Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joshua Shuemake, a correctional officer, was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a no-contact order following an alleged assault on his former girlfriend. Despite this, he borrowed a handgun from his friend and co-worker, Luke Ulavale, to continue his private security job. The FBI, suspecting non-compliance with the order, searched Shuemake's residence and found two firearms, one of which was registered to Ulavale and had Shuemake's DNA on it. Ulavale initially lied to the FBI, claiming another friend had the gun, but later admitted under oath that he lent it to Shuemake and that they concocted a false story.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington admitted Ulavale's grand jury testimony after he claimed memory loss at trial. Shuemake was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and obstruction of justice. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting Ulavale's grand jury testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under the prior inconsistent statement rule, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), a district court can admit an earlier sworn statement if a witness on the stand contradicts that statement. The court found that dubious claims of memory loss, as shown by inexplicable claims of faulty memory or evasive testimony, may be treated as inconsistencies under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). The court concluded that Ulavale's feigned memory loss made Rule 801(d)(1)(A) applicable and affirmed Shuemake's conviction for obstruction of justice. View "USA V. SHUEMAKE" on Justia Law

Steven Catlin, a California state prisoner, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his 1990 conviction for the murders of his fourth wife, Joyce Catlin, and his adoptive mother, Martha Catlin, as well as his death sentence. Catlin was convicted of murdering three family members with paraquat, a poisonous herbicide. The habeas petition in this case relates to his convictions for the murders of Joyce and Martha and the death sentence for Martha’s murder.The California Supreme Court (CSC) summarily denied Catlin’s first state habeas petition on the merits in 2007 and rejected his second state habeas petition in 2013 as procedurally barred. The district court denied Catlin’s federal habeas petition and his motion for discovery and evidentiary development in 2019, granting a certificate of appealability on several claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Catlin’s claims under the deferential standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Catlin’s habeas petition, concluding that the CSC reasonably rejected Catlin’s claims. The court held that the CSC acted reasonably in rejecting Catlin’s claims of error arising from the state trial judge’s ex parte discussion with a juror, concluding that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of Catlin’s trial, and determining that there was no violation of due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois.The Ninth Circuit also declined to issue a certificate of appealability for Catlin’s uncertified claim that the state violated his due process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence and presenting false evidence. The court found that no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s resolution of this claim. View "CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Vitaliy Chmukh, a native and citizen of Ukraine, came to the United States as a refugee in 2001. In 2017, he was involved in using a stolen vehicle to steal packages from porches, leading to his arrest. He pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle under RCW § 9A.56.068 and possession of heroin under RCW § 69.50.4013. He was sentenced to 43 months for the stolen vehicle charge and 24 months for the controlled substance charge, serving 38 months in total.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Chmukh with removability based on these convictions, alleging that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and that the controlled substance conviction violated the Controlled Substances Act. An immigration judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Chmukh’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it matched the generic federal offense of possession of stolen property, requiring possession, actual knowledge that the property was stolen, and intent to deprive the owner of the property. The court also found that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, barring withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). The court rejected Chmukh’s arguments that the statute was overbroad and that the agency erred in its analysis. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Chmukh’s petition for review. View "CHMUKH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Nathan Wilson and Christopher Beasley were alleged to have set fire to a police car during a protest in Santa Monica, California, following the killing of George Floyd. They were federally indicted on one count of arson. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing they were selectively prosecuted based on perceived anti-government views. Alternatively, they sought discovery on their selective-prosecution claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the motion to dismiss but granted discovery on the selective-prosecution claim. The government indicated it would seek appellate review rather than comply with the discovery order, leading the district court to dismiss the indictment without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which allows for government appeals in criminal cases without requiring final decisions. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by granting discovery based on an erroneous view of the law. The district court had incorrectly defined the control group for determining discriminatory effect, failing to account for relevant factors beyond committing the same crime in the same location.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s selective-prosecution discovery order and the dismissal of the indictment without prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court did not address whether the defendants presented evidence of discriminatory intent. View "USA V. WILSON" on Justia Law

Andrew Hackett, a stock promoter, was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud related to the manipulative trading of a public company's stock. Hackett engaged in a pump-and-dump scheme, promoting the stock of First Harvest (later renamed Arias Intel) and recruiting others to do the same. He used call rooms to solicit investors and artificially inflate the stock price before selling his shares. The scheme was exposed by an FBI informant, leading to Hackett's conviction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Hackett to forty-six months of imprisonment, applying a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) for a loss exceeding $1.5 million. The court calculated an intended loss of $2.2 million based on Hackett's ownership of 550,000 shares and his intent to sell them at four dollars per share. Hackett's counsel objected to the loss calculation but did not argue that intended loss was an improper measure of loss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not plainly err in relying on the guideline commentary defining "loss" as the greater of actual loss or intended loss. The court noted that any error was not clear or obvious given the precedent recognizing both actual and intended loss and the lack of consensus among circuit courts on this issue. The court applied plain error review because Hackett's objection to the loss calculation was not sufficiently specific to preserve de novo review. View "USA V. HACKETT" on Justia Law

Ahmad Abouammo, a former employee of Twitter, was accused of providing confidential information about dissident Saudi Twitter users to Bader Binasaker, an associate of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In exchange, Abouammo received a luxury wristwatch and substantial payments. A jury convicted Abouammo of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, conspiracy to commit wire and honest services fraud, wire and honest services fraud, international money laundering, and falsification of records to obstruct a federal investigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the initial trial. Abouammo was found guilty on multiple counts, including acting as an unregistered agent and falsifying records. He was sentenced to 42 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and forfeiture of $242,000. Abouammo appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing insufficient evidence, improper venue, and that some charges were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Abouammo’s convictions, holding that sufficient evidence supported his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 951 for acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government. The court found that Abouammo acted under the direction and control of the Saudi government, regardless of whether Binasaker was a foreign "official." The court also rejected Abouammo’s statute of limitations argument, holding that the superseding indictment was timely under 18 U.S.C. § 3288. Additionally, the court held that venue for the falsification of records charge was proper in the Northern District of California, where the obstructed federal investigation was taking place.The Ninth Circuit vacated Abouammo’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed his convictions on all counts. View "USA V. ABOUAMMO" on Justia Law

Dominic Dorsey was convicted of multiple federal crimes related to a series of robberies committed by two disguised men. The evidence at trial included surveillance video footage of the robberies. A police detective, who had extensively reviewed the surveillance video, testified as a lay witness about details in the video that the jury might have missed. The detective also identified Dorsey and his co-defendant, Reginald Bailey, as the disguised robbers based on his comparison of the video footage and still images.The United States District Court for the Central District of California admitted the detective's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which allows lay opinion testimony if it is helpful to determining a fact in issue. The jury found Dorsey guilty on all charges, and he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Dorsey appealed, challenging the admissibility of the detective's identification testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the detective's narrative testimony about the details in the surveillance video was admissible because it helped the jury understand the evidence. However, the court found that the detective's identification of Dorsey and Bailey as the robbers was inadmissible under Rule 701. The court reasoned that the detective's identification opinions were not helpful because they were based on evidence already before the jury, and the detective did not have personal knowledge or experience that would make his identification more reliable than the jury's own assessment.Despite this error, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the admission of the detective's identification testimony was harmless. The court noted that there was overwhelming evidence of Dorsey's guilt, including witness testimony, cell phone records, and other corroborating evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed Dorsey's conviction. View "USA V. DORSEY" on Justia Law

Barry Ray Knight was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography. He frequently downloaded child pornography using a peer-to-peer file-sharing network called BitTorrent. In January 2021, undercover officers downloaded files from Knight’s computer that contained child pornography. A search warrant was executed at Knight’s home, revealing over 3,100 videos and 115,000 still images of child pornography on his electronic devices. Knight was convicted after a bench trial and sentenced to 192 months in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada imposed several conditions of supervised release, including a special condition prohibiting Knight from viewing or possessing any visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct involving children or adults. Knight did not object to this condition at trial but later argued on appeal that it was overbroad, relying on United States v. Cope. The district court also failed to orally pronounce the standard conditions of supervised release during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Knight’s appeal. The court rejected Knight’s argument that the special condition was overbroad, distinguishing it from Cope because it only applied to visual depictions and not to materials describing child pornography. The court found no error in the special condition and concluded that it was not unduly restrictive. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the standard conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of those conditions. The court otherwise affirmed Knight’s conviction and sentence. View "U.S. v. Knight" on Justia Law

Sterling Atkins, the petitioner, was convicted by a Nevada jury of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree kidnapping, and sexual assault, and was sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed all counts except for the sexual assault conviction, which it reversed. Atkins then sought state postconviction relief, which was denied, and subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.In the federal district court, Atkins raised several claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase for failing to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence, and for inadequately preparing a psychological expert. The district court denied these claims, finding that the Nevada Supreme Court's denial was reasonable under AEDPA standards. The court also found that Atkins's claim regarding the psychological expert was procedurally defaulted and that he could not meet the Martinez v. Ryan standard to excuse the default.Atkins also challenged a jury instruction regarding the possibility of parole, arguing it was misleading and that the prosecutor improperly invited the jury to speculate about parole. The district court found this claim unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and Atkins failed to show cause to excuse the default.Atkins sought to expand the certificate of appealability to include claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the guilt phase for failing to investigate his psychological background and a claim that trial counsel had a financial conflict of interest. The court denied these requests, finding that the claims were either procedurally defaulted or lacked merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Atkins's habeas petition and denied his request to expand the certificate of appealability. The court held that the Nevada Supreme Court reasonably denied Atkins's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Atkins failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural defaults of his other claims. View "ATKINS V. BEAN" on Justia Law

Charles Porter, a Yosemite National Park employee, was charged with various sexual assault offenses after attempting to anally rape T.D., another male park employee, in April 2020. T.D. testified that Porter, heavily intoxicated, forced himself on T.D. in his cabin. Neighbors corroborated T.D.'s account. Porter claimed T.D. was the aggressor. The district court allowed testimony from Porter’s ex-girlfriend, A.H., under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which permits evidence of prior sexual assaults. A.H. testified that Porter had previously engaged in nonconsensual sex with her.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California admitted A.H.'s testimony after evaluating its probative value against potential prejudice under Rule 403. The jury found Porter guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 148 months in prison. Porter appealed, arguing that Rule 413 violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by allowing propensity evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rule 413 is constitutional, referencing its decision in United States v. Lemay, which upheld the analogous Rule 414 for child molestation cases. The court emphasized that Rule 413, like Rule 414, is subject to Rule 403, which allows district courts to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence. The court found that the district court had properly applied Rule 403 and provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding A.H.'s testimony.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Porter’s conviction, concluding that the admission of A.H.'s testimony under Rule 413 did not violate due process. View "U.S. v. Porter" on Justia Law