil in prayer. The court noted that the regulation prohibited the plaintiff from using scented oil for prayer—the way the plaintiff believes the Prophet Muhammed prayed—for 34 out of his 35 prayers per week. View "Johnson v. Baker" on Justia Law

King ran a heroin distribution ring focusing on San Francisco housing projects in 1976-1980. King was convicted of first-degree murder and firearms crimes in California state court in 1981 and was sentenced to serve 27 years to life in prison. Later that year, King was convicted of federal drug trafficking crimes and was sentenced to 45 years of incarceration in 1982. King began serving his federal sentence in 2019 after completing his separate California sentence.Shortly thereafter, King directly filed a motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), arguing that compassionate release was appropriate because he is 77 years old, highly vulnerable to COVID-19 while incarcerated, and has a wife who is struggling with cancer. The district court denied this motion as procedurally improper because it had been filed by King. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Inmates who committed crimes before November 1, 1987, cannot move for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1) but are instead subject to the Sentencing Reform Act and can gain compassionate release only if the Bureau of Prisons requests it on the prisoner’s behalf under 18 U.S.C. 4205(g). View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for possession of device making equipment (18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4)), possession of at least fifteen unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3)), aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1)), and possession of stolen mail (18 U.S.C. 1708). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in an identity theft and mail fraud scheme.The panel agreed with defendant that "intent to defraud" is an intent to deceive and cheat—an intent to deprive the victim of money or property by deception. The panel explained that the plain and ordinary meaning of "intent to defraud" under section 1029(a)(3) and (4) is the intent to deprive the victim of money or property by deception. However, given the overwhelming evidence that defendant had the intent to cheat his victims, the panel concluded that the instructional error was harmless. The panel also concluded that defendant's remaining contentions are either meritless or unsupported. View "United States v. Saini" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the confiscation of his mail violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The panel concluded that genuine issues of material fact exist both as to whether the Arizona Department of Corrections applied its order inconsistently as to the CDs, in violation of plaintiff's free speech rights, and whether the exclusion of his Nation of Islam texts substantially burdened his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Slade" on Justia Law

Flucas sexually abused his daughters and other minors in his household over several years and was the father of numerous children from his own daughters. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his convictions for transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), and transportation of an individual with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity Section 2421(a). The court rejected Flucas’s arguments that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that he could be convicted of transporting an individual for criminal sexual activity if criminal sexual activity was a motivating purpose of the transportation and that the court was required to instruct the jury that criminal sexual activity must be the dominant purpose in order to establish the requisite intent. The district court properly stated that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a dominant, significant, or motivating purpose of the transportation of the defendant’s victims was to engage in criminal sexual activity. A non-retroactive amendment to 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), a statute under which Flucas was not charged, does not undermine the consistent precedent throughout the circuits rejecting the “dominant purpose” mens rea. View "United States v. Flucas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied consolidated applications for permission to file second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions. The applicants pleaded guilty to use of a weapon in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c).The panel found that the applicants were convicted of armed bank robbery, that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under the still valid "elements clause" of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A), and that aiding and abetting a crime of violence is also a crime of violence. The panel also found that the applicants have not met the requirements for filing a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because, under Ninth Circuit precedent, their claim does not "rely on" a new rule of constitutional law. View "Young v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1982, Sanders was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Sanders’s attorney, Hoover, had never represented a capital defendant before and conducted a minimal penalty phase investigation. Sanders told Hoover that he viewed a life without parole (LWOP) sentence as unacceptable and that he did not want Hoover to present a penalty defense. Hoover presented no evidence and made no argument during the penalty phase.The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief and remanded for a penalty phase trial. Hoover performed deficiently by failing to perform even a rudimentary investigation into Sanders’s social history, failing to obtain reasonably available records, and failing to ensure that Sanders’s decision to forego a penalty phase defense was informed and knowing. Hoover failed to adequately advise Sanders about the penalty phase. There is a reasonable likelihood that Sanders would have changed his mind had Hoover informed and advised him about the penalty phase, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one juror would have changed her mind and voted to impose an LWOP sentence. View "Sanders v. Davis" on Justia Law

After attempting without success to raise her concerns about unsafe medical practices with her employer (ENTA), Armstrong filed a complaint with the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NOSHA). Armstrong alleges that ENTA retaliated against her, leading her to file a second complaint. When Armstrong withdrew her complaint before ENTA learned of it, fearing further retaliation, NOSHA notified ENTA about the complaint. More retaliation followed. When she filed a third whistleblowing complaint, NOSHA ended the investigation. ENTA fired Armstrong.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Armstrong’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 procedural due process claim. Although Armstrong was an at-will employee, Nevada's whistleblower protections can support a property interest in continued employment. Armstrong might be able to plausibly allege a relationship between Nevada officials and her termination sufficient to sustain a “direct participation” or “setting in motion” theory. Armstrong had a property right in the investigation of her complaint; she plausibly alleged that the process she received was essentially nonexistent. Armstrong did not sufficiently allege a substantive due process claim based on a liberty interest. Armstrong did not plausibly allege that the defendants’ actions entirely precluded Armstrong’s ability to work as a human resources professional elsewhere. The court erred in dismissing a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. View "Armstrong v. Reynolds" on Justia Law