Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, Langley pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to time served and 10 years of supervised release. As required by 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), the conditions of Langley’s supervised release included that he “not commit [a] federal, state or local crime,” “not illegally possess a controlled substance,” and “refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.” In 2017, Langley unsuccessfully sought amendment of the conditions of supervised release to permit him to use medical marijuana as allowed by California state law, to alleviate pain stemming from the amputation of his lower leg. Langley renewed the motion in 2020. Langley, who submitted a physician's opinion that marijuana was the best medical solution for his pain issues, argued that he has a fundamental Due Process Clause right to use medical marijuana.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Langley’s renewed motion. The court held that it is bound by precedent that rejected the identical substantive due process claim. Even if state laws decriminalizing marijuana could constitute additional evidence under the test for determining whether a right is protected by the Due Process Clause, the court concluded that it is bound by its 2007 decision until it is overturned by a higher authority. View "United States v. Langley." on Justia Law

Officers stopped a Cadillac with an expired registration. Jenkins, a passenger, showed no signs of distress. When the officers discovered that Jenkins was subject to an arrest warrant, they handcuffed her and put her in a cruiser, where Jenkins vomited. Officers called for paramedics and asked Jenkins if she was detoxing. Jenkins responded: “No … I’m pregnant.” The call for paramedics was then canceled. During transport, Jenkins groaned and screamed for help. After fingerprinting Jenkins at the police station, officers returned her to the cruiser. Several minutes later they found her unconscious, called for paramedics, and began CPR. Jenkins fell into a coma and died nine days later.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit. The district court validly exercised its discretion in choosing to review a bodycam video that was incorporated by reference into the amended complaint and did not assign the video too much weight. The complaint did not plausibly allege that any city policy or custom “was the moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violations but suggested that that the moving force was the officers’ failure to heed their training. The complaint failed to establish either objective unreasonableness or objective deliberate indifference by individual officers. The alleged violative nature of their conduct, in failing to recognize and respond to Jenkins’ serious medical need, was not clearly established in the specific context of this case, so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "J. J. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2002, Munoz digitally penetrated his daughter. He later pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14, acknowledging that “the Court will include as part of [his] sentence . . . lifetime supervision.” A Nevada state court sentenced Munoz to 48–144 months’ imprisonment, required him to register as a sex offender, and imposed a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Munoz filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the lifetime supervision under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The lifetime supervision consists of a $30 monthly fee to defray the costs of his supervision; electronic monitoring; and a requirement that Munoz may reside only at a residence approved by his parole officer, and that he keep his parole officer informed of his current address.The Ninth Circuit vacated the denial of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The conditions, individually and collectively, do not severely and immediately restrain Munoz’s physical liberty, so Munoz is not challenging his “custody,” and his claims are not cognizable in federal habeas. On remand, the district court may determine whether to allow Munoz to file an amended habeas petition that could secure jurisdiction or consider whether it would be appropriate to construe Munoz’s habeas petition to plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Mounoz v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at Mule Creek State Prison, asserted that he was physically and sexually assaulted in March 2016 and filed a grievance in March 2016, which prison officials failed to process. He submitted a second grievance in May 2016 concerning subsequent events, but referring to the March assaults. The district court reasoned that because the March assaults were mentioned in the May grievance which was pending when the plaintiff filed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, an avenue of administrative relief remained open and the plaintiff could not be excused from exhausting the March grievance.The Ninth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of the suit. The prison’s failure to respond to the March grievance rendered the administrative appeals process “unavailable” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e. Where inmates take reasonably appropriate steps to exhaust but are precluded from doing so by a prison’s erroneous failure to process the grievance, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. A later-filed grievance that alleges new complaints but refers to a previous, already exhausted grievance for context does not render the first grievance unexhausted. Because the May grievance was still pending when the complaint was filed, the district court properly deemed that grievance unexhausted. View "Fordley v. Lizarraga" on Justia Law

In 2007-2011, the Department of Justice and the FBI issued press releases disclosing Appellant’s role in the mortgage fraud crimes with which he and his co-conspirators were charged. The press releases included Appellant’s name, age, and the charges against him, and some limited employment history. The notices remain publicly available on the DOJ and FBI websitesThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s action alleging that the continued online public availability of the government’s press releases relating to Appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing violated his statutory and constitutional rights. Appellant’s Privacy Act claim was barred by the Act’s two-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a cause of action arises; while information may be repeatedly accessed after publication, the “single publication rule” provides that the limitations period runs only from the date of original dissemination. The court declined to apply equitable tolling. While individuals may have a constitutional privacy interest in certain, highly sensitive information, Appellant did not have such an interest in the information at issue. Rejecting an Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" claim, the court held that the district court applied the correct test in determining whether the press releases were punitive in purpose or effect. View "Doe v. Garland" on Justia Law

Prasad owned and operated Maremarks, through which he filed petitions seeking H-1B status for nonimmigrant, foreign workers in specialty occupations to come to the U.S. as Maremarks’ employees performing work for Maremarks’ clients. Prasad falsely represented in the H-1B petitions that there were specific, bona fide positions available for the H-1B beneficiaries. Prasad was convicted of 21 counts of visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court ordered forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(6)(A)(ii): $1,193,440.87.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Prasad’s argument that he did not “obtain” the entire $1,193,440.87 because he eventually paid portions of the money to the H1B beneficiaries. Prasad possessed the full $1,193,440.87 paid by the end-clients and had control over the money before he paid a percentage of it to employees. Considering the term “proceeds” in the context of the forfeiture statute, the statute’s punitive purpose, and its prior construction of virtually identical criminal forfeiture provisions, the court concluded that the term extends to receipts and is not limited to profit. Although the H-1B beneficiary employees performed legitimate work for end-clients, the portions of the money that Maremarks received for that work and subsequently paid to the beneficiary employees was, nonetheless, “obtained directly or indirectly from” Prasad’s unlawful conduct. View "United States v. Prasad" on Justia Law

Ochoa was convicted in a 1988 trial for violent crimes against three female victims, including murder, kidnapping, forcible rape, and assault with a deadly weapon. The California state court imposed the death penalty.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition, first rejecting Ochoa’s “Brady” claim the prosecutor failed to disclose that jailhouse informants told officers that Ramage had implicated himself in the murder. Ochoa argued ineffective assistance during the penalty phase for failure to further investigate the conditions in which Ochoa lived as a child and his family’s history of mental health issues and violence. The court rejected a separate Eighth Amendment argument based on that failure to present additional mitigation evidence.Rejecting “cruel and unusual punishment arguments,” the court stated that no clearly established federal law required the court to instruct the jury as to family sympathy; nothing precluded the jury from considering family sympathy evidence, and the court did not prohibit Ochoa from arguing family sympathy. Precedent barring the admission of a defendant’s suppression hearing testimony as evidence at trial on the issue of guilt does not dictate that suppression hearing statements cannot be considered in proceedings outside the guilt phase or for purposes other than establishing substantive guilt. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include the fact that the penalty phase jury instructions failed to direct the jury that it was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravating circumstances existed and outweighed the mitigating circumstances. View "Ochoa v. Davis" on Justia Law

A border patrol agent found and stopped Rizo-Rizo near the U.S./Mexico border. Rizo-Rizo admitted that he was a citizen of Mexico without appropriate immigration documents. The agent arrested him. Rizo-Rizo was then questioned again, waived his Miranda rights, and confirmed that he was a citizen of Mexico who had just “illegally entered.” Rizo-Rizo was charged with the misdemeanor of attempted illegal entry, 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1), and chose to plead guilty without a plea agreement. The magistrate listed these elements of attempted illegal entry. Defense counsel objected, claiming that “the Defendant ha[d] to know he was an alien” and that the magistrate had improperly omitted an element of the offense. The magistrate overruled the objection. Rizo-Rizo pled guilty and was sentenced to time served.The district court and Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that knowledge of alienage was not an element of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1). The statute describes a regulatory offense and no presumption in favor of scienter applies. View "United States v. Rizo-Rizo" on Justia Law

Tat aided a money-laundering scheme involving cashier’s checks while she managed a bank in San Gabriel, California. She was convicted of conspiring to launder money, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), and two counts of making false entries in the bank’s records, 18 U.S.C. 1005.The Ninth Circuit reversed her conviction on one count of making a false entry, affirmed her conviction on a second count of the same offense, and remanded for resentencing. The reversed conviction was premised on a bank log record stating that Tat’s customer purchased and then returned three cashier’s checks for a sum of $25,000. The record did not contain a literal falsehood and did not contain an omission such that the bank’s records would not indicate the true nature of the transaction; it could not be said that the bank would not have a picture of the bank’s true condition. Accurate records reflecting a customer’s purchase of a cashier’s check from her bank account are not false entries under section 1005 solely because that check has a nexus to money laundering. As to the second count, a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Tat knew the log record on which it was based contained a false entry because it listed a fictitious payee. The panel affirmed Tat’s convictions for conspiring to launder money. View "United States v. Tat" on Justia Law

McGill was sentenced to death in 2004 for the murder of his former housemate, Perez. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McGill’s conviction and sentence and the state trial court denied post-conviction relief.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief, rejecting McGill’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. The post-conviction review court correctly identified and reasonably applied clearly established law in assessing professional norms and evaluating new mitigation evidence, did not apply an unconstitutional causal-nexus test, and did not need to consider the cumulative effect of nonexistent errors. Counsel’s preparation, investigation, and presentation of mitigation evidence was thorough and reasoned. The defense team uncovered a “not insignificant” amount of mitigation evidence that spanned decades of McGill’s life and presented a comprehensive picture to the jury. There is no evidence that counsel failed to uncover any reasonably available mitigation records. The court also rejected McGill’s uncertified claims that counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase by failing to retain an expert arson investigator and that his death sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause in light of Ring v. Arizona, in which the Supreme Court invalidated an Arizona statute that required the sentencing judge—not the jury—“to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.” View "McGill v. Shinn" on Justia Law