Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo was sought for extradition to Mexico to face charges of intentional aggravated homicide. In January 2014, a Mexican judge issued an arrest warrant for Santoyo, alleging he shot a man twice in the head after an argument. Mexico requested his provisional arrest in November 2018, and the United States filed a complaint in August 2021. Santoyo was arrested in May 2022 and released on bail in November 2022. Mexico formally requested his extradition in July 2022, providing various supporting documents. A magistrate judge certified the extradition in February 2023, and Santoyo challenged this certification via a habeas corpus petition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Santoyo's habeas corpus petition. Santoyo argued that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, contending that the delay between the 2014 arrest warrant and the 2022 extradition request violated his speedy trial rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the treaty's "lapse of time" provision referred only to statutes of limitations, not to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the "lapse of time" language in the extradition treaty does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and that the treaty's language refers to statutes of limitations rather than the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court also noted that the judiciary's role in extradition is limited and that issues of delay are more appropriately addressed by the Secretary of State. View "SANTOYO V. BOYDEN" on Justia Law

John Walthall, while awaiting sentencing for a fraud conviction, solicited a fellow inmate to arrange for hit men to murder the judge, investigators, and attorneys involved in his case. The inmate reported Walthall's request to authorities, leading to Walthall's conviction for solicitation to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a). Walthall argued that the evidence was insufficient because he had no direct contact with the hit men, who did not exist.The United States District Court for the Central District of California found Walthall guilty, but the jury was initially unable to reach a verdict. After a retrial, Walthall was convicted, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, citing errors in denying Walthall the right to represent himself. On remand, the district court evaluated Walthall's competency to stand trial and represent himself, ultimately concluding that he was competent to stand trial but not to represent himself due to severe mental illness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Walthall's conviction. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) does not require direct communication with the person solicited or that the person solicited actually exists. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, as Walthall's intent and actions strongly corroborated his intent for someone to commit violence. The court also rejected Walthall's challenges to the jury instructions and the district court's finding that he was incapable of representing himself. The court found no error in the district court's sentencing calculation based on the maximum sentence for soliciting murder. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA V. WALTHALL" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in Nevada, Oak Porcelli was found with over a million dollars in cash, which he claimed was "petty cash" for a non-existent movie production company. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) seized the money, suspecting it was linked to drug trafficking, and the government filed a civil forfeiture complaint.Porcelli filed a claim asserting ownership of the money and moved to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing lack of probable cause. The government served interrogatories under Supplemental Rule G(6) to determine Porcelli's relationship to the money. Porcelli's responses were vague, and despite multiple court orders, he refused to provide more detailed answers. The district court struck his claim and granted the government default judgment of forfeiture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rule G(6) allows the government to seek discovery about a claimant's standing at any time during the litigation, not just at the pleading stage. The court found that Porcelli's standing was reasonably in dispute and that his vague responses to the interrogatories were insufficient. The court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Porcelli's claim for failing to comply with discovery orders. The court emphasized that while the government has the burden to prove the money is subject to forfeiture, claimants must still provide some evidence of their standing.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders, upholding the default judgment of forfeiture against the currency. View "USA V. $1,106,775 IN US CURRENCY" on Justia Law

Triston Harris Steinman was stopped by Nevada State Trooper William Boyer for speeding. During the stop, Boyer observed an ammunition box in Steinman's car and learned that Steinman had a felony conviction. Boyer asked Steinman to exit the vehicle and sit in the patrol car while he ran a criminal history check. Steinman admitted to having ammunition but denied having firearms. Boyer eventually seized the car and obtained a search warrant, leading to the discovery of firearms, ammunition, and other contraband.The District Court for the District of Nevada suppressed the evidence, ruling that Boyer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion and lacked probable cause to seize the vehicle. The court also found the search warrant overbroad and invalid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Boyer did not unlawfully prolong the stop, as his actions were within the scope of the traffic stop's mission and did not measurably extend its duration. The court also found that Boyer had reasonable suspicion of an independent offense after learning of Steinman's felony conviction. Additionally, the court ruled that Boyer had probable cause to seize the vehicle based on evidence of federal and state law violations. The court concluded that the search of the vehicle was permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, despite the overbroad warrant. Thus, the suppression of the evidence was reversed. View "USA V. STEINMAN" on Justia Law

Jackson Daniel Bowers was convicted in 2019 of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and sentenced to 36 months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. In 2023, while on supervised release, Bowers was accused of committing two state crimes: fourth-degree assault and violating a protective order. His probation officer recommended revoking his supervised release. Bowers resolved his state charges by entering a deferral agreement without admitting guilt.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington held a revocation hearing. Bowers requested a jury trial, which the district court denied. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Bowers had committed the alleged violations and revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to nine months imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. Bowers appealed, arguing that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in revocation proceedings, separate from the Sixth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Article III’s jury provision and the Sixth Amendment are equivalent in scope. It found that the history and precedent indicate that the Sixth Amendment was meant to complement, not supersede, Article III. Therefore, a right not triggered by the Sixth Amendment cannot be independently triggered by Article III. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s revocation of Bowers’ supervised release. View "United States V. Bowers" on Justia Law

Philip A. Powers III was convicted of seven misdemeanor counts related to setting three fires in national forests in Arizona. Powers, who was hiking and became lost, set the fires to signal for help. The fires, named the Taylor Fire, the Sycamore Fire, and the Sycamore 2 Fire, caused significant damage, with the Sycamore Fire burning 230 acres and incurring substantial fire suppression costs.The case was first heard by a magistrate judge in a bench trial. Powers admitted to setting the fires but claimed he did so out of necessity, as he was out of food and water, had no cell phone service, and believed his life was in danger. The magistrate judge rejected the necessity defense, finding that Powers was not facing imminent harm when he set the Taylor Fire and that his actions in setting and abandoning the fires were objectively unreasonable. Powers was found guilty on all counts, sentenced to supervised probation, and ordered to pay restitution.Powers appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which affirmed the magistrate judge's decision, agreeing that the necessity defense did not apply. Powers then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit held that Powers did not demonstrate he was facing imminent harm when he set the Taylor Fire and that his actions in setting and abandoning the fires were objectively unreasonable. The court affirmed the magistrate judge's findings and upheld Powers's convictions and the order of restitution. The court emphasized that the necessity defense requires the defendant to act reasonably, which Powers failed to do in this case. View "USA V. POWERS" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh "Sunny" Balwani, founders of Theranos, were convicted of defrauding investors about the capabilities of their company's blood-testing technology. Theranos claimed it could run accurate tests with just a drop of blood, attracting significant investments. However, the technology was unreliable, and the company misled investors about its financial health, partnerships, and the validation of its technology by pharmaceutical companies.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California severed their trials due to Holmes's allegations of abuse by Balwani. Holmes was convicted on four counts related to investor fraud, while Balwani was convicted on all counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud against investors and patients. Holmes was sentenced to 135 months, and Balwani to 155 months in prison. The district court also ordered them to pay $452 million in restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution order. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony from former Theranos employees, even if some of it veered into expert territory. The court found any errors in admitting this testimony to be harmless due to the weight of other evidence against the defendants.The Ninth Circuit also upheld the district court's decision to admit a report from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, finding it relevant to Holmes's knowledge and intent. The court rejected Holmes's argument that the district court violated her Confrontation Clause rights by limiting cross-examination of a former Theranos lab director. Additionally, the court found no merit in Balwani's claims of constructive amendment of the indictment and Napue violations. The court concluded that the district court's factual findings on loss causation and the number of victims were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the restitution order. View "USA V. HOLMES" on Justia Law

Brandon Wade Kurns, a convicted felon, began working at Modern Pawn & Consignment in Helena, Montana, in June 2021, where he sold firearms and ammunition. In July 2021, after an investigation linked stolen gunpowder to the shop, ATF agents searched Modern Pawn and found evidence that Kurns had possessed several firearms. Kurns was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the District of Montana sentenced Kurns to 36 months in prison, applying a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(I) for possessing a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possessing eight or more firearms. Kurns objected, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these enhancements and that the court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his silence during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the evidence, including surveillance footage and ATF transfer forms, supported the finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Kurns possessed a semiautomatic firearm with a large capacity magazine and at least eight firearms. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as there was no indication that the district court drew an adverse inference from Kurns' silence. Additionally, the court declined to consider Kurns' Second Amendment challenge based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, as it was raised for the first time after the completion of appellate briefing. View "USA V. KURNS" on Justia Law

Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Lamar Allen Thompson was convicted of production and possession of child pornography. He had a prior 2016 Washington state conviction for first-degree child molestation. Thompson argued that this prior conviction should not have triggered a 10-year increase to his mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), which increases the mandatory term for production of child pornography if the individual has a prior conviction for certain sexual offenses involving minors.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held that Thompson's 2016 conviction did trigger the 10-year increase, concluding that the Washington statute under which Thompson was convicted relates to sexual abuse of a minor. Additionally, Thompson requested the district court to recommend that his federal sentence run concurrently with anticipated state sentences. The district court declined to make any recommendation, noting that the decision would ultimately be up to the state courts. Thompson did not object to this decision at the time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Washington Revised Code § 9A.44.083, under which Thompson was convicted, either categorically matches or relates to the predicate generic offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), thus triggering the mandatory minimum sentence increase. The court also found that the district court did not plainly err in declining to recommend whether Thompson's federal sentence should run concurrently with anticipated state sentences, as there was no controlling authority requiring the district court to make such a recommendation.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Thompson's 28-year term of imprisonment. View "USA v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law